WHAT NEW FIXED WING SEARCH AND RESCUE AIRCRAFT MEAN FOR THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

On December 8^th of this year, Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan, Public Services and Procurement Minister Judy Foote, and RCAF Commander, LGen Michael Hood announced that the Airbus C-295W is the winning Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue (FWSAR) Aircraft Replacement Project candidate.

From the outset this has always been seen as a contest between the C-295 and the Alenia C-27J Spartan.

During the course of the project and following the report of the National Research Council on the FWSAR Project Statement of Requirements it was decided that rear ramps were a necessity for the successful deployment of SAR Techs and the safe loading of stretcher cases. It can also be argued that the desire for ramps also reflected the FWSAR aircraft's secondary role as tactical transports.

It was widely believed that the C-27J was the RCAF preference, based on a degree of commonality with the in-service CC-130J Hercules and it should be noted, the perception that the Spartan had greater utility as a military transport.

There is no question that the chosen aircraft, the C-295W will be a capable aircraft for Search and Rescue purposes. Equally there is no question that the government has opted for a status-quo response to whole issue of  Search and Rescue and that there is no thought of changing our current Search and Rescue system or of tasking some other government agency with the role.

In the past it was assumed that the RCAF could use its assets, specifically fixed wing aircraft, to aid in Search and Rescue while at the same time maintain a fleet of transports with military utility. In choosing an aircraft for this role that has a lesser military utility the government and the Air Force have signalled that this is no longer the case.

To a certain extent, the tail now wags the dog. While the government should be congratulated for making a decision, any decision, on the FWSAR file, the choice they have made reflects a troubling development.

 In the “Summary Report – The Evaluation of Options for the Replacement of the CF-18 Fighter Fleet” provided by DND the department makes the unusual claim that “Canadian engagement in future state-on-state conflicts will be highly unlikely”. Far more likely, according to this report are military engagements that are not clearly defined and that can choose to take part in “on a case-by-case basis”. They believe that not only will the Government “not be obliged to undertake such a mission” but that “the Government has choices regarding the type, degree and duration of Canada's involvement in, and contribution to, an expeditionary mission.”

Rather than trying to determine what are the threats to Canadian security  and trying to decide how those threats can best be met, within an affordable economic framework, the department has decided that the above description of use of military force as being at the governments discretion means that “The capability-based planning process for the Canadian Armed Forces uses these considerations when deciding what type of capability, if any, is required.”

“What type of capability, if any, is required” appears to be the guiding sentiment behind the choice of the C-295W. While it may be a perfectly good SAR aircraft, it’s more limited utility as a military transport means that using it to replace DHC-5 Buffalo and C-130 Hercules aircraft means that Canada will have less strictly military strength after this project is completed then we did before.

The fond belief that we will always be able to pick and choose our military engagements flies in the face of everything we know of history and common sense.  In the long run, equipping our Armed Forces based on this fallacious belief is a mistake that will be paid for in both treasure and the lives of our service people.

Summary Report – The Evaluation of Options for the Replacement of the CF-18 Fighter Fleet

http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/air/snac-nfps/eorfcf18-eorcf18ff-eng.html

THE CHOICE BETWEEN AIR LIFT AND SEARCH AND RESCUE

There is a fundamental disconnect at the heart of the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue program which may explain some of the problems the government and Armed Forces are experiencing as they try to procure new aircraft.

It is the self described role of the Royal Canadian Air Force to “support the Government of Canada in fulfilling the Canadian Armed Forces’ three key defence roles: defending Canada by delivering excellence at home, defending North America by being a strong, reliable and credible defence partner with the United States in the defence of the continent, and contributing to international peace and security by projecting leadership abroad.”

The RCAF further describes its mission as “providing the Canadian Forces with relevant, responsive and effective airpower to meet the defence challenges of today and into the future” and its vision as “An agile and integrated air force with the reach and power essential for Canadian Forces operations.”

In short, the RCAF is a military organization whose job it is to provide military forces for the use of the Canadian people. The traditional military roles of an Air Force are reconnaissance (often referred to as ISR-Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), dropping or threatening to drop, bombs on people who don’t do what we want, deterring others from dropping bombs on us and moving militarily useful articles by air.

Most other Air Force jobs are subsets of the above or support for them. None of these strictly military roles include a National Search and Rescue function.

In Canada search and rescue was not considered to be a military responsibility until 1949 when both the Royal Canadian Air Force and aircraft of the Royal Canadian Navy began to task resources for SAR operations. Unification in 1968 formed the Canadian Forces, at which time SAR operations were divided between Maritime Command and Force Mobile Command. After the Canadian Forces Air Command (now RCAF) was created in 1975 that SAR responsibility was transferred to that command.

Created in 1986 the National Search andRescue Secretariat is responsible for the management and coordination of the National Search and Rescue Program and works with all levels of government, police and emergency services to manage and improve search and rescue activities throughout Canada. It is in theory an autonomous arm’s length organization within the Department of National Defence; however it is accountable to the Lead Minister for Search and Rescue, who just happens to be the Minister of National Defence.

The primary SAR responsibility of the Canadian Armed Forces is the provision of aeronautical SAR and the coordination of the aeronautical and maritime SAR system. The CAF have the primary responsibility for the provision of aeronautical SAR services. It is also responsible for the effective operation of this coordinated aeronautical and maritime SAR system, which means the control and conduct of aeronautical SAR and coordination of maritime SAR operations in the Canadian area of responsibility, liaison with other SAR operating departments and agencies, nationally and internationally and the oversight of annual coordinating activities between the CAF and CCG, and regional SAR staffs.

Currently the RCAF devotes significant resources to the Search and Rescue role. As well as providing personal for the three Joint Rescue Coordination Centres, RCAF wings, based across Canada, provide military air resources in response to approximately 1,000 annual SAR taskings.

Canadian Forces Search and Rescue resources are mostly in the form of squadrons of dedicated SAR aircraft located at bases across the country supported by 750 personnel, which includes ground crew, air crew, and 150 Search and Rescue Technicians (SAR Techs). Dedicated aircraft include CH-149 Cormorants, CH-146 Griffons, CC-130 Hercules and CC-115 Buffalos. They can be joined by almost any other aircraft in the Air Force inventory as needed.

When the Armed Forces were first tasked to provide SAR assets they had a lot of assets. It was not a great stretch for an organization with a large number of aircraft to use some of them for SAR. This is no longer the case.

As it stands now, in the near future after the retirement of our ‘legacy’ Hercules aircraft and the DHC-5 Buffalos Canada’s fixed wing military transport fleet will essentially consist of five CC-150 Polaris transports, four CC-177 Globemaster III strategic transports, seventeen C-130J-30s Hercules tactical transports and of course four CC-138 Twin Otters. Does anyone really believe that this is sufficient transport to provide “an agile and integrated air force with the reach and power essential for Canadian Forces operations.”?

The kinds of aircraft used for SAR have been in the past the same kind of aircraft used for transport functions. Aircraft whose primary purpose is moving military goods can be used for Search and Rescue. Contrarily aircraft primarily designed for SAR are not necessarily as good at moving military supplies.

While it makes sense for the RCAF to increase its’ budget and the number of aircraft it can devote to military activities by taking on a Search and Rescue function, it makes no sense for the service to spend money and acquire assets for non military purposes. 

The Department of National Defence has indicated that new SAR aircraft will be primarily for that task, with only secondary use as transports. At some point it would appear that the tail has started to wag the dog.

Canadian Defence Matters has commented at length on the issue of Search and Rescue procurement and has in the past advocated the direct purchase of suitably modified Bombardier Dash 8 aircraft to meet the need. This is the correct answer to the problem of increasing Search and Rescue capabilities.

However the problem is that Canada also needs more military airlift, it is the role of the Air Force to provide it and Dash 8s, or some other kind of similar aircraft, will not do it. When Search and Rescue begins to detract from, rather then add to, Air Force capabilities it is time to reassess priorities and roles. 

We are now being asked to make a choice between having adequate Search and Rescue and having an adequate Air Force. If Canada wishes to have a comprehensive Search and Rescue service they should pay for it. If they wish to have useful and efficient Armed Forces they will have to pay for that as well.

Royal Canadian Air Force

http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/index.page

Mission and Vision

http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/index.page

National Search and Rescue Secretariat

http://www.nss-snrs.gc.ca/en/about.page

Search and Rescue Canada

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america-current/sar-canada.page

FWSAR

http://jgmjgm516.blogspot.ca/search/label/FWSAR

DASH 8 FOR FIXED WING SEARCH AND RESCUE, NOW

 

Although there are a number of candidates for the title,” Worst DND Procurement Ever”, the attempt to replace Canada’s fixed wing search and rescue assets must surely rank as first among equals. Canadian Defence Matters has written about this debacle before, but it deserves to be revisited.


The effort to renew Canada’s search-and-rescue fixed wing aircraft fleet began under Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government in 2002; the 2004 federal budget provided the necessary funds and promised new planes “within 12 to 18 months.” The Conservative government under Steven Harper closed the procurement office for search-and-rescue planes in favour of other projects. 

Since then the project has stalled over the Air Forces attempt, under an ACAN bid, to acquire the C-27J Spartan. An ACAN bid essentially picks the desired aircraft and then invites other competitors to make an offer. To date, ACAN experience is that the requirements are explicitly written to exclude many competitive choices. ACAN bids by other manufacturers are generally a waste of time. Complaints by Industry Canada led to the rejection of the original proposal. Even after Public Works became involved in the procurement process the program has drifted.



Canada must have adequate search and rescue aircraft, it is the 2nd-largest country in the world in terms of square area. Its ocean borders to the east, west and north expand its required coverage into large and hostile environments. Each year, the Joint Rescue Coordination Centers handle an average of more then 8,000 air and marine SAR cases, and Canadian Forces SAR aircraft conduct well over 1,000 missions per year

JRCCs are staffed by a combination of coast Guard and Canadian Forces personnel, and are currently located in Halifax, Trenton, and Victoria. The SAR crews and aircraft are based in Gander, with CH-149 Cormorant helicopters, Greenwood, with CH-149 Cormorants and CC-130 Hercules aircraft, Trenton, with CH-146 Griffon helicopters and CC-130 Hercules air, Winnipeg with CC-130 Hercules and Comox, with CH-149 Cormorants and DHC-5/ CC-115 Buffalo fixed-wing aircraft.

These are supplemented as required by Canadian Forces’ Griffon helicopters in Goose Bay, Bagotville, and Cold Lake, and by a small arctic fleet of 4 CC-138 Twin Otter aircraft based in Yellowknife.

The early model Hercules and aging Buffalos that makes up the fixed wing portion of this fleet are in desperate need of renewal. What is needed is an immediate purchase of Bombardier Dash 8 aircraft, suitably modified for the search and rescue mission.
As the table below illustrates, there is little difference between the candidate aircraft in terms of performance.

Specifications	Bombardier Dash 8 Series 400	Alenia C-27J Spartan	EADS CASA C-295M
Overall length	107 ft 8 in (32.81 m)	74 ft 6 in  (22.7 m)	80 ft 3 in  (24.50 m)
Height	27 ft 3 in (8.3 m)	31 ft 8 in ( 9.64 m)	28 ft 3 in (8.60 m)
Maximum cabin width	8 ft 3 in (2.51 m)	8 ft .5 in (2.45 m)	8 ft 11 in (2.70 m)
Cabin length	61 ft 8 in (18.8 m)	28.15 ft (8.58 m)	41 ft 6 in (12.70 m)
Wingspan	93 ft 2 in (28.4 m)	94 ft 2 in (28.7 m)	84 ft 8 in (25.81 m)
Engines	2xP&W 150A 5071 HP (3,782kW) each	2×R-R AE2100D2A  4,640 HP (3,460 kW) each	2×P&W  127G 2,645 hp (1,972 kW) each
Cruise speed	414 mph (667 km/h) 360 kt	362 mph (583 km/h) 315 kt	300 mph (480 km/h) 260 kt
Maximum altitude	27,000 ft (8,230 m)	30,000 ft  (9,144 m)	25,000 ft  9,100 m
Range *	1,610 miles (2,591 km)	1,151 miles (1,852 km)	828 miles  (1,300 km)
Takeoff run at MTOW	3,150 ft (960 m)	1,903 ft (580 m)	2,200 ft (670 m)
Maximum takeoff weight	64,500 lb (29,260 kg)	67,241 lb (30,500 kg)	51,146 lbs (23,200 kg)
Payload	26,615 lb (12,075 kg)	25,353 lb (11,500 kg)	20,392 lbs (9,250 kg)

* It should be noted that range figures are dependant on payload and can be extremely variable.

At last count some fourty Bombardier Dash 8’s were in service for search and rescue with ten other countries. The cost of these aircraft is dependent on the sensor fit and a reasonable number of Dash 8’s could be purchased within the budget parameters already established. The former minister of National Defence assured this writer that aircraft purchased for search and rescue are for search and rescue only and that secondary military air mobility uses are not a priority. That being the case there is no reason that the lack of a rear loading ramp should be any impediment to the recommended purchase.

It has been alleged that at least one Canadian in need of search and rescue services has already died because the current fleet was unserviceable. What is certain is that if the program to replace our aging fleet continues as it has there will be more tragedies. The new Minister of National Defence and his colleagues at Public works should move immediately to implement their CanadaFirst procurement policy and purchase a suitable number Canadian manufactured and modified Dash-8 search and rescue aircraft.

HOW TO FIX SEARCH AND RESCUE

 

Once again procurement issues are in the news. With the release of the Auditor Generals report the theme of most of the reporting appears to be that the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue program is off the rails, something knowledgeable observers have been saying for some time. Parallels have been drawn between the F-35 debacle and the search for a FWSAR candidate.

The general argument (widely repeated until it becomes self sustaining) is that, just as the Department of National Defence chose the F-35 for the next generation fighter with no thought of alternatives, so the FWSAR requirement was written around the C-27, which caused the current mess.

The idea of picking a preferred choice out of the catalog and then pursuing it to the exclusion of all others often seems like an attractive option. It is assumed that by moving straight to the purchase phase one can forgo the time and money consuming steps dictated by the normal procurement process without, it is hoped, incurring any penalties.

When this method works, as in the purchases of the C-17, the C-130J and the M777 howitzer the results appear to vindicate the theory. It is informative to note that in all these cases the purchases were almost literally off the shelf. They were purchased from existing production lines with almost no attempt to modify the purchases to meet Canadian requirements. As well, given the nature of the purchases, the fact that they were established products with established markets, the price range was already established making it easier to calculate costs.

The technique of direct purchasing fails when, as in the case of the CH-47 Chinook helicopter program, there is an attempt to make modifications to an existing design. The results in this program have been price increases, time delays, and fewer aircraft being acquired.

In the case of the F-35 it is widely believed that the fault lies in deciding on an aircraft which was in its development stage. Much like the CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopters, another badly flawed program, this is technology in its early stages. It would appear that the trick to making this procurement technique work is to buy mature technology off of an existing production line.

How does this apply to the FWSAR program? The government, according to the Auditor General, needs to do something now to avoid endangering an already threadbare Search and Rescue system. Specifically, they need to buy fixed wing aircraft. The stage is set for the competitive process known as an Advance Contract Award Notice (ACAN).

 The ACAN process permits the Government to identify an intended contract award winner based on the mandatory capabilities and detailed market research conducted by the Department. In theory industry is then given the opportunity to respond, should they feel they have an aircraft that meets this criteria. If no supplier submits a statement of capabilities that meets the requirements set out in the ACAN during its posting period of 30 calendar days, then the competitive requirements of the government’s contracting policy have been met and the government’s choice is bought.

The aircraft the Government needs to buy is a variant of the Bombardier Dash 8-400 modified to act as a search and rescue aircraft. The Canadian Armed Forces already have one Dash-8 in service, as a navigation trainer, and they would have no problem taking more of them into inventory.

When considering the purchase of Dash-8s’ it is necessary to deal with the whole rear aircraft ramp issue. Although widely used for search and rescue or maritime patrol in other countries the Dash-8 has not been considered for the purpose in Canada because it lacks a rear opening cargo door.

After botching the procurement program the DND was forced to commission a report on the issue written by the National Research Council. They have been leaning on it, at least the parts they like, ever since. In that report the NRC mandated a rear opening cargo door. They believed that it was a safety issue for the rescue techs who had to parachute into crash sites. As well, it was considered to be easier to maneuver stretchers into an aircraft with a large rear opening door.

In truth, the NRC report was based on existing aircraft with no special modifications for side exits by parachutists. No attempt was ever made to examine the air operable doors provided by Field Aviation to most operators of Dash-8 search and rescue aircraft.

The Minister of National Defence has assured this writer that aircraft purchased for search and rescue are for search and rescue only and that secondary military air mobility uses are not a priority. That being the case there is no reason that the lack of a rear loading ramp should be any impediment to the purchase of Canadian manufactured and modified Dash-8 search and rescue aircraft.

If the government wants to deal with the shortfall of search and rescue aircraft in an efficient and timely matter they can do so by immediately purchasing at least 12 Dash-8 aircraft with basic modifications for search and rescue. This would recapitalize the existing search and rescue fleet at an affordable price, take the pressure off the procurement system as it looks for the systems necessary to upgrade our search and rescue organization and show a willingness to acknowledge that sometimes good enough is good enough. 

SEARCH AND RESCUE AND ECOMONICS

 

  On their web site the DND writes;” The planning for this program has evolved. A Statement of Operational Requirements (SOR) was first developed in 2004 (emphasis added) outlining the technical requirements for an aircraft to effectively carry out search and rescue missions in Canada’s harsh and vast environment.   In fall 2009, industry feedback was solicited on the high level considerations for the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue SOR. This consultation demonstrated the commitment to an open dialogue with Canadian industry and helped assess its ability to support the procurement of a new fleet. Following the industry consultation, the National Research Council (NRC) was engaged to conduct an independent review of the SOR. In its review, NRC focused on the technical requirements as well as the assumptions and constraints underlying them. The Government received the NRC report in March 2010 and then proceeded to review the report’s findings and recommendations. Based on the NRC review, the SOR has been amended to allow for a wider range of Fixed Wing Search and Rescue solutions and to reflect a capability-based rationale.

In 2005 Peter Pigott at Frontline Canada wrote “In October 2003,(emphasis added) then Defence Minister John McCallum said that the purchase of FWSAR aircraft was a government priority and that it would be funded in the 2004 Budget. To quote the Minister’s General Strategic Plan: “The primary goal of the FWSAR Project is the procurement of 15 airframes with SAR sensor equipment, a simulation and training suite, integrated logistic support, and a 20-year in-service support contract. The RFP (Request for Proposal) will be released by March 31, 2005 with the intent of replacing the current SAR aircraft as soon as possible.”

The whole article is well worth reading if only for the sense of nostalgia invoked by the implied belief that something was actually going to happen with the Search & Rescue file.

It has been at least eight years since the FWSAR program became a priority. Why can’t the RCAF buy Search and Rescue aircraft? Canadian Defence Matters has visited this subject in the past. Complaints are easy, and have had little effect, so now we are forced to the expedient of giving practical advice.

It should not be as difficult as the Government and the procurement bureaucracy have made it. James Hasik has written extensively on the economics of defence procurement. What he has to say is directly applicable to the FWSAR program.

The RCAF says they need Search and Rescue Aircraft. The kinds of aircraft being considered are in many ways dual-use products made by several large manufacturers in Canada and elsewhere. There are extensive civil and military markets for those aircraft, so prices, performance parameters, and product quality are all more-or-less readily observed. There are clear tradeoffs to buying Search and Rescue aircraft that are bigger or smaller, faster or slower, and higher- or lower-flying. Those tradeoffs can be piled into a total cost model that handicaps the various prices against the varying overall capability delivered. Or, a total price cap could be imposed, and contractors challenged to provide a general level of capability in lesser or greater numbers of aircraft. For example it is imaginable that a single C-130 could provide the same capability as two C-27’s, or perhaps more, depending on the scenario of employment. It could provide less, for the money, but that's the point of modeling.

That whole approach is what induces price competition for a contract with different offerings. It's also something that pretty much any top drawer MBA knows how to do. Graduate and upper-division undergraduate courses in procurement also teach how to do it. The Air Force should consider hiring a few new graduates, sit them next to the colonels, and watch the spreadsheets flow forth. Structuring that competition correctly is important because without it, the buyer is stuck with a single offering, and thus cedes buying power.

Does the RCAF or the DND or Public Works have “a total cost model that handicaps the various prices against the varying overall capability delivered”? If they do, why can’t we know more about it and if they don’t have such a model, why not?

FWSAR AND THE EMBRAER KC-390

 

 It has been recently announced that the
Embraer KC-390 is a candidate for Canada’s Fixed Wing Search and Rescue (FWSAR) program. The reason for this is that the RCAF may change course and consider the purchase of two types of search-and-rescue aircraft instead of one.

The RCAF believe that with a large, long-range, fast aircraft they could maintain their current model of providing Search and Rescue (SAR) services to the north using southern air bases. (Which is rather like providing Search and Rescue service for Vancouver Island from Winnipeg, but let’s not dwell on that, or give anybody any ‘fresh’ ideas) According to this model, smaller, more maneuverable aircraft would provide SAR in appropriate areas.

It’s hard to know where to begin to criticize this option.

From the viewpoint of any kind of national industrial policy it makes no sense at all. The KC-390, sometimes described as “a C-130 killer”, is a product of Embraer, described in Wikipedia as;

“Embraer S.A. is a Brazilian aerospace conglomerate that produces commercial, military, and executive aircraft and provides aeronautical services. Headquartered in São José dos Campos, Embraer is the third-largest commercial aircraft manufacturer in the world.”

Of interest is the description in Wikipedia of Bombardier Aerospace;

“Bombardier Aerospace is a division of Bombardier Inc. and is the third-largest airplane manufacturer in the world after Boeing and Airbus. It is headquartered in Dorval, Quebec, Canada.”

Alert readers will note that both companies are described as being “the third largest aircraft manufacturer in the world”. The reason for this is that the companies are of similar size and are direct competitors in many markets.

It is hard to understand why the Government of Canada, having rejected Bombardier's aircraft offerings for the FWSAR program would help to develop a competing product from a competing foreign company.

Canadian Defence Matters (CDM) has corresponded with the Minister of National Defence on the FWSAR issue. At first, assuming rather cynically, that the purpose of maintaining an RCAF SAR mandate was to acquire more tactical air lift capacity, used C-27 Spartans were advocated. Having been assured by the minister that the only purpose for the aircraft to be acquired was SAR it became obvious that some variant of Bombardier’s Dash 8 Maritime Patrol/Search and Rescue variant was the answer.

CDM was informed that a Review of the Statement of Operational Requirement for the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft by the National Research Council had recommended that a rear ramp was mandatory. Although the DND was not interested in some of the other suggestions contained in the report (for example alternate service providers) the issue of a rear ramp was considered non-negotiable.

After correspondence with Fleet Aviation CDM was assured that as far as they were concerned the Air-Operable Door (AOD) modification they provided, as approved by all other users, was suitable to the task, but had never been trialed by the DND or the National Research Council.

In communications with Bombardier it was made clear that the company saw no point in making modifications to the Dash-8 which would bring it into compliance with the NRC recommendations.

 The current candidates for Canada’s FWSAR program include the C-27J, C295, DHC-5NG, C-130J, KC-390, and the V-22. CDM does not advocate national industrial strategies being followed at the expense of properly equipping the Canadian armed forces. At the same time, if Canadian forces can be appropriately equipped with nationally sourced items it makes no sense not to do so.

It is a symptom of the shambles that FWSAR has become that CDM finds itself in agreement with the Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Rideau Institute.  The FWSAR program has become a textbook study in procurement failure. No matter what aircraft are eventually acquired it may be that the best thing that can come of this fiasco will be for all concerned to learn and apply the lessons being given on how not to buy an airplane.