TIME FOR CANADA TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE

 It can be argued that, as a “junior partner” since World War 2, Canada has followed the British and American lead in security and defence, subordinating its national interest to the goals of our allies and alliances.

There are good reasons for Canada to have followed this approach in the past. Following the lead of our allies appears to improve Canada’s standing in the world, especially amongst peer allied nations, and allows Canada to exercise some leadership in international affairs.  This increased leadership role allows Canada to further its interests through diplomacy. These policies also make it possible for the Government of Canada to highlight perceived successes abroad so as to increase popular support for its foreign policy and raise awareness of the role of the Armed Forces in maintaining security.

However this is not the only policy option available. As a sovereign power Canada can set its own strategic priorities.  Moreover, by continuing the historical pattern of letting alliance leaders determine its’ strategy, the case can be made that Canada is abdicating its responsibility to protect its own national interests.

The Canadian Armed Forces spend time and resources estimating the capabilities and kinds of forces they may confront in the future. The need to assess the probable opposition is driven by the requirement to determine what resources will be necessary to meet those threats. The time has come to start making the same estimations about the capabilities and intentions of those allies who, at least in the past, we have expected to be fighting alongside. These assessments should be driven by the same need to determine the resources necessary to meet the goals of the Government of Canada.

We are approaching the point at which it becomes necessary to take a more active role in safeguarding our own security interests.  As quoted in MacLean’s Magazine while discussing his book “America: The Farewell Tour” author Chris Hedges is quoted as saying: “America is an empire. So we’re much more fragile than nation-states, non-imperial countries. You see that throughout history: the ancient Greeks invading Sicily, and their entire fleet sunk, thousands of soldiers killed and their empire becoming unsustainable; or in 1956 when Britain tries to invade Egypt after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, retreats in humiliation and thereby triggers a financial crisis and the end of the pound sterling as a reserve currency, marking the death of the British Empire, which had been on a slow descent since the end of World War One. The dollar as the world’s current reserve currency is running on fumes. The moment that’s over, American financial supremacy is instantly finished. It will be very similar to the aftermath of the Suez disaster—something like that is always characteristic of late empire. And the fragility of an empire means that when collapse comes it’s almost instantaneous. You look back at the rapid final fall of the old Soviet Union. A failing empire is like a house of cards that just comes down—it’s not a slow descent. We know from history what happens. It’s not a mystery.”

This is not just speculation. The U.K.’s Global Strategic Trends describes a 2045 People’s Republic of China (PRC) with an economy more than double that of the United States ($62.9 trillion versus $30.7 trillion) and noting that even today, the PRC military may already be “close to matching that of the U.S., perhaps exceeding it in some areas.”  Studies show that the trajectory of PRC growth means that it poses a far greater economic challenge to the United States than did Soviet Russia, Imperial Japan, or Nazi Germany.

There is a growing understanding that the ability of the United States to afford the kind of resources it spent over the Cold War years on furnishing defense for its allies will inevitably become more challenging over the balance of the twenty-first century. From 1940 to 2017, U.S. government debt averaged 61.70 percent of GDP. For 2017, that debt ratio soared to 105 percent of GDP, a level not seen since 1946. The United States today has accumulated more government debt than any other country in the world and is approaching the point at which it can no longer afford to finance its allies’ post WWII traditions of not taking on more responsibility for their own defense.

Even absent the collapse of the American ‘empire’ the time of lone American superpower status is passing. Relative U.S. economic and technological decline may translate into significant strategic and military challenges more rapidly than many expect, leaving allies like Canada with the requirement to modify their foreign and defence policies.  

Such a reappraisal is not just a prescription for increased defence expenditure.  A brave new world in which Canada takes a greater responsibility for its own security may well result in a decision that commitments should be more in line with capabilities.

In the past Canadian Forces have taken part in operations that were only vaguely related to Canadian interests, not committing to those kinds of operations in the future would free up resources to take part in more nationally-relevant operations. Maintenance and readiness have both suffered from over-stretch. Reducing the number of extraneous deployments would decrease costs and increase readiness.

More care in selecting operations, based on realistic commitments and driven by changing geopolitical realities, would let Canada set its own priorities and allow the Armed Forces and our allies to plan based on actual capabilities.

Canadians like to see themselves as citizens of middle power that ‘punches above its weight’. It is not true. There are 195 assorted nations in the world. In terms of economy Canada has roughly the tenth largest in the world. In terms of defence spending in dollar terms Canada is the fourteenth largest spender in the world. Even in population Canada is bigger than 157 of those 195 countries.

Canada is not a small country; we are not even a middle power. Canada is a large country that actually punches well below its weight. The time is rapidly approaching when we will no longer have the luxury of pretending otherwise.

America: The Farewell Tour

https://www.macleans.ca/politics/worldpolitics/why-the-american-empire-has-lost-control-and-its-failure-is-imminent/

Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/348164/20140821_DCDC_GST_5_Web_Secured.pdf

Andrew Krepinevich, Preserving the Balance: A U.S. Eurasia Defense Strategy,  https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/preserving-the-balance-a-u.s.-eurasia-defense-strategy/publication

Reality Check: NATO's Defense Budget Woes Won't Disappear

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/reality-check-natos-defense-budget-woes-wont-disappear-30582

Economy of Canada

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Canada

List of countries by military expenditures

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures

Countries in the world by population (2018)

http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/

THE BUDGET AND CANADIAN DEFENCE

As has been widely reported the Liberal government’s first budget has no new money for big-ticket military items and instead shrinks funding by $3.72-billion over five years to account for major delays in plans to buy new fighter jets and ships.

In a pre election position paper entitled “Real Change, a plan to strengthen the economy and create jobs with navy investment.” the party argued that; “The Canada First Defence Strategy is under funded and out of date. We will immediately begin an open and transparent review process to create a new Defence White Paper that will replace Harper’s failed Canada First Defence Strategy.”

The same paper suggested that “A Liberal government will take immediate action to ensure that Canada’s Armed Forces have the equipment they need – and the support they require – to protect Canada and its sovereignty, while also growing local economies and creating jobs”

Of course that was then, before an election, and this is now, in a real budget, and it would appear that both “immediate action” and the idea of using increased defence funding to “strengthen the economy and create jobs” will have to wait. In fact the government has reallocated $3.761 billion from the 2016-17 to 2020-21 fiscal periods to future years so as to “align better with timelines for large-scale procurement projects, such as the replacement of Canada’s aging fleets of CF-18 fighter aircraft and maritime warship”

Of course there is nothing new about a Canadian government of any stripe finding it advisable to postpone defence spending. In fact this practice, like the Leafs disappointing their fans or Quebec running out of step with the rest of the country, could be considered one of the great verities of Canadian life.

The budget did however re-state the Liberal campaign commitment to develop a new defence strategy that the government says will include measures for accurate costing for major defence procurement, as well as providing Canadians with regular updates on project costs and timelines

If it is true that the government hopes to develop a new defence strategy, by which we take it to mean they plan to write a new Defence White Paper, then perhaps the time has come to adapt “Sunny Ways” process.

There are a lot of questions that need to be answered: "What role will the Canadian Armed Forces play in the defence of Canada? Where and how will the Canadian Armed Forces cooperate with United States military forces in the defence of North America? Why, how and where will the Canadian Armed Forces be deployed abroad? What are the Canadian interests that will guide our military deployments? What kind of military do we need?"

But before these questions can be answered a fundamental change has to occur. The government must consult the public, industry and the other political parties and find agreement from all on the essential ingredients a of Canadian defence policy.

What is needed is all-party consensus that military defence is in the national interest. To achieve this Canadians must convince their politicians that there is a strong public expectation that political parties and their leaders will work together to achieve a common vision on security which will inform choices on strategic policy, defence budgets and procurement

Canada has not had a broad public or political consensus on major military matters for some years and there is no chance that will happen as long as Canadians and their elected representatives do not regard national defence as a priority. If there is any good to come of this budget then it may be because this will be a chance for that to happen.

Military left waiting on big-ticket items as Liberals shrink funding in budget

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/military-left-waiting-on-big-ticket-items-as-liberals-shrink-funding-in-budget/article29352298/

Real Change, a plan to strengthen the economy and create jobs with navy investment

https://www.liberal.ca/files/2015/09/A-new-plan-to-strengthen-the-economy-and-create-jobs-with-navy-investment.pdf

Military equipment gets no extra funding

http://thechronicleherald.ca/novascotia/1351264-military-equipment-gets-no-extra-funding

Why Canada's New National Defence Policy Matters

http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/sean-speer/canada-national-defence-policy_b_9119706.html

NEW BUDGET REDUCES CHOICES FOR ARMED FORCES

In its most recent budget, the Conservative government announced it would “reclaim” the $3.1 billion in cash it had planned to allocate to the military over the coming years but restore it four years hence, so that equipment can be bought then.

The Conservative governments’ latest budget effectively removes one billion dollars a year from defence spending. The argument, advanced by the Minister of Finance, is that money will be returned in the future to fund new programs.

The belief appears to be that in that yet to be determined future the same choices will be available then that we have now. The question is, what will be available for the government, any government, to buy in four years? Because an interesting thing is happening to western military aircraft programs, they are all ending.

Even in the unlikely event we had been in the market for them, the last Lockheed Martin F-22 was produced in 2012.

Baring further orders, the Lockheed Martin F-16, which at this point is competing in the market with used examples of itself, has a backlog which takes it to 2017. After that it will be competing with the F-35, also a Lockheed Martin product, which makes it unlikely the company will keep that production line open.

In September of 2013 Boeing delivered the 223^rd and final U.S, Air Force C-17, the company announced the line would close in 2015. A month later, South Korea rejected the Boeing F-15 for its F-X3 competition, dooming the proposed Silent Eagle variant and probably killing the line after the last of Saudi Arabia’s current order is delivered in 2018.

It is true that the US Congress has given Boeing’s Super Hornet fighter jet a lifeline for now. The recent omnibus spending bill contains a down payment of $75-M for 22 of the fighters that the Navy did not request. This lifeline may not be enough. In December 2013 the Boeing F/A-18E/F lost the Brazilian FX-2 competition, one of several key international defeats. A previous pre-selection announcement for 36 Hornets by the U.S. Navy was withdrawn, under pressure it is assumed. At that point the last Super Hornet was slated to be produced in 2016; Boeing has announced that it will decide in the near future whether it will preserve the line.

In Europe, barring further orders, the last Eurofighter Typhoon is scheduled to role off the assembly line in 2017. Rafale production is on life support having been cut from 11 per year to 26 aircraft to be delivered over 6 years. Of course, assuming negotiations in India do not go off the rails it might be possible to purchase Rafales from HAL in the future.

Even after winning the Brazilian FX-2 competition Saab has sold relatively few of the Gripen JAS-39E variant and future upgrades are at the mercy of long suffering Swedish tax payers. With the less expensive KAI FA-50 Golden Eagle beginning to compete for market share it will be up to those same taxpayers to decide how long they want to continue to produce this under appreciated aircraft.

It is not just the fighter market that is shrinking; the last Beechcraft T-6 will be produced in 2016. In fact it is estimated that total military aircraft procurement between 2011 and 2018 will be half of what it was in the eight preceding years with inevitable effects on production and availability.

It is this combination of events which explains the U.S. Air Force’s unrelenting support for the flawed F-35 program. For the United States this is a crisis of the production base, for Canada it is all about procurement choices. In the future imagined by the government there may not be any choice, at least when it comes to fighters.

The truth is that the government is cutting defence spending by stealth. It has been decided that a balanced budget is of more worth then national defence. This may be a rational argument, however it is not one the government wishes to have. They would like the general public to believe that Defence capabilities and choices are being left intact. They are not.

Budget 2014: Military wings clipped again

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/budget-2014-military-wings-clipped-again-1.2532827

Federal budget sends Canadian military’s equipment buying plan into limbo; new fighter jets likely off the table

http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/02/11/federal-budget-sends-canadian-militarys-equipment-buying-plan-into-limbo-new-fighter-jets-likely-off-the-table/

CANADIAN DEFENCE BUDGET 2013

 

National Defence is the biggest discretionary spending item in the federal budget and has always been a target for governments trying to cut expenditures, regardless of political party. The recent budget brought down by the current government is no exception.

It would seem redundant to point out that any expenditure cuts to the Armed Forces need to be carefully thought out. Unfortunately the current government views Defence spending as an adjunct to the political process rather then as a basic function of Government. In fact, it would appear that the current government does not distinguish between the Government of Canada and the Conservative Party of Canada. They are quoted as giving the following direction to the Department of National Defence. (1)

"Ceasing activities viewed as priorities by the government of Canada will invite scrutiny into those activities the Army chooses to do at the expense of those items that hold government interest," said the letter, which is meant to guide the army's business planning for the coming year.

"As an example, activities such as the Ceremonial Guard hold particular interest for the (government of Canada) and must be sustained; even at the expense of area programming. Any and all (government of Canada) directed activities will be fulfilled."

David Perry at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute has pointed out in his most recent analysis that even prior to Budget 2013, DND faced a significant fiscal challenge. (2)  The existing Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) was insufficiently resourced to finance its planned capital acquisitions. Inflation as well as the continued inability to spend money on capital acquisition in the year ahead will further reduce the department’s purchasing power. These measures mean that CFDS acquisitions continue to be unaffordable.

An army planning document, obtained by The Canadian Press, shows that land forces expected a further eight per cent hit on operating and maintenance in the coming fiscal plan, in addition to the existing 22 per cent budget reduction. (3)

These latest cuts, estimated in the range of $32 million, will slice into the army's ability to train for operations in the jungle, desert and mountains, and come on top of $226 million in cuts ordered in the government's strategic review and Deficit Reduction Action Plan, says a Jan. 31, 2013 document, written by Lt.-Gen. Peter Devlin.

Three successive budgets have reduced the DND funding allocations directed towards Operations & Maintenance spending. For a more complete analysis check out Colonel (Ret’d) Brian MacDonald’s paper “Waiting for Defence Budget 2013/14”. (4) It is not, however, necessary to analyze the figures to understand them. The governments own figures speak for themselves. (5)

The Government Expenditure Plan and Main Estimates

National Defence: 2013-2014 Estimates

2011–12                    2012-2013               2012-2013                  2013- 2014    

Expenditures            Main Estimates        Estimates to Date      Main Estimates    

$19,799,128,095     $19,799,128,095     $20,678,142,610     $17,985,310,381

The Canadian Armed Forces' readiness has already been reduced significantly. Given the governments emphasis on high profile, if not to say ceremonial, projects at the expense of maintenance and training it will only get worse. It is not overly dramatic to point out that these deficiencies may be paid for in blood in the future.

(1) Changing of the guard soldiers about the only ones safe from DND's budget axe

http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/canada/changing-of-the-guard-soldiers-about-the-only-ones-safe-from-dnds-budget-axe-198686391.html

(2) Defence Austerity: An analysis of the Impact to date,

Conference of Defence Associations Institute

David Perry | Defence Analyst

http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/images/Defence_Austerity_Budget_2013.pdf

(3) Chief of defence staff prepared for deeper military cuts

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2013/03/19/pol-cp-lawson-defence-spending.html

(4) Waiting for Defence Budget 2013/14: Fifth of the Canada First Defence Strategy Budgets

http://www.cdacanada.ca/images/Waiting_for_Defence_Budget_2013_EN.pdf

(5) The Government Expenditure Plan and Main Estimates

 2013–14, Estimates Parts I and II

http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/20132014/me-bpd/me-bpd-eng.pdf

SEQUESTER, CANADIAN STYLE

 

The government has announced budget cuts which affect the Department of National Defence.(1)  A spokesman for the minister of National Defence said reductions were to be anticipated after the Afghan war.

"Canada ended its combat mission in Afghanistan in 2011 and will end its military training mission in 2014," said Jay Paxton.

"Naturally taxpayers would no longer be absorbing the costs associated with our training mission to Afghanistan when the deployment of our military members is complete."

In this same vein it has been suggested that the effect of not anticipating future deployments in the new budget is that the military will have to scramble to find the funds when something does happen.

This is not strictly true. As a general rule wars and other major operations are not funded in by the Department of National Defence out of their own budget. At least in theory its annual spending plan is designed to maintain the readiness of the Canadian Forces by training and equipping them.

In point of fact, the government funded much, but not all, of Afghanistan through special appropriations. National Defence was forced to raid some of its program budgets in order to cover the difference.

Since the Armed Forces became involved in Afghanistan, and since the Conservative government decided to cast itself in the role of savior of the Armed Forces, the budget for the DND has grown substantially.  From a budget of roughly $15 billion in 2005 to a high of close to $23 billion in 2012 the department has been on a spending spree. While billed as necessary to make up for previous parsimony, it is also true that weaning the military off this comparative windfall of cash will not be easy.

The idea that the nation can’t trim its military spending back to previous levels is one not shared by the general public. The Conservatives have discovered, as many governments before them, that, lacking an obvious threat or the deployment of Canadian forces in harms way, the Canadian public is not interested in spending money on defence. They have found that for all their rhetoric about supporting the troops it is far easier to cut military spending then to cut the various entitlement programs so close to Canadian hearts. ( While "entitlements" is not a phrase as common in Canadian discussions as in some others, it still fits.)

While it is true that the Armed Forces will have to make do with less in the future, it is not impossible. Making do with less, in Canadian terms, means that the department must make clear to its political masters that with fewer resources they can do fewer things. As easy as it will be for them to present politically unpalatable alternatives, “no more Snowbirds, no more search and rescue” in hopes that the politicians will reject these suggestions it is a mistake. There will be less money. The Generals are going to have to take a hard look at which capabilities they can save by downloading to the reserves, even if it is at the expensive of the regular forces budget, and those which they are genuinely going to have to forgo rather then impact the readiness and training of those forces that are available.

 (1) Canadian military may slash overseas spending

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2013/02/25/military-foreign-deployment-spending.html

A GENERAL STRATEGY FOR CANADIAN DEFENCE BUDGETS

 

 It has been widely reported that the recent spate of retirements and promotions in the upper ranks of the Canadian Forces is directly related to the governments attempt to balance the budget by cutting spending in all departments. (1) While Canadian Defence Matters is always in favour of making economies by getting rid of excess generals, (2) in this case it would appear that the over all amount of brass will remain unchanged, meaning that other methods of saving money must be found. 

In fact, the staffing changes come after Prime Minister Stephen Harper made clear last fall that he wanted the military to find administrative savings. A 2011 report on transformation done by Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, (3) now retired, identified measures that could save as much as $1 billion in administration costs. It should be noted that, as has been pointed out in these pages, the Department of Defence never met a cost cutting program that it didn’t like. (4)

While not every observer sees these changes at the top as being influenced by the governments desire to implement savings, (5) there is no doubt that the Defence budget will be cut and that one way or another the department will have to deal with it. (6)

The danger is that poorly managed economies will lead to what has been called a “hollow force: one that while capable on paper is in reality unable to fulfill its duties. It happens when budgets contract and it seems easier to take a little something out of  maintenance, training, and operations, and to add a little  bit of "doing more with less". It’s easier than making the hard choices by identifying what missions you won't do anymore and trimming low priority capabilities. Those easier choices may be described as “temporary” and they may seem better than making the "wrong" long-term choices, but eventually you end up with a military force that can not accomplish the goals that have been set for it 

The hardest part is deciding which missions and capabilities are going to be sacrificed. (7) If you get it wrong then equipment and capabilities available will determine policy. This is exactly backwards. What should happen is that strategy should determine operations, operations determine tactics, and tactics in turn should inform equipment procurement.

Venturing into the swampy waters of Canadian Strategy is another impediment to the rational decision making that is necessary when budgets are tight. Robert J. Sutherland, director of operational research, Department of National Defence, 1962 once pointed out that, ”Canada has no particular tradition of strategic calculation. Such tradition as we possess seems to be that strategy is a suitable diversion for retired generals who need not be taken very seriously”.
 
While not having the status of a retired general Canadian Defence Matters takes heart in the thought that it is not taken very seriously and therefore qualifies, in Canada, as a traditional purveyor of strategic calculation. 

That being said, Sean Maloney (8) has pointed out four aspects of Canadian Strategic tradition. 

Forward Security: This is the deployment of Canadian Forces overseas to ensure that violent international activity is kept as far away from North America as possible and that Canadian interests overseas are protected.

Coalition Warfare: Canada has a comparatively small population and its industrial base is maximized for civilian purposes. Canada can not generate large standing forces like its allies can. 

Operation Influence: The ability to determine what deployed Canadian Forces can and can not do within the coalition and prevent there misuse by larger coalition members.

Saliency: Canada must have effective forces allocated to the coalition which have unique capabilities or employment which makes up for the lack of numbers and permits operational influence in the coalition command structures.

This is the kind of thinking that has to start any discussion about which missions and which capabilities are going to be eliminated in order that the remaining forces remain capable. You can be reasonably sure that there was a lot discussion around the decisions to delete the air defence capability found in ADATS (9) and the direct fire capability of TOW. (10) What is not known is what strategic calculation went into these decisions.

 Without a public discussion of the alternatives within the context of strategy and Canadian foreign policy, there is no assurance that the inevitable contraction of our armed forces will result in an effective force for Canada.

 Strategy is an art of the possible. It is not just about the politico-military means of employing purposive and definitive force; it is also about sustaining in the context of competing peacetime values the means to act should the necessity arise. 

 ( A Two-Edged Sword, The Navy as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy, by Nicholas Tracy. Page 317)

 (1) Toronto Star, 2013/02/06

http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/02/06/host_of_military_retirements_means_extraordinary_change_for_canadian_forces.html

 (2) Canadian Defence Matters, General Inflation 

http://jgmjgm516.blogspot.ca/2012/08/general-inflation.html

(3) Report on Transformation 2011

http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports-rapports/transfo2011/index-eng.asp

(4) Canadian Defence Matters, Raiding the Readiness Budget http://jgmjgm516.blogspot.ca/2012/11/raiding-rediness-budget.html

(5) Defence Watch, New Canadian Forces Leadership To Oversee Budget Cuts? February 7, 2013.

http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2013/02/07/new-canadian-forces-leadership-to-oversee-budget-cuts/

(6)  The Globe and Mail, Published Thursday, Mar. 29 2012, Deep cuts to military mark reversal for Harper

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/budget/deep-cuts-to-military-mark-reversal-for-harper/article4097823/

(7)Canadian Forces selling equipment, mothballing base housing to meet cuts. http://www.ottawacitizen.com/technology/Canadian+Forces+selling+equipment+mothballing+base+housing+meet+cuts/6443814/story.html#ixzz2KR9wuwz9

(8) Sean M. Maloney, War with Iraq, Canada’s strategy in the Persian Gulf, 1990 – 2002, Martello Papers # 24

https://qshare.queensu.ca/Groups/QCIR/www/Publications/Martellos/Martello24.pdf?uniq=-y2lgx8

(9) ADATS Heading To Museums and Concrete Pads Outside Bases

May 16, 2012. 11:49 pm • Section: Defence Watch

http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2012/05/16/adats-heading-to-museums-and-concrete-pads-outside-bases/

(10) Canadian Army Studies Its Direct Fire Capability As It Gets Ready to “Divest” Itself of Some TOW Systems May 28, 2012.

http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2012/05/28/canadian-army-studies-its-direct-fire-capability-as-it-gets-ready-to-divest-itself-of-some-tow-systems/

RAIDING THE READINESS BUDGET

 The report, “The Ghost of General Otter: Putting the Canadian Forces Report on Transformation 2011 in Context” by Andrew Godefroy, published by the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, November, 2012, is recommended reading, and not just because it references Sir William Otter, one of Canadian Defence Matters favourite generals.

The report is a companion piece to the CDFAI’s report “Defence after the Recession” and adds to our understanding of the future of the Canadian Armed Forces.

Godefroy makes two excellent points. First he makes clear the use of the word “transformation” in this context.

Reorganizations are not popular. Because of the belief, best summed up by the quote, “We trained hard . . . but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization” (Erroneously attributed to Petronius Arbiter, 210 B.C.) the word itself has fallen into disrepute. As the report points out” Whereas in the past such plans were more simply known as ‘reorganizations’, in the 21st century DND has given them the much more Disney-like title of ‘transformation’”.

Needless to say, the Canadian Armed Forces are not going to transform themselves into a car, or even an intergalactic robot.  What they are doing is reorganizing in an attempt to save money and retain as many capabilities as possible with a smaller budget.

This is where the report makes another pertinent observation. The author notes that: “Canadian history has repeatedly observed that in the absence of War, all military efficiency studies eventually come to pass.”

This report argues that while trying instinctively to the same with less (also known in government circles as “doing more with less”) it is not possible. The author argues that any reorganization should acknowledge this and not attempt to maintain capabilities at the expense of corporate abilities and the ability to re-generate those capabilities in the future when need and budget allow for them.

 "At one time in 2010, for example, the CF was simultaneously carrying out five of the six core missions laid out by the government in the Canada First Defence Strategy. In addition to ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan, the CF responded to a sudden humanitarian crisis in Haiti, supported government security initiatives for the 2010 Winter Olympics, maintained its preparations for a response to a terrorist attack, and carried on its daily provision of maritime aerial surveillance and search and rescue capabilities.”

In order to adequately cope with the coming budgetary shortfall the Armed Forces are going to have to speak truth to power. They have to tell government and the public that they can no longer fulfill the full range of services they have attempted to perform in the past with the budget they have today.

In the past they have essentially said of their capabilities, “you can have one from column A and 2 from column B at any time”. In the future the nation must explain that the choice is “one from column A or two from column B.  Unless you want to mortgage the future capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces you will have to understand that doing with less means less.”

A NEW CANADA FIRST DEFENCE STRATEGY

 

A report by David Perry of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute entitled Defence after the Recession analyses the effect of decreased spending on the Department of National Defence. Widely reported and little read that report deserves further examination

The Government of Canada spends a little less then 8 per cent of its budget on Defence. At something like 1.3 per cent of our gross domestic product this works out to about $560 per capita.  These figures, contrary to the claims of both the Conservative Government and the Peace movement are not high for a country like Canada and well within our historic norms.

The economics of Defence spending are debatable. While the government likes to believe it can be a positive factor for the economy there is no reason to believe that Defence spending is inherently any better economically then any other form of government expenditure.

Over the last few years the Government has increased the deficit to deal with the recession but now believes it is in a position to cut the budget to deal with that deficit.  As a result, defence spending which peaked in 2011/2012 will decline over the next three years.

By 2014/2015 the required reduction will be $2.1 billion, or 10.5 per cent of the budget base. The Government and the DND have determined that they do not want to cut spending for personal or for capital equipment projects.

The strategy embraced by the government and the DND of concentrating spending cuts on operations and maintenance will have the two consequences. It will affect the ability of the DND to complete its re-equipment plan and it will affect readiness.

The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) was built on a promise of predictable, long term funding. In truth the CFDS was never adequately funded.  General Andrew Leslies’ “Report on Transformation 2011” made this clear. The combination of the original inadequate funding and the new budget reality means the CFDS is no longer a realistic goal.

In fact, as Ughurhan Berkok, a policy studies professor and adjunct chain of Queens University’s defence management studies has noted, many of the major procurements the Conservatives have pushed forward on decisively-such as buying new Hercules transports and Cyclone helicopters-were initiated by the Liberals. It might even be argued that the Conservatives haven’t signed a contract for any major purchase beyond those planned by previous governments.

According to General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff, readiness “is the degree of preparedness and responsiveness of our forces that allows me to deploy them with little notice in response to government direction. It's the ability to get the right people, with the right skills and the right equipment, into the right place at the right time and to sustain that for as long as government requires.”

The new budget acknowledges that with the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan the Canadian Forces will “transition to a lower pace of operations”. I suspect that most people assumed that this meant that that the Forces would be “good to go, but not going as much”. It would appear that given the new reality of less money being spent on readiness related items what it really means is “can’t go as often with as much”

Canadians and their government need to understand these new realities. As David Perry calls for in his report “It is time for a new Canada First Defence Strategy”

GUNS OR BUTTER? FRIGATES OR LIGHT HOUSES?

What costs more, a Light House or a Frigate? It all depends on how you calculate it.

The Canadian Armed Forces are going to take a hit. The 2012 Federal budget is going to give them a lot less money to try to spend then they have had in the recent past. In the U.S. the so called sequestration which promises to cut their defence spending by almost eleven per cent has created a great deal of debate. The same or perhaps even greater cuts in Canadian spending have had far less public impact.

One of the problems the Forces are going to have is figuring out what to cut that will actually impact their budget. Currently they use an accounting method that calculates total program costs. While this method has its merits it can introduce distortions.

Think of it in more common terms, the example being the purchase of a car. It costs $15,000 to buy. You figure it’s going to cost about $5,000 a year for insurance and about $5,000 a year for gas and maintenance. Now you might think this means that you are going to have to come up with $15,000 dollars to buy a car and that you’re going to have to figure if your budget can stretch to cover the rest over the course of the year.

Or, you could decide that if you plan to keep the car for twenty years then the total, program cost is $215,000. Now that’s a lot of money. Sticker shock is beginning to set in (just ask anyone trying to justify the cost of the F-35 program), but it’s not completely unreasonable. That is the amount you are forgoing over the next twenty years that you could be spending on something else.

A program cost of $215,000 over twenty years works out to $10,750 per year. Which means, according to the accountants, if you decide not to buy a car this year you are not saving $15,000 plus another $10,000 in expenses, you’re only saving $10,750.  This is the same problem faced by the Department of National Defence when they try to cut the budget.

So what does cost more, a ten year old frigate or a one hundred and fifty year old light house? Cutting which one will save the government the most money?  If we figure the total program costs for the light house we might actually discover it costs more then the frigate and that getting rid of it will save more money then getting rid of the frigate. The trouble with this theory is that it’s not true. The frigate costs us much more, year to year, then the light house.

Knowing what to cut (and as David Perry’s report shows there will be cuts) and how to do it is going to call for more then just accountants and common sense. The response of the Armed Forces so far has been to hold on to as much capability as possible and squeeze the operations budget in an attempt to get through what they hope will be a relatively short period of austerity. There is no way of telling whether they are right or wrong. You have to have a certain amount of sympathy for the Generals. What they need is informed public debate as well as political direction to determine what our defence priorities are. In the absence of that they are really just making it up as they go along.