A FUTURE FOR THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY MAY BE FOUND IN THE PAST

Michael Byers, who holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia and is a frequent commentator on defence matters, has written, in the National Post, on the sad state of the Royal Canadian Navy.

He points out that there are effectively no ships available to support any request from NATO, let alone fulfill normal domestic requirements. As Matt Gurney wrote in the same newspaper, “Canada does not currently meet even the modest military thresholds required to provide domestic security, and on the international scene, threats materialize faster than we can muster the strength to respond to them”.

Against this background is a previous decision by the RCN to discard a planned $100M mid-life refit plan for the twelve vessels of the Kingston class.

The Kingston class consists of 12 coastal defence vessels. Also known as Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV) these multi-role vessels were built and launched from the mid- to late-1990s and are largely crewed by members of the Naval Reserve.

Their main missions are coastal surveillance, sovereignty patrol, route survey, and training. They were designed with a minesweeping role in mind however this role has diminished as a result of the evolving nature of mine warfare and not having been equipped with the appropriate equipment necessary to undertake the mission.

As with all naval ships the Kingston-class patrol vessels represent some design compromises. The program was conceived to advance the use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and construction techniques in a ship designed to military specifications.

The engines, although quite powerful and fuel-efficient, are being used with a hull shape designed for minesweeping. This prevents the ship from achieving a high speed compared to the patrol vessels of other nations, which are considerably faster. However, the Kingston’s' top speed is faster than that of most mine warfare vessels and is comparable to most large non-naval seagoing vessels.

Unlike other Mine warfare vessels the Kingston class was built with conventional steel hulls. The vessels are, however, equipped with a magnetic degaussing system that allows the ship's magnetic signature to be manipulated to minimize vulnerability to magnetic mines.

In an attempt to make the vessels truly ‘multi-role’ the Kingston class are designed to carry up to three 20-foot (6.1 m) ISO containers with power hookups on the open deck aft in order to embark mission-specific payloads. The available modules included:

·        Indal Technologies AN/SLQ 38 deep mechanical minesweeping systems

·        MDA Ltd. AN/SQS 511 heavy-weight high-definition route survey systems

·        ISE Ltd. Trailblazer 25 bottom object inspection vehicle

·        ISE Ltd. HYSUB 50 deep seabed intervention system

·        Fullerton and Sherwood Ltd. 6-man, 2-compartment containerized diving systems

·        Naval engineered 6-person accommodation modules

·        MDA Ltd. Interim Remote Mine hunting and Disposal System

The original mid-life refit plan was intended to allow the retention of the ‘mid-lifed’ vessels through 2045–2055, however the RCN concluded that the money would be better spent in acquiring a new platform. It was hoped that the MCDVs would be replaced by new vessels to enter service in 2020.

As of this date, a contract for the construction of new ships to replace the Kingston class has not been signed. The only new ships, on the distant horizon, configured for a similar mission are the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) for whom current design constraints will render them not much more useful then the Kingston class for the surveillance and sovereignty roles and of no use at all for the reserve training and mine warfare roles.

As it stands now the Canadian Navy is hard pressed for both recruits and operating funds as well as the numbers of ships necessary to maintain the ‘critical mass’ necessary to have a force of use to Canada.

The solution to this problem can be found in our past. Our Navy needs to reconsider the corvette. With their storied history vessels of this class could fit into the present and future of the RCN. With modern corvettes, the Navy would acquire vessels able to fulfill its domestic waters patrol mandate far more economically than its current major warships and fulfill many of the overseas tasks we are currently engaged in.

Needless to say, this is not the first time that this remedy has been advocated. On 2 June 2003, Mr. John Dewar testified to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence that Canada should purchase a corvette-sized ship, also called a ‘cutter,’ for use by the navy in the performance of law enforcement functions. 

He recommended a vessel measuring 75 meters that was able to operate in a high sea-state, move quickly (25 knots minimum using diesel propulsion), and remain at sea for 30 days. He said that a landing deck or hanger for a large maritime helicopter like the Sea King is essential. A helicopter would assist in the identification of ships and extend the visible range from the vessel. 

A modern corvette, which meets many of Mr. Dewar’s criteria, such as the STYX Canadian Marine PV85 has a core ships company of 35 compared to a Halifax class frigate which requires a crew of 180. It stands to reason that a PV85-based corvette would be substantially less expensive to operate then a frigate with a hull almost twice as long and a displacement 2.5 times greater.

The Danish Knud Rasmussen-class is another example of an offshore patrol vessel which would meet Canadian needs. The ships' normal tasks include fisheries inspections, environment protection, search and rescue, sovereignty enforcement, icebreaker assignments, towage and salvage operations and general assistance to the Danish and Greenland governments (including police tasks).

Like the original Kingston MCDVs the Knud Rasmussen is designed to take multiple mission modules, in this case using StanFlex modular mission payload slots (one on the foredeck, the other aft of the superstructure), which can be fitted with a multi-purpose gun, surface-to-air missiles, or ASW torpedoes, along with other non-weapon payloads. Another two container positions are "prepared for" but not installed.

Mercantile standards were used for the original MCDVs, primarily as a cost-cutting measure. Just as commercial-off-the-shelf parts and equipment were used wherever possible, the hull was adapted from an existing civilian design for an offshore supply vessel. The design used steel in its construction, a material familiar to most Canadian shipyards. These standards are common in the kind of modern corvettes being considered and the ships could easily be built in Canada.

That they could be built is not the question, the question is “will they be built?”

It should be pointed out that the RCN analyses that lead to the decision to cancel the MCDV mid-life update was badly flawed. The belief by that service that the Department of National Defence can consistently and reliably procure new ships is not based in reality. If the RCN had understood, as an institution, that it was far more likely to be able to find funding and consensus for a mid-life update then for entirely new ships then they would have made better choices, or at least choices more likely to have tangible results.

If, in the future, the Government and the DND/CF re-acquire the ability to consistently and efficiently procure new warships for our Navy then Corvettes would be a useful addition to a useable fleet.

Sorry, NATO — We’re fresh out of warships

http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/03/12/michael-byers-sorry-nato-were-fresh-out-of-warships/

Matt Gurney: Ukraine crisis shows need for larger Canadian military

http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/04/20/matt-gurney-ukraine-crisis-shows-need-for-larger-canadian-military/

The Kingston Class: Mid-Life or Move Over for MCDVs?

http://www.casr.ca/id-mcdv-midlife.htm

Kingston-class coastal defence vessel

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingston-class_coastal_defence_vessel

Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS)

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-equipment/arctic-offshore-patrol-ships.page

The Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship

http://www.casr.ca/bg-navy-aops-icebreaker.htm

A USEABLE NAVY

http://jgmjgm516.blogspot.ca/2014/04/a-useable-navy.html

Operation CARIBBE

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america-recurring/op-caribbe.page

 Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World

http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/372/defe/rep/rep17vol2part3-e.htm

STX Canadian Marine/STX US Marine

http://www.stxmarine.net/ship_patrol.html

Knud Rasmussen-Class Ocean Patrol Vessels, Denmark

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/knud-rasmussen-class/

StanFlex

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STANFLEX

A USEABLE NAVY

Sir Julian Stafford Corbett was born on
November 12, 1854 in the United Kingdom. He was a prominent British naval historian and geostrategist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A contemporary of the celebrated American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, Corbett’s works helped shape the Royal Navy's reforms of that era. One of his most famous works is “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy”, which remains a classic among students of naval warfare. 
 

Corbett's most important contribution to the theory of naval warfare was the belief that what mattered most was not the Mahanian concept of physical destruction of the enemy, but the act of passage on the sea. Corbett argued that command of the sea was a relative and not an absolute and could be categorized as general or local, temporary or permanent. Corbett defined the two fundamental methods of obtaining control of the lines of communication as the actual physical destruction or capture of enemy warships and merchants, and or a naval blockade.

Corbett's concepts, which seem more and more relevant to modern conflict management, include controlling the lines of communications, a focus on the enemy, manoeuvre for tactical advantage, and the importance of the political, economic and financial dimensions of war as well as the technological and material aspects. He also understood the primacy of politics in war and in devising an appropriate strategy to protect the national interests and he stressed the necessity for efficiency in battle while preserving costly assets.

Sir Julian believed that navies can do several basic things.

If strong enough, they can take command of important sea areas for strategically relevant spaces of time. That usually means wresting control of these spaces from a hostile navy through battle. When sea control is achieved navies can exploit it by moving people and materiel without serious interference, land troops, or strike inland or alternatively not allowing their opponents the ability to do those things

If not strong enough to fight and win, they can prosecute an “active defense.” Defensive measures include thwarting a stronger opponent’s plans, or inducing that opponent to weaken himself while building up superior strength.

Peacetime functions can include maritime security, the constabulary-like missions navies discharge in peacetime. Maritime security is an umbrella term for upkeep of the global system of trade and commerce. Counter-piracy and counter-proliferation are counted among these functions.

This is what navies can do. They can dispute command, win command, exploit command and police the sea. Innumerable subordinate functions all fit within these basic categories. The question then becomes; what ships are necessary to fulfill these roles in an efficient and economic fashion?

One suggested answer is the “light frigate” which in some ways is simply an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) used as a frigate. The most prominent example may be the French Floréal class surveillance frigates. It is believed that these vessels can contribute to the peacetime functions of maritime security more cheaply then warships designed for the full spectrum of warfare.

Sir Humphrey at The Thin Pinstriped Line in a post entitled “The Royal Navy and Light Frigates - A solution in need of a problem?” has argued against their utility. Sir Humphrey points that while a high end warship can fulfill lesser roles, a vessel with lesser capabilities can not cope with high end conflict. He notes that acquiring such vessels might come at the expense of the full spectrum warships that currently make up the bulk of the Royal Navy.

Sir Humphrey may have missed an important point. It is true that that an expensive warship, like the Type 45 destroyer, or “The pinnacle of naval power” as Sir Humphrey describes them, can fulfill any role given it, but will it be given any role?

Canadian scholar James Pritchard has written about Gabriel de Sartine, Louis XV’s first secretary of the navy. He superintended the reconstruction of the French Navy after British Admiral Sir Edward Hawke smashed it at Quiberon Bay in 1759. Having managed the finances, he was intimately acquainted with the cost of outfitting a fleet. He also presided over French naval strategy for a time after France allied itself with the American colonists in 1778.”Sartine,” writes Pritchard “was anxious to preserve the great hoard of wealth that the navy represented. He may have feared to risk it without a guarantee of success.” He thrust risk-nothing tactics on French commanders as a result. Better to conserve precious ships, he believed, than hazard them in combat against the Royal Navy.

This is the problem that faces modern naval leaders. Corbett’s emphasis on preserving costly assets resonates with admiralties around the world. The cost, in both money and industrial capacity, to replace a modern warship can make both politicians and admirals loath to use them. The question then becomes: what use is a warship, no matter how capable, if they can’t or won’t be used.  

The loss of a Type 45 Destroyer would be devastating for the Royal Navy. Between the cost and the lack of industrial capacity it could almost literally not be replaced. Given these facts, how likely is the British admiralty, or the politicians who ultimately make the decisions, to hazard it in any but the most existential of circumstances?

When naval ships become so valuable that their loss becomes unthinkable they become unusable. Author Robert O’Connell has written about this phenomenon in his book “Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy”. 

Canada originally planned a follow-on order of 6 more Halifax class frigates after the first 12 were ordered. A fleet of some 18 frigates and 4 air defence destroyers was envisaged. Needless to say, this didn’t happen. We currently have a force of some 12 frigates and 3 destroyers. The current plan is to replace them with 15 Canadian Surface Combatants. Given the previous history of a continually shrinking Canadian Navy, it is unlikely that all 15 will be procured.

What use will a force of expensive and irreplaceable ships be? As well as having an unusable force, Canada is in danger of having a pointlessly small force. One answer to this dilemma is to look at smaller, less expensive, dare one say it, more expendable, ships. The OPV, the Light Frigate, the “frégate de surveillance”, no matter what you wish to call them, will have an important role to play in the formation a 'usable' navy.

Julian Corbett

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Corbett

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, by Julian Stafford Corbett

http://gutenberg.readingroo.ms/1/5/0/7/15076/15076-h/15076-h.htm

Protector-class offshore patrol vessel

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protector-class_offshore_patrol_vessel

Floréal Class Frigate, France

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/florealclassfrigate/

The Royal Navy and Light Frigates - A solution in need of a problem? http://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.ca/2014/04/the-royal-navy-and-light-frigates.html

Louis XV's Navy, 1748-1762, A Study of Organization and Administration

By James Pritchard

http://www.mqup.ca/louis-xv-s-navy--1748-1762-products-9780773536319.php

How to Measure an Aircraft Carrier’s Worth

http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/how-to-measure-an-aircraft-carriers-worth/?utm_content=bufferf8bf9&utm_source=buffer&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Buffer

Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy 

Robert L. O'Connell

http://www.amazon.ca/Sacred-Vessels-Cult-Battleship-Rise/dp/0195080068

Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC)

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-equipment/canadian-surface-combatant.page

THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING NAVY

 

Navies are shrinking. All over the western world fewer warships are being built as replacements with the inevitable result that navies are smaller then they used to be. It can, and has been, argued that as modern warships are more effective then their predecessors this lack of hulls makes little or no difference. Unfortunately for this belief, the threats to modern warships have increased in efficiency at the same rate. In the final analysis fewer ships means fewer ships and a smaller navy.

A smaller navy has multiple problems. As well as the inability to be everywhere the Navy needs to be there is a danger of "tactical instability," where a navy is unwilling to risk its ships because the fleet is constituted principally of small numbers of expensive ships

Analysis has found that naval ship costs have escalated at a rate between 7 and 11 percent since the 1950s. Common measures of inflation over that time period ranged from 4 to 5 percent; thus, the cost increases for naval ships have substantially outpaced inflation. Such a rapid cost escalation has significant implications for the Navy and the composition of its fleet given that shipbuilding budgets are not likely to increase for the foreseeable future

No simple solutions exist. A combination of efforts, including those designed to contain ship requirements and some investment in improving shipbuilding efficiency, might be able to reduce cost escalation. However with tighter and potentially diminishing shipbuilding budgets, there is a need to make hard choices between the capabilities and numbers of ships. The fleet can be rebalanced by supplementing the currently planned large surface combatants with the procurement of smaller or less expensive ships.

One way to achieve this high-low mix of warships is to supplement the expensive destroyer/frigates with less expensive Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs). These vessels, often built to commercial standards, are becoming increasingly popular among the worlds Navies.

First announced in July 2007 the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship Project is a Government of Canada procurement project for acquiring 6-8 ice breaking vessels for the RCN that is part of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy.

It was announced on October 19, 2011 that Irving Shipbuilding would be awarded the $25 billion contract for building six to eight Arctic/Offshore Patrol ships. The patrol ships would have a polar class of PC-5, which means year-round operation in medium first-year ice which may include old ice inclusions. (It should be noted that of the nineteen Canadian Coast Guard icebreakers currently in service, only six have a polar class higher than PC 5.)

The vessels are to be based on the Norwegian Svalbard class and as of 2007 are projected to cost $3.1 billion CAD to construct with a total project procurement budgeted to cost $4.3 billion in order to cover maintenance over the 25 year lifespan of the vessels. These ships are now long overdue and given the rates of inflation cited above there is no reason to believe that this figure is still relevant.

These expensive ships will not make good OPVs nor are they icebreakers. The compromises in their design necessitated by their dual role mean that they will be of limited use as either OPVs or as Arctic patrol vessels.

What the RCN needs is real OPVs, something like the New Zealand Protector class OPV. The two Protector-class offshore patrol vessels (OPV) were designed by STX Canada Marine and built in Australia by Tenix Defence. They completed their operational and system qualification testing in September 2010. The two 1,900-tonne OPVs have a long endurance to enable patrolling of the full EEZ. The core crew consists of 37 crewmen, but they can accommodate an additional 33 personnel. The OPV hulls are ice-strengthened to provide Lloyds ice class 1C protection (thin or broken first year ice to a maximum depth of 0.4m). As planned, the introduction of these capable OPVs has freed up frigates for tasks further afield. Although these vessels have design issues, for example high weight brought about by ice strengthening, these issues have been addressed and a Canadian version could benefit from New Zealand experience.

The suggestion has been made that the Canadian Coast Guard could become an armed service. The barriers to this idea are as much cultural as technical but armed icebreakers, real icebreakers, would obviate much of the need for naval vessels capable of Arctic patrols. If it was necessary it would still be possible for the navy to have one armed genuine icebreaker to be deployed once a year for the duration of the Arctic shipping season. 

The RCN needs numbers to be effective. The current program of ship building will not deliver those numbers even if it is completed as planned, an unlikely event. The answer is OPVs. Reasonably well armed and equipped comparatively inexpensive patrol vessels that have not been compromised by the need to fulfill a Government promise.