TANKS FOR THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

 

TANK

As stated in the new government defence policy update (DPU) "Our North Strong and Free", it is now accepted that "main battle tanks continue to have a decisive effect on the modern battlefield and remain key to conducting land operations against conventional militaries with advanced capabilities". Based on this belief the new defence policy states that the government intends to "explore options for upgrading or replacing our tank...fleets". 

One must assume that those who formulated this document felt the need to emphasize the gravity of their message by the use of bold type in the policy report.

So if it is true that the government, and one presumes the Army, really believe that "main battle tanks...have a decisive effect and remain key to conducting land operations " then certain questions are inevitably raised. For example, how best can Canada use tanks to achieve these effects and how many tanks are needed to do it? 

At this time it would not appear that the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) have a clear vision as to how they want to integrate tanks into the brigade structure or how to use them alongside armoured reconnaissance forces for combat against peer forces.

According to Canadian Army Doctrine, tank forces exhibit characteristics which include firepower, protection and mobility. Firepower is usually provided by an accurate large calibre main gun system capable of, among other things, defeating enemy armoured forces. Protection is a dominant characteristic. A tank’s armour enables it to operate in the face of enemy fire.  Mobility, as a characteristic, speaks to both the bold mindset traditionally instilled in armour commanders as much as it does to mechanical performance. Of the tank’s characteristics the most unique are firepower and protection which are generally regarded as the qualities that fully distinguish tank forces from other land elements because of their ability to maneuver and fight when in direct contact with enemy forces.

The role of armoured reconnaissance is different. It acts as a specialized reconnaissance and security element, structured to conduct its primary tasks and capable of fighting for information. Armoured reconnaissance elements are not associated with a specific platform and are defined by their mobility, light protection, communications, firepower and low personnel density. Containing integral combat support elements they can fulfill a variety of combat roles but their primary task is reconnaissance.

In theory the RCAC is currently divided into two streams; tanks and armoured reconnaissance, with approximately 30% of personnel specializing in the former and 70% in the latter.

In fact, even though these are separate roles calling for separate doctrines and in most cases different equipment, training courses at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School train all students on the Leopard 2, Textron Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV) , and LAV VI armoured fighting vehicles in a single unified 14 week course in which students are taught about commanding the crew of a single vehicle on the Leopard 2 MBT, as well as being trained as armoured reconnaissance troop leaders, using the LAV 6 and TAPV.

Currently the RCAC fields a series of armoured subunits: some of which are reconnaissance squadrons and some of which are tank squadrons, all under the overarching umbrella of “armour.” These are separate tasks. To distinguish between them and for the purposes of this argument, it would be better to refer to reconnaissance as a 'cavalry' role while tank forces are designated as 'armour'. What is important to understand is that while tanks can conduct cavalry duties, vehicles which are not tanks can not act as armoured forces. 

The RCAC has struggled with these issues for decades. When left with tanks (obsolescent Centurions) they have called them fire support vehicles, when given fire support vehicles (AVGP Cougars) they have been organized as tanks. When the Cougars were replace by Coyotes, first in service in 1996 for use in the reconnaissance scout role, they were also tasked in the role of medium tank trainer within armoured cavalry squadrons in the same way as the AVGP Cougar it replaced.

Now the Coyotes have been replaced by the Textron TAPV (Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle) which, while a reasonable replacement for the woefully inadequate Mercedes-Benz G-Wagons used in the light reconnaissance role, is a step backward from the 25mm cannon armed Coyotes. Hopefully the addition of suitable numbers of LAV 6 Recce and LAV OPV units will help to redress this issue. 

So, how best can Canada use tanks to meet the goals laid out in the new defence policy, and how many tanks are needed to do it? 

There  are several alternatives for the Canadian Army and their tank force. And while it may seem redundant, but based on previous experience it is still mandatory, to point out that, regardless of which options are chosen, all vehicles assigned to army formations should have appropriate finances allocated to provide suitable spares and maintenance. It would also be a real asset to such a relatively small force to use just one model of whichever tank is being used, rather than the three different models of Leopard 2 tanks currently in use.

They can continue with the present organization. Currently Leopard 2 tanks have been issued to one of the three regiments associated with the three mechanized brigade groups fielded by the regular (full time) forces of the Canadian Army. That unit, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) is attached to 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and based in Edmonton, Alberta. Leopard tanks can also be found at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School based at Gagetown, New Brunswick where, at least in theory, the tank squadrons of the two other RCAC regiments attached to regular force brigade groups can be found.

Minister Blair also noted that a Canadian Army Tank Squadron of 15 Leopard 2A4M tanks, along with supporting personnel and equipment announced in July 2023, recently arrived in Latvia as part of Operation REASSURANCE. The full complement of approximately 130 personnel should be in place by spring 2024.

Properly supported with spares and training, retaining this structure could be accomplished using the Leopard 2 tanks currently in inventory, approximately 70 vehicles. 

Another option, and probably the least expensive, would be to maintain a tank squadron in Latvia while concentrating all other tank units at Gagetown. As well as being cheap, this choice would have the advantage of allowing the army to field a full regiment (battalion) at least occasionally as a training option. 

It would also allow the armoured regiments attached to the regular force to concentrate on the armoured reconnaissance (cavalry) role. Exercising as cavalry regiments (battalions) for the associated brigades would make it possible to determine the best mix of organic support units, such as fire-support, anti-tank and infantry, that should be added to the reconnaissance teams to achieve desired effects. 

The downside of this strategy would be that the regular force brigades would no longer be able to train regularly with organic tank units, although admittedly this opportunity is only available to one brigade currently, so nothing would change for the majority of the army. With one tank squadron in Latvia and four in Gagetown that would be a total of 5 squadrons of 15 tanks or 75 Tanks. This would be the bare minimum number of gun tanks necessary and would not include support vehicles like armoured recovery, engineering and bridging vehicles based, one hopes, on the same chassis.

If, as another example, the Canadian Army were to field one squadron with each mechanized brigade, one squadron in Latvia and two squadrons (for training and in reserve) in New Brunswick at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School that would be a total of 6 squadrons of 15 tanks or 90 tanks. This would be the bare minimum number of gun tanks necessary and would not include support vehicles like armoured recovery, engineering and bridging vehicles based, one hopes, on the same chassis.

In this scenario armoured regiments (battalions) attached to brigades would consist of two squadrons (companies) in the armoured reconnaissance role and one tank squadron.  Suitable fire-support, anti-tank and infantry support for the reconnaissance units would be attached at either the squadron or regimental level as dictated by doctrine developed through exercises. The armoured squadron (tanks) although attached to the regiment for logistics purposes would be seen as a brigade level resource and tasked as such. They would not, except at the brigade commanders discretion, be used as reconnaissance assets.

Of course it is always possible that the Army, and government, could go 'all in' on tanks and purchase enough vehicles to provide a complete regiment (battalion) of tanks for each regular force brigade, to add to the existing armoured reconnaissance regiments (battalions), as well as another regiments (battalion) worth of tanks at armoured school in Gagetown and a squadron in Latvia. As this would involve the purchase and maintenance of over 200 tanks this option, while possibly desirable, seems wildly unlikely.   

Which ever options are chosen, the government appears to have signaled in the DPU that they want the Army to get serious about tanks and tank warfare. To do this properly the Canadian Army is going to have to separate the roles of armoured reconnaissance (cavalry) and armour (tanks) and organize their forces in such a way as to maximize the advantages of these complementary but distinct forces.

NOT A TANK

 The Role of Armoured Reconnaissance Within the  Canadian Army

https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/05/the-role-of-armoured-reconnaissance-within-the-canadian-army.html

Canadian Army Journal 19.3, published December 2022
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2022/mdn-dnd/D12-11-19-3-eng.pdf

Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring 2022
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/PDFs/CMJ222Ep17.pdf

THE RE-TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARMOURED CORPS
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/mdn-dnd/D12-11-17-3-eng.pdf

CAVALRY: AN OPTIMIZED CAPABILITY FOR ADO
https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/317/305/morin.pdf

The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1999

https://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/D12-9-2-4E.pdf

A Perspective on Cavalry: Re-examining the Mounted Arm for the Future

https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/12/a-perspective-on-cavalry.html#operations

PEACE KEEPING TANKS

On Oct. 29, 2003, Liberal Defence Minister John McCallum and Lt.-Gen. Rick Hillier announced the end of the country's tank force

According to Lt.-Gen. Hillier, the army's Leopards had served their purpose and were now of limited use. The vehicle of the future was instead a LAV III variant, which the general, an armoured officer, called state-of-the art and a "war-winner."

"A mobile gun system is the right vehicle for Canada's army and will provide an excellent capability on Canadian Forces operations," Lt.-Gen. Hillier said. "We are losing a millstone that has hamstrung our thinking for years,"(emphasis added), referring to the Leopard tanks.

Flash forward nine years and we find that the Canadian Forces have acquired 100 Leopard 2A4 tanks from the Netherlands in 2007. Twenty Leopard 2A6Ms were borrowed from Germany from mid-2007 to support the Canadian deployment in Afghanistan, with the first tank handed over after upgrading by KMW on August 2, 2007, and arriving in Afghanistan on August 16, 2007.  Two Bergepanzer 3 Büffel recovery vehicles were purchased from the German Bundeswehr for use with the Canadian deployment in Afghanistan.  An additional fifteen Leopard 2A4 tanks are being purchased from Germany for spare parts.  An additional 12 surplus Pz 87 were purchased from Switzerland in 2011 for conversion to protected special vehicles. (For more on the tortured history of Canada’s Leopard 2 acquisitions check out the excellent collection of pages at CASR)

 Currently the Canadian Army plans to be able to deploy 40 combat tanks. The Canadian Forces want 2 combat-ready squadrons of approximately 20 tanks each: 1 for deployment and a 2nd for rotation into theater to allow for depot repair and overhaul of the 1st.

They also need 40 for training. Another 2 squadrons of 20 tanks each are required for collective and individual training in Canada: individual training at the Combat Training Centre at CFB Gagetown, New Brunswick; and squadron training at CFB Wainwright at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre in Alberta. 

Finally, there are at least 20 key support vehicles such as armored recovery vehicles, which can winch out stuck tanks, or lift a turret or engine out for repairs.

The Department of National Defence believes this is the minimum fleet size necessary to support a deployed tank squadron.

 What happened?

 Why do we have tanks?

 Is there such a thing as a Peace keeping tank?

 Just how wrong was Gen. Hillier?

What happened is Afghanistan. That war highlighted a need for armoured fire support. Leopard 1 tanks (known in Canadian service confusingly enough as “Leopard C2’s) still in service, were brought in to fill that need. They were always seen as a stopgap measure and eventually the Leopard 2’s were purchased to replace them.

When the Army contemplated getting rid of tanks they planned to replace them with a variety of direct fire vehicles. The system of direct fire vehicles contemplated by the army (the mobile gun system, tow missiles and ADATs, all on LAV platforms) were advertised as being a system to defeat enemy armour.

The key here is the need to defeat enemy armour. Although they are a formidable anti-tank system that is not what Canada’s ‘new’ tanks are for. The anti-armour mission has decreased in importance as the possibility of Canadian Forces engaging in front line combat against traditional armies has declined. 

Fire support for infantry has always been the goal, the increasingly complicated nature of modern warfare dictated that troops have always have powerful organic fire support. The Leopard 2 tanks provide mobile, protected, accurate fire support. That is why we have them.

Tanks can be used for peace keeping. They are very intimidating, and intimidating people is better then killing them, especially in a peacekeeping situation. Tanks give troops the luxury of time; time to evaluate a situation while rocks, bottles, bullets and worse bounce off all that heavy armour. Tanks are accurate; the 120mm high velocity gun on a Leopard 2 is astonishingly accurate at long ranges under a wide variety of conditions. Hitting what you want, and just what you want, without danger of ‘collateral’ damage is a peacekeeping “must have”. The troops inside a tank are surrounded by modern sensors and hooked into a comprehensive communications network, all the things necessary to manage and control complex situations. Not the be all and end all for peacekeeping, but a valuable tool.

In the final analysis Gen. Hillier was not that wrong. I suspect that what he was concerned about was an army that was still preparing to fight massed Russian tank forces in Europe. He wanted a more mobile, more flexible force that could be used in a wide variety of situations.

It’s not whether or not you have tanks, its how you organize them and how you plan to use them that matters. Canada’s tanks are a powerful addition to our forces, a useful addition to our military ‘insurance’ policy and if used properly a flexible instrument of national policy.