It
is reported that on June 19 U.S.
President Donald Trump sent a letter to Prime Minister Justin calling on
allies, including Canada, to increase defence spending on NATO. President Trump
is quoted as saying that “The United States is increasingly unwilling to ignore
this Alliance’s failure to meet shared security challenges.”
President
Trump’s letter comes at a time of increased trade tensions between Canada and
the United States. The president’s administration
imposed stiff tariffs on steel and aluminum imports which Washington has said, “are
necessary because of national security concerns”– an argument Canadian
officials have said is "insulting" and “absurd.”
The
application of tariffs based on ‘national security concerns’ has been greeted
with surprise in Canada. It should not. Although it may well be true that these
tariffs are motivated more by concerns over bi-national and international trade
then they are genuinely motivated by so called ‘security concerns’ it should
not come as a surprise that the U.S. would put its own interests first.
As
Ed Whitcomb pointed out in the
Globe and Mail the United States followed, almost literally for centuries,
isolationist policies. It could even be said that the current fashion for
multilateralism in that country is the aberration, not the norm. As he points
out, “The U.S. is moving back to its
traditional preference for bilateralism and isolation and no amount of
lecturing on the advantages of multilateralism will change the minds of those
who think that way.”
In
point of fact, as Canada has discovered in the past, all countries, no matter
how close the relationship, put their own interests first. In 1903 the Alaska boundary dispute took
place between Canada and the United States over the boundary of southeastern
Alaska and the coast of British Columbia. The dispute was referred to an
international tribunal, whose members included three, two Canadians and Lord
Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of England.
To
the surprise of many, Alverstone supported the American position against that
of the Canadian delegation. It appeared to Canadians that the British felt that
their new policies of what came to be known as rapprochement with the United States counted for more than
Canadian interests. Although Canadian representatives refused to sign the final
decision this act of protest did not prevent the decision from taking effect,
since the question had been put to binding arbitration.
One
unforeseen outcome of this decision was a growing Canadian desire for full
control over their foreign policy. Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier emphasized
that Canada's lack of treaty-making power made it difficult to maintain its
rights internationally and the dispute, as well as fueling anti-British
sympathy, supported Ottawa’s case for increasing independence from London,
especially in the years following the First World War.
In
our current situation both Matt Gurney writing for Global News and Ted Campbell on his website have made the point that if a nation wishes to
be truly sovereign then it needs to have independent foreign and defence
policies backed up by spending adequate to realize those policies. Gurney in
particular laments what he perceives as the Canadian tendency to assume that in
the final analysis we can always count on the U.S. to protect us. As history
has shown us, this is a false belief.
In
the past Canada has effectively used military spending to achieve
political/trade goals. Writing in The Canadian Military Journal Frank Maas pointed out that: “After
a lengthy review of foreign and defence policy in 1968 and 1969, the Trudeau
government announced plans to reduce 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in
Europe by half and replace its Centurion tanks with a lighter vehicle. This
angered Canada’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, but they
could not convince Trudeau to reverse course, and the plan was confirmed in the
1971 defence white paper, Defence in the 70s.
The following
year, the government announced plans to develop trade links with Western Europe
and Japan, the “Third Option,” to reduce dependency upon the United States.
Attempts to foster a contractual link with the
European Economic Community began in 1973 and it quickly became apparent that
the Europeans were resentful of the reduction of the brigade in 1969, and
pressed Canada to beef up its defences in Europe. An intensive review of
Canada’s armed forces, the Defence Structure Review, began in 1974, and NATO
allies, particularly West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, prevailed upon
Canada’s diplomats, soldiers, and Trudeau himself to reverse the 1969 decision
and keep tanks in Europe. The suggestion was that if Canada wanted trade with
Europe, it would have to help defend Europe.”
The
end result was that the cabinet directed the Armed Forces to purchase 128 German
built Leopard 1 tanks. Compared to most procurement projects the
speed of the program was spectacular. Cabinet directed the army to purchase new
tanks in November 1975, approved a deal in May 1976, and the government signed
a contract in October 1976. By 1979, the army received 128 modern tanks, on
time and under budget.
This
was a case in which Canada used a directed military procurement to achieve
political and trade goals.
The
time has come for Canada to consider similar actions with respect to our
ongoing disputes with the United States. Canada does need to spend more on
defence, if for no other reason than to increase our own capacity to maintain
an independent foreign and defence policy. At the same time we need to send a
message to our U.S. allies that actions have consequences and that there are costs
associated with forgoing traditional methods of diplomacy in favour of bullying
tweets and gratuitous insults.
Canada
cannot win a trade war with the United States, we should not even try. As Conrad Black has pointed out, “Behind
the peeling facades of Norman Rockwell and Walt Disney, America is a monster,
and not always an amiable one… Canadian policy-makers must understand that they
are playing for almost mortal stakes with potentially dangerous protagonists
who have no sense of fair play and no interest in what Canada thinks of them.”
That
does not mean that there are not actions that Canada can take.
Cabinet
should immediately direct the Armed Forces to procure a minimum of 88 Typhoon
Eurofighters. Any complaints from other manufacturers over the lack of an open
competition can be dealt with by referring to the “national security” caveat included
in any government procurement program.
Directing
that an acquisition program worth up to $19 billion , include associated equipment, weapons, and other services, go
to a European conglomerate would send a strong message. It would be a message
that could be heard and understood by many sectors of the U.S establishment.
If
the announcement of a directed purchase of European jet fighters were to be
followed shortly thereafter by a similar declaration concerning the acquisition
of suitable numbers of Airbus A330 MRTT aircraft for use as air-to-air refuelers and transports the
message would become deafening.
No
project, however necessary or well-managed, can prevail against a government
that does not see the political utility of the project. Conversely, a Cabinet
and Prime Minister who understood the practical benefits, both domestic and
international, to be derived from giving clear and unambiguous political
support to purchasing proven, in-service aircraft and working with accommodating
contractors could overcome many of the negative factors that have bedeviled Canadian
military procurement efforts in recent decades.
Even
more important would be the lesson delivered to both a national and
international audience regarding the importance Canada places on its own
sovereignty.
Trump
warns Trudeau on lack of defence spending ahead of NATO summit
How Canada deals with
America in seven simple steps
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-how-canada-deals-with-america-in-seven-simple-steps/
Alaska Boundary Dispute
The Great Rapprochement
COMMENTARY: Still think
outsourcing our national defence is a good idea?
Ted Campbell's Point of
View
“From a Beetle to a
Porsche:” The Purchase of the Leopard C1 Tank for the Canadian Army
by Frank Maas
Conrad Black: Take heed
Canada: the U.S. would win a true trade war
U.K. firm's Ottawa offices
to help feds find new fighter jets
Airbus, Boeing tankers jockey
to replace Polaris
