A NEW MODEL (CANADIAN) ARMY

 

The Canadian Armed Forces, as currently constituted, were unable to sustain a small brigade in Afghanistan.

In 2011, as our troops left the country Lt. Gen. Peter Devlin, Canadian Army commander was quoted as saying “it will be more than a year after leaving Afghanistan, before the Canadian army is “reconstituted” to a level fit to again deploy in substantial numbers.  “We will have the means, by December 2012, to deploy a capable task force – not of this size – to respond if the government of Canada wants us to,” Gen. Devlin said.

Approximately 3,000 troops served in Afghanistan at any one time, many had three tours in nine years. This so depleted our armed forces that a time-out was needed to recover. Essentially Canada’s military was paralyzed for a year, unable to contemplate combat missions because of its participation in the Afghan war.

How is this possible? Was this situation caused by a lack of troops and equipment and money, or was it a failure of organization?

Currently the main strength of Canada’s army can be found in three Mechanized Brigade Groups. These Brigades are made up of regular force units which consist of Headquarters and Signal units, an artillery formation, an armoured regiment, three infantry battalions, a combat engineer regiment and a service battalion. Regular force units consisting of a Helicopter Squadron, a Field Ambulance unit and a Military Police Unit are co-located, and work closely with, the brigade group, but are not officially a part of it.

These Mechanized Brigade Groups are headquartered at Valcartier, Quebec, (5 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group) Petawawa, Ontario,(2 CanadianMechanized Brigade Group) and Edmonton Alberta.(1 CanadianMechanized Brigade Group) with sub units scattered as far apart as Petawawa, Ontario and Gagetown, New Brunswick.

While at one time the Brigade groups were differentiated by mission and there were some differences in composition, the current structure has been in place since at least 1995 when Canada’s NATO contribution, 4 Brigade in Europe, was disbanded. The Canadian Airborne Regiment was disbanded the same year.

Seventeen years and there has been no important change of any kind in the structure of the Canadian Army. The end of the cold war, 9/11, and our Afghanistan commitment have come and gone, yet this structure remains unchanged. It reflects either a triumph of military thinking and planning or more likely, inertia in action.

There are other options.

As currently deployed the Brigade groups are not cohesive entities capable of training as whole units. They are not present in all of the major regions of Canada. For example, the regular army unit closest to Vancouver (and the Pacific region) is stationed in Edmonton. Three units can not easily meet the Armed Forces six point strategy for regeneration

Five smaller, but still fully functional, brigades stationed across the country in the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, the western provinces and the Pacific region, would better deal with these issues. The same number of soldiers could be divided into smaller, more easily deployed brigades. It should be noted here that given our bloated command structure it would not be necessary to promote more officers. These leaner brigades would more nearly resemble the kind of forces we actually sent to Afghanistan. 

The Canadian battle group that served in Kandahar Province from October 2005 to June 2011 consisted of a full battalion of infantry, a tank squadron, an armoured reconnaissance squadron, a battery of field artillery, and a field engineer squadron.

One possible model for these new brigades is a U.S. Army brigade combat team.The BCT is the basic deployable unit of maneuver in the US Army. A brigade combat team consists of one combat arms branch maneuver brigade, and its attached support and fire units. The infantry brigade combat team is organized around two battalions of infantry. Each type of brigade (light infantry, air assault, or airborne) has the same basic organization. The infantry brigade combat team consists of six units: two infantry battalions and one each of cavalry (RSTA), fires, special troops, and brigade support.  BCTs contain organic artillery support. The number of Soldiers in a BCT varies between 3,500 and 3,900 depending upon whether it is a Light, Heavy or Stryker BCT. A brigade combat team is generally commanded by a colonel (O-6), but in rare instances it is commanded by a brigadier general. A brigade combat team carries with it support units necessary to sustain its operations away from its parent division.

There are other models, other organizational changes that could be made. What is not in question is the status quo has not served us well and will not serve us in the future. It deserves to be said again, “The Canadian Armed Forces were unable to sustain a small brigade in Afghanistan”. Twenty-three thousand army troops, a Defence budget of over Twenty Billion dollars a year and as currently constituted the Canadian Army, in its own words, needed a year to reconstitute itself after withdrawing from Afghanistan.

It’s not good enough, the tax paying public as well as our overworked soldiery, deserve better.

PEACE KEEPING TANKS

On Oct. 29, 2003, Liberal Defence Minister John McCallum and Lt.-Gen. Rick Hillier announced the end of the country's tank force

According to Lt.-Gen. Hillier, the army's Leopards had served their purpose and were now of limited use. The vehicle of the future was instead a LAV III variant, which the general, an armoured officer, called state-of-the art and a "war-winner."

"A mobile gun system is the right vehicle for Canada's army and will provide an excellent capability on Canadian Forces operations," Lt.-Gen. Hillier said. "We are losing a millstone that has hamstrung our thinking for years,"(emphasis added), referring to the Leopard tanks.

Flash forward nine years and we find that the Canadian Forces have acquired 100 Leopard 2A4 tanks from the Netherlands in 2007. Twenty Leopard 2A6Ms were borrowed from Germany from mid-2007 to support the Canadian deployment in Afghanistan, with the first tank handed over after upgrading by KMW on August 2, 2007, and arriving in Afghanistan on August 16, 2007.  Two Bergepanzer 3 Büffel recovery vehicles were purchased from the German Bundeswehr for use with the Canadian deployment in Afghanistan.  An additional fifteen Leopard 2A4 tanks are being purchased from Germany for spare parts.  An additional 12 surplus Pz 87 were purchased from Switzerland in 2011 for conversion to protected special vehicles. (For more on the tortured history of Canada’s Leopard 2 acquisitions check out the excellent collection of pages at CASR)

 Currently the Canadian Army plans to be able to deploy 40 combat tanks. The Canadian Forces want 2 combat-ready squadrons of approximately 20 tanks each: 1 for deployment and a 2nd for rotation into theater to allow for depot repair and overhaul of the 1st.

They also need 40 for training. Another 2 squadrons of 20 tanks each are required for collective and individual training in Canada: individual training at the Combat Training Centre at CFB Gagetown, New Brunswick; and squadron training at CFB Wainwright at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre in Alberta. 

Finally, there are at least 20 key support vehicles such as armored recovery vehicles, which can winch out stuck tanks, or lift a turret or engine out for repairs.

The Department of National Defence believes this is the minimum fleet size necessary to support a deployed tank squadron.

 What happened?

 Why do we have tanks?

 Is there such a thing as a Peace keeping tank?

 Just how wrong was Gen. Hillier?

What happened is Afghanistan. That war highlighted a need for armoured fire support. Leopard 1 tanks (known in Canadian service confusingly enough as “Leopard C2’s) still in service, were brought in to fill that need. They were always seen as a stopgap measure and eventually the Leopard 2’s were purchased to replace them.

When the Army contemplated getting rid of tanks they planned to replace them with a variety of direct fire vehicles. The system of direct fire vehicles contemplated by the army (the mobile gun system, tow missiles and ADATs, all on LAV platforms) were advertised as being a system to defeat enemy armour.

The key here is the need to defeat enemy armour. Although they are a formidable anti-tank system that is not what Canada’s ‘new’ tanks are for. The anti-armour mission has decreased in importance as the possibility of Canadian Forces engaging in front line combat against traditional armies has declined. 

Fire support for infantry has always been the goal, the increasingly complicated nature of modern warfare dictated that troops have always have powerful organic fire support. The Leopard 2 tanks provide mobile, protected, accurate fire support. That is why we have them.

Tanks can be used for peace keeping. They are very intimidating, and intimidating people is better then killing them, especially in a peacekeeping situation. Tanks give troops the luxury of time; time to evaluate a situation while rocks, bottles, bullets and worse bounce off all that heavy armour. Tanks are accurate; the 120mm high velocity gun on a Leopard 2 is astonishingly accurate at long ranges under a wide variety of conditions. Hitting what you want, and just what you want, without danger of ‘collateral’ damage is a peacekeeping “must have”. The troops inside a tank are surrounded by modern sensors and hooked into a comprehensive communications network, all the things necessary to manage and control complex situations. Not the be all and end all for peacekeeping, but a valuable tool.

In the final analysis Gen. Hillier was not that wrong. I suspect that what he was concerned about was an army that was still preparing to fight massed Russian tank forces in Europe. He wanted a more mobile, more flexible force that could be used in a wide variety of situations.

It’s not whether or not you have tanks, its how you organize them and how you plan to use them that matters. Canada’s tanks are a powerful addition to our forces, a useful addition to our military ‘insurance’ policy and if used properly a flexible instrument of national policy.

POST WAR RIFLES

 

At the end of WWII the Canadian Forces, like most other Commonwealth countries was armed with the .303 caliber Lee-Enfield bolt-action rifle.

The bolt action rifle in general and the .303 caliber round in particular were seen as obsolete in light of the experiences and technical advances coming out of WWII.

The post war small arms scene saw the rise of the assault rifle. Specifically the Soviet designed Ak-47, or Kalashnikov, which became the new standard against which other weapons were judged. The western response was the M-16 rifle and its accompanying 5.56mm round.

The Kalashnikov has become an icon. As much a symbol as a weapon, it is a formidable weapon. Part of its success lies in the bullet it uses. The large caliber bullets in use up to the Second World War were too big for use in fully automatic rifles; the answer was smaller bullets that traded speed for weight to achieve lower recoil with acceptable lethality. The Ak-47 uses a 7.62×39mm cartridge. Larger then a pistol bullet but smaller then a full sized rifle bullet it made the relatively light weight fully automatic assault rifle possible.

The whole field of bullet sizes and descriptions is uncommonly complicated, but an excellent primer (pun intended) on cartridges can be found at Anthony G. Williams’ homepage:

 http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/Cartridges.htm

 The M-16 and its 5.56mm bullet were born out dissatisfaction with the heavy rifle and full sized round favoured by the U.S in the post-war era. After the war the British in particular had been interested in replacing their .303 Lee-Enfield’s with a modern weapon. U.S. pressure forced them to cancel a promising new assault rifle, with accompanying new .280cal. cartridge, and, along with Canada and the rest of NATO, adopt the full sized 7.62mm U.S. round. The semi-automatic FN rifle which was well suited to the cartridge became the weapon of choice for most of NATO.

It was the Vietnam War which changed the situation. The Americans found themselves literally outgunned by the Ak-47 in the jungle environment. Against great internal opposition, which went so far as to use bullets made to the wrong specifications when the weapon was first introduced, the M-16 and its derivatives eventually became the standard U.S. rifle. Needless to say its 5.56mm cartridge then became the new NATO standard round.

Canada adopted a Canadian made version of the M-16 and has used it and other Canadian made derivatives since 1984. More information about the weapon can be found at:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colt_Canada_C7_rifle

The complaint against assault rifles in general and the various 5.56mm type rounds specifically is that they are too light and that they lack range and lethality. In Afghanistan this appeared to be true in some circumstances. NATO troops sometimes felt that the Taliban could engage them from greater ranges then they could return effective fire. The 5.56mm round trades velocity for weight and then looses some of that velocity being fired from the short barreled versions of the M-16 currently favoured. Troops in the field have found that at ranges greater then two or three hundred meters the bullet is no longer effective.

 What is needed is a completely new rifle and accompanying round. Much easier to suggest then to do it is even harder then it appears. For reasons that may best be left to the psychologists, purchasing small arms appears to be an incredibly emotional issue. The sheer amount of discussion and impassioned debate that goes into the purchase of a new service pistol or rifle makes the debate over F-35’s seem mild in comparison.

For a more dispassionate explanation of the whole state of play check out Anthony G. Williams’ article, “The Case for a General-Purpose Rifle and Machine Gun Cartridge” at:

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/The%20Next%20Generation.htm

It is never going to be a good time to spend all the money necessary to equip the Canadian Forces (and NATO) with a new family of small arms. This is a particularly bad time as the Forces (along with the rest of NATO) can expect to have smaller budgets for the immediate future. There is one thing however that can be done. As Mr. Williams says;

“What I believe is needed is a small-scale research and development project which examines the caliber, ballistics and bullet design of an optimum GPC and produces one or more conventional rounds for thorough testing in suitably modified existing 7.62mm guns, preferably including active service. This could provide valuable input into advanced ammunition projects like LSAT, and would also act as a back-up, ready to go into production if needed. The cost and risks would be very low, the potential benefits substantial. This is not complicated. We could have gone down this path decades ago, first with the .276 Pedersen, then with the 7x43, and we should not, yet again, miss the opportunity to do so in our next generation of small arms.”

In a difficult economic time small scale and carefully focused research, and to a lesser extent development, is the appropriate choice. Now is the time to be spending what money is available on developing the weapons that will be needed when circumstances and money make them a necessity.

 On a final note it is ironic that, as the Canadian Forces increase their Arctic presence, concern about the inadequacy of currently issued firearms to deal with the threat of  polar bear encounters has lead to the limited re-issue of .303 caliber Lee-Enfield bolt action rifles to northern bound troops.

HOW NOT TO BUY A TRUCK, PART TWO

In a previous post, How Not to Buy a Truck I tried to unravel the troubled history of attempts by the Department on National Defence to buy trucks.

Since then there have been new developments.

 On July 11, 2012 the government cancelled the military truck competition just minutes before companies were to submit their bids and after the firms had already spent millions on their proposals as well as shipping the vehicles to an American test range. Several firms, including Mercedes-Benz Canada, Oshkosh Defense and Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles had planned to bid on the project. The government had asked companies to submit their bids on Wednesday as well as to transport their trucks to a facility in Nevada for testing.

Several minutes before the bids were to be submitted, company representatives were told the process had been shut down. Companies were told by Public Works and Government Services Canada in an email that  "Economic, marketplace and budgetary circumstances have changed since this solicitation process began Therefore; the Government of Canada needs to reassess this procurement to ensure that the right equipment is acquired for the Army at the best value for Canada, prior to proceeding with a new solicitation. Canada will be contacting you shortly to arrange for the return of your vehicles. The Government of Canada would like to thank you for your interest in being a supplier to the Government of Canada, Your participation is appreciated, and we hope that you will continue to bid on procurement opportunity offered by Public Works and Government Services Canada."

Does anybody know what is going on at the Department of Public Works and the Department of National Defence? This is an 800 million dollar project that has been running for more then six years and has been cancelled at the last minute. Trucks matter! If the government does not have the competency to provide them for our armed forces it suggests they are not competent to manage the Department of National Defence. In any private for-profit organization this level of incompetence would get someone fired. It remains to be seen whether anyone will be held accountable for this ongoing fiasco.

HOW NOT TO BUY A TRUCK

Canada's ability to build trucks was proven in the Second World War. Currently it would appear we can't even buy them.

The DND's attempt to buy trucks is not going well. In 2004 the Defence Department warned in an in internal report that it's existing truck fleet could be hit by a "catastrophic" failure at any time because of poor brakes and steering systems. Catastrophic failure is used to signify accidents that could involve serious injuries or death. Given this situation you would think this program would have a higher priority. 

What they say they want:

 "The aim of the Medium Support Vehicle System (MSVS) project is to procure new medium-sized logistics trucks for the Canadian Forces. This new fleet will be used by the Regular Forces and the Reserves in a wide range of roles - from support during domestic emergencies, to deployed operations. They will replace the current Medium Logistics trucks, which have been in use since the 1980s and are reaching the end of their service life.
This project will also:

• provide the platform for integral unit logistics;
• provide mobile support facilities such as field kitchens, workshops and medical facilities;
• effect resupply operations to deliver reinforcements and supplies;
• operate in a simplified environment in a manner compatible with commercial containerized cargo to reduce or eliminate duplicate handling; and
• provide for tactical movement to support operations across the spectrum of conflict.

The MSVS project will modernize and improve the sustainment capability and capacity of the Army, joint operations, Air Force and Reserves. It is managed as a capability replacement project, not a project replacing equipment on a one-for-one basis.

There are four components to the MSVS project:

• Militarized Commercial Off-The-Shelf (MilCOTS)
• Standard Military Pattern (SMP)
• Baseline Shelter
• Special Equipment Vehicle (SEV) Kitting

 DND will also buy key add-ons, including: 300 SMP armour protection systems. Every SMP truck must be able to accept the up-armouring kits, even if only a small percentage of them can be armoured at any one time. 895 Specially Equipped Vehicles kits (such as mobile kitchens, offices and medical or dental stations): 145 for the MilCOTS 7400s, and the rest for SMP. DEW Engineering will lead the base SEV contract. There’s also a separate contract for “kitting” (modifying) the SEV base shelters.”

What they have been able to acquire so far:

In January 2009 (following the November 2007 RFP for an estimated 800 trucks), it was disclosed that Navistar Defense LLC had been awarded the MilCOTS segment of the MSVS requirement. Under the terms of the C$274 million contract, Navistar will deliver a total of 1,300 trucks in six primary variants. The MSVS MilCOTS fleets, which will be serviced and maintained by Navistar’s 93 Canadian dealerships, are based on Navistar’s International WorkStar medium duty commercial platform (previously known as the 7000 series).  Supplementary to the MSVS vehicle components, DEW announced in August 2009 that it had been awarded the MSVS Baseline Shelter contract, valued at C$130 million and calling for 895 shelters (plus an optional 110) over four years. .

  

How they got here:

In 2004 the Defence Department warned in an internal report that its existing truck fleet could be hit by a “catastrophic” failure at any time.

 In 2006  the project was announced by then Defence Minister Gordon O’Connor. The DND background materials added that:

“The requirement for this equipment is urgent. Delivery is expected as soon as possible and will continue until the requirement is fully met.” (italics added)

 

In 2009 the Department of National Defence had not  issued a formal RFP (Request for Proposals) for the front-line SMP trucks. 

In  2011 a formal RFP for the front-line SMP trucks was issued

In 2012 there has been yet another extension on the deadline for the MSVS request for proposals. This one now sets the RFP response for July 11^th (from late May).

In  2013, a decision is expected.

In  2014 deliveries are expected to begin and run to June 2016.

Or, to put it another way, the “urgent” buy would begin deliveries of front-line vehicles about 10 years after the need was identified.

So where are we?

 Trucks are the backbone of a modern army. They are more important then the fighting vehicles normally associated with land combat. No matter how impressive tracked and wheeled fighting vehicles look none of them would be able to go anywhere without trucks to bring them fuel and ammunition. The logistics footprint of a mechanized force is gigantic. Without trucks to service those needs you don’t have an army so much as a force of hungry marching men.

 Given this importance it may say something about the professionalism of the Canadian Armed Forces that they can not successfully prioritize the replacement of their aging trucks.

 In this new age of austere defence budgets the Department of National Defence’s inability to purchase new trucks in a timely manner can only get worse. Having been unable or unwilling (it has been reported that “ In 2008 and 2009 in-fighting between Canadian Army and DND officials over the requirements for the trucks led to further delays”) to acquire the vehicles they may now be in danger of not having the resources to fulfill there own requirements.

TACTICAL ARMOURED PATROL VEHICLE PROGRAM

It was announced today, June 8, 2012 that Textron had been chosen to fill Canada’s Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle Program. The TAPV project will procure 500 vehicles with an option for an additional 100. They will replace the RG-31 Nyla and Coyote Reconnaissance Vehicle and will complement the G-Wagon.

  The Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle, the RG-35, the Nexter Aravis, the Oshkosh M-ATV, the Rg-31Mk5 EM, the BAE Alligator 6x6 and the Textron-Cadillac Gage Mobile Survivable Vehicle (an upgraded version of the M1117 Armoured Security Vehicle) were all considered. Nexter and Bushmaster both withdrew from the competition. Both Textron Systems Canada Inc and Rheinmetall Canada completed the physical portion of the Canadian Forces TAPV competitive process.

  
 With up to 600 of these new ‘Cadillacs in service they will as common in the Canadian Armed Forces as the LAV III or the G-Wagen. It remains to be seen if the replaced RG-31 Nyalas and Coyotes will find their way into the hands of the reserve force.

  

  In rough, very rough, figures these new vehicles will cost more then a million dollars each to purchase and are expected to cost more then one hundred dollars a day to run. Just how expensive this is depends on your perspective. From the viewpoint of a taxpayer it seems like a great deal of money, if you’re under fire in a war zone it might seem like not nearly enough.

 DND and the government must be hoping that this announcement will go well and that there are no unforeseen developments. They desperately need to be seen to have run a successful program. At this point even one more public failure will just about guarantee that the DND looses all authority over these decisions.

More background information below;

  According to the DND website “the TAPV project will deliver a wheeled combat vehicle that will fulfill a wide variety of roles domestically and on the battlefield, including but not limited to reconnaissance and surveillance, security, command and control, cargo, and armoured personnel carrier. It will have a high degree of tactical mobility and provide a very high degree of survivability to its crew.”

More from DND:

“TAPV Background

The mission of the Army is to generate and maintain combat-capable, multi-purpose land forces to meet Canada's defence objectives. Multi-purpose forces provide full spectrum capability, derived from a combination of integral complementary capabilities as well as the full integration of joint and coalition assets. Army capability is based on a range of leading edge technologies that provide lethality, deployability, mobility, agility survivability, and modularity. Analysis of the future security environment has led the Army to optimize its concepts, structures, equipment and training for adaptive dispersed operations, in a context of counter-insurgency operations, with the capacity to address all aspects of full spectrum operations. Lighter elements must exploit technology to achieve a high level of survivability and enhance responsiveness, deployability and mobility while potentially trading off a measure of protection and lethality compared to heavier systems.

A number of critical deficiencies have been identified within the current fleet of soft-skinned and older light armoured vehicles which are no longer capable of meeting today's and future requirements for mobility, ergonomics, information and intelligence sharing, and the ability to deliver integrated lethal and non-lethal effects. In addition, they fail to provide an adequate level of protection against current and emerging threats. While some success has been realized through extensive protection enhancements in mitigating the various threats, the vehicles have now reached their certified gross vehicle weight limits and therefore their potential for further upgrades. All these fleets are now either approaching or at their limits of viable economic and technical upgrade.

The TAPV is intended to overcome the aforementioned deficiencies in capabilities as well as fulfill future operational concept requirements. Changes in recent years to the threats facing the CF on operations have led to an increased attention on protection”

The Textron Systems announcement released today reads, in part:

“GAGETOWN CFB, NB – JUNE 8, 2012 — Textron Systems Canada Inc., a Textron Inc. (NYSE: TXT) company, today announced that it has been selected by the Canadian government for the Canadian Forces Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV) program. The contract provides that the Textron TAPV Team, led by Textron Systems Canada, together with Textron Marine & Land Systems and Rheinmetall Canada, will manufacture 500 vehicles, with an option for up to 100 more.

The TAPV contract has a value of $603.4 million CAD; excluding government sales tax/harmonized sales tax (GST/HST), with an additional five-year in-service support contract of $105.4 million CAD, excluding GST/HST. The first vehicle is scheduled to be delivered to the Canadian Army in July 2014 and the last delivery is scheduled for March 2016.     

Ottawa-based Textron Systems Canada, as prime contractor, will provide overall TAPV program and configuration management, act as design authority for change management, coordinate vehicle integration activities by Canadian subcontractors, manage the In-Service Support contract, and implement the Industrial and Regional Benefits program.

“We are honoured that the Department of National Defence and Public Works and Government Services found our team and vehicle best suited to their needs for this important program,” said Textron Systems President and Chief Executive Officer Fred Strader. “The Textron TAPV will provide the men and women of the Canadian Army a fully supportable tactical armoured vehicle platform that delivers outstanding performance in the world’s most challenging environments.”

Engineered over a five-year-period to meet and/or exceed Canada’s requirements, Textron’s TAPV is designed to be the most reliable and technologically advanced vehicle of its kind. It draws on the company’s more than 45 years of experience in the design and production of armoured vehicles. A technology readiness level 8 vehicle, the Textron TAPV has successfully completed extensive testing to confirm its ballistic, blast, mobility and reliability levels.

“The Textron TAPV will deliver an unmatched blend of survivability, crew protection, power, mobility and payload versatility,” explained Neil Rutter, general manager of Textron Systems Canada.  “Our program team is ready to move forward to produce this modern and upgradable 4 by 4 armoured vehicle, which will serve the Canadian Army extremely well for the next 25 years.”

The Canadian Textron TAPV team includes Kongsberg Protech Systems Canada (London, ON), Rheinmetall Canada (St. Jean sur Richelieu, P.Q.) and EODC – Engineering Office Deisenroth Canada (Ottawa, ON).  As the program is ramped up Canadian companies including Michelin (Waterville, NS), General Kinetics (Brampton, ON), Evraz North America (Regina, SK), SED Systems (Saskatoon, SK), Ontario Drive and Gear (New Hamburg, ON), Mobile Climate Control (Vaughan, ON) and many others from across Canada are expected to figure prominently in the Textron TAPV supply chain.

Textron currently employs more than 2,200 Canadians at its Textron Systems Canada, Bell Helicopter and Kautex facilities in Canada. Textron companies have procured approximately $450 million CAD in materials over the past year from Canadian supplier companies.”

Textron Systems MSV-Derived TAPV Specifications 

Crew	Recce -  4  (driver, commander, gunner, operator )  Utility – 10 (driver, commander, gunner, up to 7 dismounts)
Armament	Kongsberg M153 Protector RWS  1x40mm AGL or 12.7mm HMG     + 1 x 7.62mm C6 option
Size/Weight	Length:  6.81 m,  Width: 2.69 m,  Height: 3.0 m  (estimated and not counting the RWS ) Gross weight: 17 tonnes
Powerplant	365 hp Cummins QSL 8.9L   inline 6-cylinder turbo diesel Allison MD3560 6-spd (+1 rev) automatic transmission
Performance	Max speed: 105 km/h (on road) Cruising range: 644 km

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ARMOURED PERSONAL CARRIER IN CANADIAN SERVICE

 In some ways Canada invented the armoured personal carrier (APC). In the Second World War Canadian built Ram tanks with turrets removed and “defrocked” Priest self-propelled artillery vehicles were pressed into service as APC’s. Known as Kangaroos, they were operated by the 1st Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron.

 In the post war environment an attempt to design a Canadian APC, named Bobcat, joined the Avro Arrow and HMCS Brasd'Or (FHE 400) as ‘might have beens’ that never were. One of the things that killed the Bobcat was the ubiquitous M-113 (Gavin) APC.

  Cold war strategy in the ‘60s assumed WWIII might start with tactical nuclear strikes on military targets. Dispersal was the answer to the problem and the M-113 was the answer to dispersion. An armoured, tracked, amphibious vehicle capable of holding 11 men it was perfectly suited to the task. Not too heavy at 12 tons, mechanically reliable, simple and affordable it was purchased in quantity by all the western forces. If WWIII or something like it had broken out it would have been as common on the battlefield as the jeep was in WWII.

  Designed to safely take troops around the battlefield, it was not expected to enter directly into combat but rather to transport troops to the battle; it was referred to as a battlefield taxi. It could keep up with tanks but was not designed to fight with them. As time progressed the whole concept of the APC was superseded by the Mechanized Infantry FightingVehicle (MICV). Much more heavily armoured and armed then the M-113 class of APC’s, MICV’S were designed to accompany tanks into battle while carrying troops and supporting them.

 In the late 1970’s the Armoured Vehicle, General Purpose (AVGP) entered the Canadian Forces inventory. A six wheeled Swiss designed family of armoured vehicles they were procured for use by the reserves. They were used mainly as APC and tank surrogates for training purposes. Inevitably they ended up in the hands of the regulars on operations who valued them for their low maintenance and ease of use on roads.

 With the end of the cold war and the necessary re-orientation of the army as a more general purpose force a new APC was needed. Experience with the AVGP and the need for an MICV class vehicle led to the introduction of the LAV III. “LAV” in this case stood for Light Armoured Vehicle which was something of a misnomer. Twice as heavy and with eight wheels it was much more heavily armoured and armed (with a 25m automatic canon) then its predecessors. Oddly enough its wheels made people think of trucks while the tracks on an M-113 reminded people of tanks which led to a situation in which some felt the LAV III was a step back in terms of capability. Combat in Afghanistan would end this misunderstanding.

 The LAV III has been a success in service. The platform has been updated and will continue in use for many years, at the same time some of the limitations inherent in a wheeled design have been noted. Wheeled vehicles ride higher then tracked vehicles which can give them a greater ability to withstand ground based explosives. However the higher center of gravity can limit the amount of armour they can carry. They have a generally lower maintenance footprint and can self deploy for long distances on roads but lack the all terrain mobility of tracked armour.

 Tracked vehicles come with their own set of compromises. Drawbacks include slower road speeds, greater maintenance demands, and a lower center of gravity which, although good for stability, leaves them more vulnerable to mines and IED’s

 The obvious solution is a mixed fleet of vehicles. Rebuilt and re-purposed M-113’s are in use for engineers and support duties but it was felt that an infantry carrier was needed to keep up with newly acquired Leopard II tanks. So was born the Close Combat Vehicle Project. The project has not gone well. DND so far seems incapable of defining its requirements in a manner that satisfies both itself and industry. With budgets shrinking there is some doubt that a new Armoured Personal Carrier of any description will enter the inventory of the Canadian Armed Forces any time in the near future. 

MENTAL EXERCISES AND REALITY

 

In Colin S. Grays’ book “Another Bloody Century” (published by Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005, and highly recommended) he quotes British military theorist Major-General J.F.C. Fuller as saying;

“Tools, or weapons, if only the right ones can be discovered, form 99 per cent of victory…Strategy, command, leadership, courage, discipline, supply, organization and all of the moral and physical paraphernalia of war are nothing to a high superiority of weapons – at most they go to form the one per cent which makes the whole possible. In wars, especially in modern wars, wars in which weapons change rapidly, on thing is certain; no army of fifty years ago before any date selected would stand a ‘dog’s chance’ against the army existing at that date…”

As Gray points out “Fuller was, and remains, monumentally wrong.”

  Let’s test the proposition. As a mental exercise let us suppose that some Canadian army from the past rather than our current force had fought the war in Afghanistan.

 How would the Canadian Army of 1918 have faired? Think about it, over 300,000 men with rifles, machine guns, mortars, artillery, a certain amount of internal combustion logistic support and a lot of horses. (If nothing else such a force would have an admirably small carbon footprint) With comparatively small logistics needs, and a good tooth to tail ratio, this was force that had proved it could stay in the field for years. In fact the old style weapons carried by the Canadian Corps would have been well suited to the conflict. The long range of the Lee-Enfield rifles carried by our troops would have stood them in good stead in Afghan style fighting. The machine guns, mortars and artillery used by that force would have been more than adequate for the task.  We could even add a few squadrons of DH-9As for air support of a similar vintage.

  As can be seen the Canadian army of 1918 would have been perfectly well equipped for the current Afghan war. It illustrates the point that it is the quality of the troops that would matter. We are talking about a force which marched farther, fought more, and defeated larger enemy forces in the final months of WWI than any other corps in any other army. These were men who could march and fight and then march again, for days or weeks on end. Based on the historical record we can predict that this would be an army for whom the prospect of casualties would have less concern then our current armed forces could contemplate. This not to say this army would constitute a blunt instrument with which an opponent would be bludgeoned into submission by brute force and a willingness to take casualties. In fact;

“The military effectiveness of the corps has been extensively analyzed. The corps evolved steadily following the 1915 summer campaign. The Canadian Expeditionary Force "worked ceaselessly to convert all of its available political and physical resources into fighting power." One striking feature of the corps' evolution was its ability to exploit all opportunities for learning. This was a corps-wide activity, involving all levels from the commander to the private soldier. His ability to learn from allied successes and mistakes made the corps increasingly successful. Doctrine was tested in limited engagements and, if proven effectual, developed for larger scale battles. Following each engagement, lessons were recorded, analyzed and disseminated to all units. Doctrine and tactics that were ineffective or cost too many lives were discarded and new methods developed. This learning process, combined with technical innovation and competent senior leadership in theatre created one of the most effective allied fighting forces on the Western Front”

Godefroy, A. (April 1, 2006). “Canadian Military Effectiveness in the First World War”

 Would this army from the past be capable of defeating the Taliban? The answer seems self-evident. Even if a brigade size force with both the weapons and the qualities of the Canadian corps had been committed to the Afghan conflict it would have been at least as successful in that conflict as the force that we did send.

What is the point of any mental exercise? In this case it serves to point out what a national commitment really is. The force Canada sent overseas in WWI represented a serious national commitment. The forces we sent to Afghanistan did not. They were not a war fighting force.  At best they were a gesture to an alliance. Maintaining an alliance is good, thinking you can fight a war on the cheap is not.  Canada never made a wartime commitment in Afghanistan. As a mental exercise “what’s the smallest force we can reasonably send to Afghanistan” is interesting, as policy it fails.

A REBORN AIRBORNE REGIMENT

LIGHT INFANTRY

 The subject of the Canadian Airborne Regiment has come up again. Aficionados of the unit are campaigning for its re-instatement. It raises the question; do paratroopers have a place in modern warfare?

 Airborne soldiers are in the final analysis light infantry. Light infantry fill a limited but occasionally useful place in spectrum of war. At its simplest light infantry are soldiers armed with not much more then rifles and equipped with not much more then jeeps that are best used in a variety of peacekeeping and constabulary situations. Their best points are that they can be moved swiftly and have a limited logistics footprint. Their drawbacks include a lack of firepower and armour. The danger is that dedicated light infantry will be used improperly, as emergency reinforcements in deteriorating military or political situations. At which point they begin to refer to themselves as “speed bumps” and moral has been known to suffer.

  It is this limited usefulness and predilection for misuse that inclines many in the Canadian Armed Forces against the concept of dedicated airborne formations. As well, nobody seems to believe that large scale parachute operations are ever again going to play a part in modern warfare. Against these arguments adherents of the regiment can only argue the case for northern deployments of a parachute force in disaster relief situations.

  There is a use for the Canadian Airborne Regiment. As well as firepower and mass (armour) there is a third component to mastery and survival on the battlefield and that is maneuver. In this case maneuver brought about by helicopters. This new form of “vertical envelopment” seems like a rational evolution of the airborne ideal. As a battalion sized helicopter borne and equipped force it would only need to keep one company jump qualified at any given time to be able to meet the limited need for parachute forces. More important it would be a focus for the development of helicopter doctrine within the Canadian forces. With a new and potent force of CH-47 heavy lift helicopters coming into service and with the need for a replacement for our Griffon utility helicopters beginning to show itself on the horizon, now is the time to think about how to use these aircraft for more then just logistic support. An airmobile force would concentrate resources as well as minds and give the Canadian forces an important new capability it currently lacks.