One of the things that make
this a difficult decision is that there are a number of viable options. The
purchase of a fleet of Fighters is as much a strategic as a technical
calculation. The amount of money being spent and the long term consequences for military, industry and foreign policy means that the purchase must be
considered from a wide variety of viewpoints.
Dassault Aviation, as it is now known, originally made its’ name
selling light, comparatively inexpensive, jet fighters. Their first, and
perhaps greatest, success was with the Mirage III and Mirage V line of
fighters. This was followed by the Mirage F1, an air-superiority fighter and
attack aircraft, designed and built as a successor to the Mirage III family.
The F1 was followed in turn by the Mirage 2000, which reverted to the classic
delta winged shape of the Mirage III.
Each of these aircraft was
larger and more complex then its predecessor, but all could still be considered
‘light’ and relatively simple fighters. To put it in context, the Mirage 2000
was widely seen as a direct competitor to the F-16. However, Dassault wanted to
develop a heavier, more complex aircraft. The resulting Mirage 4000 was
noticeably larger and heavier than the single-engined Mirage 2000.
Financed as a private venture
by Dassault, the Mirage 4000 was comparable in size to the United States F-15
Eagle, and was designed to be both a long-range interceptor and a capable
fighter-bomber. Dassault ended the program shortly after the Saudis chose the
F-15 as their preferred aircraft. The French Air Force preferred to concentrate
on the Mirage 2000, leaving Dassault with no customers. In the end, though,
some of the expertise gained would influence the development of the Rafale.
The Rafale on offer these
days is in fact much more of a middle weight, more sophisticated aircraft, an
F-18 class jet, then its simpler and lighter Dassault predecessors. Perhaps because of this, Dassault has not
enjoyed the sales success with this offering that they have had in the past with earlier generation aircraft. In
Canada Rafale was dismissed, by some, as a CF-18 replacement because of concerns
about the aircraft’s ability to operate alongside our US allies; in fact the
jet flew seamlessly with U.S. and other fighters during the 2011 Libya bombing
campaign. As the manufacturer points out, “It has been proven in war”.
Dassault Aviation is now offering lower long-term support
costs if its Rafale fighter is chosen as the new air force jet. The offer includes
the unrestricted transfer of technology, such as software source codes for
servicing the planes. That could shave hundreds of millions of dollars off the
life-time price tag to operate and upgrade the fighter, which is already in
service with the French air force and was recently selected by India.
It is said that a transfer of
technology would allow Canada
more flexibility to service the aircraft without involving the French parent
company. It might be a boon to domestic aerospace firms, especially those that
are already making parts for the Rafale fighter. In sharp contrast the issue of
how much technology the U.S.
is willing to share with its allies has become a major sticking point and a
barrier to the participation of other countries. Washington has not helped matters by
refusing to share the jet’s software source codes.
If the purchase of a fleet of
Fighters is as much a strategic as a technical calculation then Dassault Aviations' success surely illustrates the effect of the mutually beneficial
relationships between the company, the Armée de l'Air and the national
government. The ability to independently develop and field advanced war planes
is important to French military, industrial and foreign policy.
In Canada, as in all nations, strategy
is linked to interests, which change slowly, if at all. One illustration of
this is the similarity between the calculations made by military professionals
in the past and their modern equivalents.
In 1935, the Chief of the
General Staff (Major-General Andrew McNaughton) noted that the need for a large Militia had been mitigated
by the Washington Conference, an agreement marking parity between the U.S. Navy
and Royal Navy. By making American naval supremacy in North American coastal
waters possible, it was no longer practicable to rely on reinforcement of
Canadian land forces by sea in a theoretical war with the U.S. Without such reinforcement,
McNaughton concluded that "war for Canada could only be
unfortunate" and thus considered such a war unlikely, in light of
political developments. With no need for a military based on maximum available
manpower what was needed was an organization capable of providing for aid to
the civil power in peacetime, of use for home defence and for maintenance of
Canadian neutrality should the U.S. become involved in a war in which Canada
did not participate, as well as an expeditionary force to support other members
of the British Empire or implement a decision of the Council of the League of
Nations..
With only a few changes,
substituting U.S. for
British Empire and United Nations for League of Nations,
this conclusion still informs much of Canadian military strategy.
The F-35 was designed as a
coalition aircraft, an F-16 replacement, which had become the fighter of choice
for the western world. Part of the motivation behind the governments’ original
choice of the F-35 was that as coalition aircraft it promised to fulfill Canada’s need to support other members of the Western Alliance and take part in U.N. sanctioned
actions. It is not, however, the only
aircraft that can meet these requirements.
It is not necessary to
purchased US built aircraft to remain an ally of the United States. Purchasing the
Rafale would not necessarily distance Canada from the mainstream. As well
as having an aircraft perfectly capable of integrating with other western
fighters, we would have a fighter used by two of our other important allies,
France and India.
Nations, it has been said, do
not have friends, they have interests. Friends may change, interests are less
likely to. Canada’s
interests do not necessarily reside in expending the necessary capital, both
monetary and political, to maintain a completely independent fighter
capability. Canada
does have an interest, however, in maintaining and managing its alliances. A
degree of autonomy in military affairs is necessary to do this. Having greater
national control over our fighter fleet, which the unrestricted transfer of
technology promised by Dassault would bring, increases national autonomy and
therefore increases our ability to manage our foreign and military policies.
It is also in Canada’s
interest to have an industrial policy which brings the maximum benefits to the
greatest number of Canadians and the government has said that it seeks to align
military, industrial and domestic strategies with the use of its procurement
policies. In many ways a Rafale purchase would appear to meet all of these
goals more efficiently then any other aircraft.
While Canadian Defence
Matters advocates a split purchase of different aircraft to fulfill the
different roles the RCAF is tasked to perform, it can not be denied that the
Dassault Rafale is a true multi-purpose fighter and a purchase of these
aircraft to fulfill all roles would follow the philosophy which motivated the
original CF-18 procurement.
F-35s controversy back on the
horizon for federal government
Dassault Aviation: Defense
French Aircraft Manufacturers
Say Rafale Fighter Can Provide Canada
With Lower Long-Term Support Costs
1936 Reorganization of the
Militia
