A 2011 Defence Department analysis found that in 1998 the average
acquisition time for equipment was 190 months. Within several years, after
initiatives to improve the situation were brought in by Alan Williams, then
assistant deputy minister at the Defence Department in charge of procurement,
the figure dropped to 96 months and then to 89 months.
By the time of the DND study,
however, the time it took, from start to finish for military acquisitions, had
grown to an average of 199 months — more than 16 years. It can be inferred that
in the ensuing years, with the Fixed Wing Search & Rescue program and the Medium
Support Vehicle System Project as examples, that these figures have become even
worse.
The 2011 study found that the
increase might have been caused by factors such as; a larger number of
equipment projects on the go, a lack of skills among staff, or the complexity
of the procurement system. The DND analysis also pointed to some of the
challenges procurement staff are facing, including government cutbacks, the
rapid pace of technological change, the increasing need to consider political
and economic factors and a “high level of Auditor General and media scrutiny.” Other
issues raised in the DND analysis include a lack of staff to manage the
equipment projects and inadequate training for procurement officials.
It should be pointed out that
in recent years the Defence Department has gained a reputation in some
government circles of playing fast and loose with procurement rules. At one
point the government even took the unprecedented step of intervening and
putting a temporary halt to the purchase of military trucks after it was
discovered the Defence Department tried to spend more than $300 million extra
on the program without permission.
Former DND procurement chief Alan Williams, who left the
public service in 2005, has said that he
believes the problems can be traced to the Conservative government’s decision
to make a number of large purchases without competition. He is quoted as saying
“When you start doing sole-source procurements you give the upper hand to the
company. That’s why it drags on and on because you have no leverage in contract
negotiations.”
He has also written that he
believes that the single most significant impediment to improving the defence
procurement process is the lack of a minister directly accountable for results.
The overlap and duplications between the roles and responsibilities of the
ministers of PWGSC and Defence guarantees that no single minister can be held
accountable for the billions of dollars spent annually.
If that is indeed the problem,
then the Conservative governments’ announcement, by Public Works Minister Diane Finley, that they will
require that all future military procurements be reviewed by third-party
advisers may do more harm then good.
Joyce Murray, the Liberal Defence critic, believes that what is needed is a
procurement process that is transparent, timely, cost-effective, innovative and
accountable. She is calling for clear responsibility for results, not multiple
persons and agendas in charge to avoid conflicts, delays, re-sets, cost
escalations, and program cancellations.
James Cowan
of the Canadian Business Magazine has suggested that the government practice of
tying Canadian jobs to military machinery projects has been a huge mistake. He
points out that the government’s military strategy is also an economic
development strategy. It’s just not a particularly good one.
Studies of procurement,
notably by J.C. Stone, suggest
that the separate Defence Procurement Agency advocated by many would not
necessarily work. His report points out that issues of cost overruns, delayed
deliveries and equipment not meeting requirements are also found with those countries
that have tried this approach.. He argues that the reasons have much more to do
with internal issues that have nothing to do with whether or not there is one
agency responsible or three departments responsible. Politics, he says, will
always be a critical factor regardless of whether or not there is a single
agency and concludes that a single agency may improve many parts of the
process, but it will not solve the underlying challenges.
What is needed, in the view
of this writer, is a change in attitude, a change by the government, by the
government’s critics, by the media and by the public at large.
In his book “The Longer I'm Prime Minister: Stephen Harper and Canada” author Paul Wells makes the point that the Prime
Minister, and his government, are relentless in their quest to control all
aspects of any messages of any kind which emanate in any way from any part of
the federal government.
The problem with this
approach is that it works, from a political view point, and reinforces the government’s
belief in the system they have created. It is a system which involves all
output of any kind being directed through the Prime Minister’s Office for
vetting before it can be released to the general public. This adds yet another
layer to the sheer complexity of military procurement. It is this additional layer
which in many cases is enough to de-rail the entire process.
This government, and
governments to follow who may be enticed into the same behavior by its apparent
success, needs to make the intellectual, and emotional, leap necessary to understand
that in giving up some control they increase their chances of better outcomes.
At the same time the public
at large and critics of all stripes must become discriminating enough to understand
that apocalyptic headlines which essentially carry the message “New Army Trucks Not Perfect”,
can and sometime should, be read as “New Army Trucks Bring Increased
Capabilities”.
The government, the military,
and the public must relearn the lesson that both in terms of controlling the
message and in delivering new equipment to the Armed Forces, ‘perfect’ is the
greatest enemy of ‘good enough’.
$1.7 billion already spent on
upgrading Canada
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/01/09/17_billion_already_spent_on_upgrading_canadas_chopper_fleet.html
What is wrong with Canada
http://ca.news.yahoo.com/blogs/canada-politics/wrong-canada-military-procurement-213306039.html
Delays in purchasing for
Canadian military at record levels under Conservatives
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/technology/Delays+purchasing+Canadian+military+record+levels+under+Conservatives/7978257/story.html
New single defence
procurement agency would be more efficient and accountable. By Alan Williams
http://www.ipolitics.ca/2012/02/07/alan-williams-new-single-defence-procurement-agency-would-be-more-efficient-and-accountable/The Government of
http://www.dianefinley.ca/?p=619
Kicking 2014 off right: my
wish list for National Defence in 2014
http://joycemurray.liberal.ca/blog/kicking-2014-list-national-defence-2014/
A Separate Defence Procurement
Agency: Will it Actually Make a Difference? By J.C. Stone
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/A%20Separate%20Defence.pdf
The Longer I'm Prime
Minister: Stephen Harper and Canada
http://www.amazon.ca/The-Longer-Im-Prime-Minister/dp/0307361322
