Much has been written about
the end of combat operations in Afghanistan
and a ‘war-weary’ public not supporting renewed expenditure on military
operations, especially in a time of fiscal uncertainty. The ‘pause’ in military
deployments abroad has been seen by some as a sign of a fundamental change both
in how nations conduct their affairs and in Canada’s likely military future.
The truth is that there have
not been any changes in the fundamentals the brought about our involvement in
the Afghanistan conflict or
the intervention in Libya.
A recent analysis of the
prospects for war in the Persian Gulf is a
timely reminder of some of the basics that still inform Canadian foreign
policy.
The reality is that the confrontation between communism and capitalism which had dominated much of the 20th century has been replaced by a new political and economic order.
The 21st century has has seen the emergence of a new ordering of the world. The ability to
electronically move large amounts of funds across borders has undermined
national economies and economic sovereignty. Similar scales of mobility in
other areas has meant that natural resources, industry, markets and even work
forces have become increasingly transnational.
The result has been what is
often called “globalization”, meaning a world wide macro-economic system in
which individual national economies no longer function as separate
entities.
Having arrived at a
globalized economy the various nation states that inescapably participate in it
have recognized that any retreat from it would likely be catastrophic in the
social and political sense
The necessity of guarantying
the flow of petroleum, other resources, and the new currency of information,
means that high levels of transnational cooperation have become vital. This
globalization of economics has inevitably been followed by a globalization of
security interests. This in turn has lead to transnational security
arrangements, one example being the expansion of NATO.
At the same time the war
which lead to the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in many ways marked the end
of traditional military challenges by emerging nations to both the old and
the new global systems. The Gulf wars appeared to demonstrate that a modernizing
nation state, even one with combat-experienced armed forces, could not
effectively challenge the new world order.
The new security order which
marks the 21st century has a number of characteristics, many of
which work to increase the likelihood of military interventions to perceived transnational
problems.
First among these
characteristics is coalition warfare. This involves a number of countries
committing their forces to a common campaign under a unified command, which increasingly
is becoming the norm.
These coalitions may now include a number of nation-states as well as non-state actors, such as insurgent groups, NGO, military contractors, the media and private citizens.
Transnational troop
commitments, of any size, ensure not just adequate numbers of forces but add to
the political legitimacy of any operation. By the same token the loss of any
one countries participation is not fatal to the overall effort, and new allies
can be mobilized. By combining the armed forces of a number of countries the
relatively low level of combat casualties suffered by each national force
mitigates against a speedily developing popular reaction against military
intervention.
Within a theatre of
operations the coalition may work with, or set up, alliances with local
political power bases and insurgent factions. In some cases, as in the first
Western intervention in Afghanistan,
such forces may make up the bulk of the military forces on the ground.
NGO’s may also have an
interest in supporting government operations, as they can facilitate their
conduct of humanitarian operations or implement political agendas.
Military contractors provide
logistical and sometimes even combat capabilities to supplement state forces.
With their interest in keeping those contracts they provide another source of
aid in maintaining political support in protracted conflicts
Modern information operations
include embedding reporters in military units. That has helped to overcome the
image of a media automatically hostile to any war effort. In return news
operations receive higher ratings and the opportunity to become participants in
shaping events with their punditry and editing.
Military campaigns have also
now taken on a ‘whole of government’ approach to include other government
agencies, such as law enforcement, which has its own transnational character.
This increases overall Coalition effectiveness and creates more participants
with a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict.
It is because of these
factors that there have been no total-war mobilizations in the 21st century of the kind that characterized the proceeding era. There have been no
mass conscription or disruption of civilian society by the conversion of
consumer industries to war production. The polymorphous military effort has
been more easily portrayed in a positive light by transnational media, with
just enough combat imagery to provide drama along with providing moral boosting
victories for television consumption.
The mass casualties of past
wars have also been avoided, forestalling a loss of support on the domestic
front. By effectively keeping the home front demobilized this form of warfare
maintains steadier support for protracted operations.
Of the few impediments left
to discretionary foreign military operations, the peace movement has proved, in
recent years, to be singularly ineffective. At least in Canada the movement has been revealed as a
branch plant operation, mainly following the lead of its United States
contemporaries. In turn the U.S.
movement is now seen as dominated by domestic politics and the culture wars of
that country. While it is possible that the movement could be reinvigorated
with the election of a Republican President it is equally possible that a media
savvy, and popular, U.S. President of any political persuasion may be in a position to negate
anti-war sentiment through the use of his, or her, party machinery.
The other impediment to war,
the treatment and condition of returning veterans is also in flux. Sadly
enough, as governments and bureaucracies become better at caring for our
wounded, and at the same time removing their condition from the public
discourse, the more likely it is that the public will countenance foreign
military deployments. To the extent that a government can use its’ treatment of
returning veterans as a positive, to the extent that stories about Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder are replaced by ‘feel good’ stories about amputees
discovering their potential in the West End theatre, the more likely it is that
troops will be sent overseas.
Given Canada’s historical-strategic need to engage in
alliances, both to leverage our own power and to help manage our security
relationship with the United
States, it is impossible to believe that we
will not find ourselves involved in the security of the 21st century. If Canada
is to be a part of this century then the chances are that our Armed Forces will
be involved as well.
Finances and the passing
political agenda may appear to suggest that Canada does not need to equip and
train our Armed Forces for combat. A longer term view suggests that our
military will be used to further Canadian interests and that a failure to
maintain our military will inevitably be paid for, one way or another.
Joseph Miranda, Modern War,
issue 10
