In the March 2014 edition
Dorr has both his monthly column, “Front
Line” and an interesting article about the use of the T-37B Dragonfly in South-east Asia, not an unfamiliar subject to the author, entitled “Shake and Bake”.
It is probably a testament to
the vagaries of publishing that the two articles, probably written months
apart, came together in the same issue.
In his “Front Line” opinion
piece Dorr takes on the legacy of Robert Gates, who served as the 22nd United States Secretary of Defense from
2006 to 2011. The author takes Gates to task for his focus on the counter
insurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at
the expense of preparedness for the kind of near peer wars that Dorr finds more
palatable. One of the examples he cites is the experience of the A-29 Super Tucano which he
suggests was an unnecessary ‘sideshow’, one which detracted from the main goals
of the U.S. Air Force.
In “Shake and Bake” he recounts
the often overlooked activities of the US Air Force’s A-37 Dragonflies in South-east Asia. Specifically he points out that the
skills necessary for close air support in a complex environment are continually
being re-invented as the Air Force does not adequately support the concept.
Here he points out that many A-37 veterans were disappointed in the inability
of their service to acquire A-29 coin aircraft.
It is a paradox that the
better equipped and prepared the U.S. Armed Forces are for high intensity
‘near-peer’ warfare the less likely they are to find themselves engaged in it. By
the same token the more powerful the U.S. finds itself in conventional
military terms the more likely it is to be engaged by enemies in unconventional
ways. This has certainly been the template for most conflicts that country has
engaged in during the last half century.
Coincidentally there is
another article, in this case not authored by Robert F. Dorr, in the March
issue of Combat Aircraft outlining the progress of the Textron AirLand Scorpion. One of the interesting
things about this aircraft is that it is the modern fighter which most closely
approximates the capabilities of the A-37B Dragonfly. According to the
manufacturer “The aircraft is intended to handle mission profiles typically
performed by the U.S. Air National Guard, including domestic interdiction,
quick-reaction natural disaster support, air sovereignty patrols, and
low-threat battlefield missions.”
The U.S. is fortunate in retaining its Air
National Guard and Reserve formations. The ability of these units to maintain
high quality forces at a cost much
less then that of regular force units is enviable, and possibly instructive for
Canada.
The Guard estimates that it
provides 35% of USAF capabilities for 6% of budget. This estimate is based on
peace time conditions where the reserves have cost advantages. Their simpler
bases are cheaper and it costs less to maintain an airplane assigned to a Guard
base, in part because of the Guard's older, more experienced pilots who can
stay proficient with fewer overall training hours.
In Canada we have not had, in modern
times, the kind of infrastructure necessary to protect our reserve forces from
the depredations of the regular force, particular when budgets are tight.
Unlike the U.S.,
there is no state bureaucracy to make a case for the continued existence and
support of reserve organizations. Canadian Defence Matters is not arguing in
favour of provincial control of reserve military formations, but rather
pointing out that there are no officers in the Canadian Armed Forces whose
successful career paths are dependent on the relative health and growth of our
reserves.
This explains the demise of
so many Air Force auxiliary squadrons, which in the past formed the back bone
of the R.C.A.F. In 1946, the government
approved a new scheme for the air force. This included a Regular Force, an Auxiliary (an active reserve
force), a Reserve (a ready reserve force similar to the Supplementary Reserve
of today) and the Royal Canadian Air Cadets.
The Auxiliary was assigned
the role of defending Canada's
major cities, a task they would continue for 12 years. It placed the Auxiliary
almost on a par with the Regular Force, operating not only flying squadrons but
also radar units, medical, technical training and intelligence units.
This continued until 1962
when the CF-100 squadrons were withdrawn without replacement. There are
currently 2 squadrons described as “reserve heavy” as well as numerous
individuals employed by regular formations at all levels.
The Scorpion at first glance
may seem like an unlikely candidate for consideration by the R.C.A.F. However the
Scorpion is designed to be affordable, costing US$3,000 per flight hour, with a
unit cost expected to be below US$20 million. This means a per hour flight cost
of something like one tenth that of a modern fighter at one quarter the
purchase price.
If issued to an expanded Air
Force Auxiliary, Scorpions would solve a multitude of problems, they would
renew the Air Force commitment to close air support, they would form the
nucleus of an expanded and useable force, and it might even solve
the 'Snowbirds dilemma'.
the 'Snowbirds dilemma'.
The Textron AirLand Scorpion
may not be suitable for high energy, near-peer warfare. What it is designed for
is “domestic interdiction, quick-reaction natural disaster support, air
sovereignty patrols, and low-threat battlefield missions”, just the kind of commitments
that Canada needs to be able to meet, just the kind of roles that a renewed and
re-energized Air Force reserve could fulfill.
Robert F. Dorr, Author
Combat Aircraft, March 2014 –
Vol. 15 No 3
Vietnam era's Dragonfly a ground-support warrior
Robert Gates
LAS in, LAS out: Counter-Insurgency
Planes for the USA
and its Allies
Textron AirLand Scorpion
Important Guard-Related
Studies
Air Reserve
Snowbird Replacement Project
(SARP)
