The CBC, among others, has reported that “The Trudeau government has promised to get Canada back into the peacekeeping
business, but a new report from two independent think tanks says the military
is ill-prepared for the task”. They go on to report that the study comes to
us from the Rideau Institute and the Centre for Policy Alternatives.
It would be easy to be so
astonished with the inconsistencies in the
previous statement that one could completely miss the point of the story.
Even after getting by the
oxymoron involved in referring to the Rideau Institute and the Center for
Policy Alternatives as two separate bodies, one is dumbstruck by the suggestion
that they constitute an “independent” think tank.
Of course this may all depend on how one defines “independent’. It
does not seem to conform to the normal dictionary definitions, which include:
(1) not influenced or controlled by others in matters of opinion,
conduct, etc.; thinking or acting for oneself:
(2 )an independent thinker.
(3) not subject to an other's authority or
jurisdiction; autonomous; free:
an independent businessman.
(4) not
influenced by the thought or action of others:
independent research.
(5) not
dependent; not depending or contingent upon something else for existence,
operation, etc.
(6) not relying
on another or others for aid or support.
However, a close examination
of the paper itself helps to re-assure the uniformed as it clearly states, “The CCPA is an independent policy research organization.
This report has been subjected to peer review and meets the research standards
of the Centre.” And to be fair,
the Rideau Institute and the Centre for Policy Alternatives and their
publications may well meet the standard contained in the alternative definition
of independent; “expressive of a spirit
of independence; self-confident; unconstrained”.
They make the point that:
"Particularly important is learning
effective co-operation with the non-military components of modern peacekeeping
operations, including police, civil affairs personnel and humanitarians, as
well as UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the local actors
engaged in building a viable peace: "
The study recommends the reinstatement and updating of the many
training programmes and exercises that have been cut, as well as the
introduction of new training activities to reflect the “increasing complexity of modern peace operations.”
The authors refer to the
belief that general combat Training is sufficient to prepare troops for
peacekeeping deployments as a myth. They argue that, “If the idea that peacekeeping is a low-intensity, “easy” deployment of
armed forces is false; it is also untrue that soldiers trained for combat
operations are sufficiently trained to be peacekeepers. The complex environment
faced by UN peacekeepers means that the old notion that the best way to train a
peacekeeper is to train a general-purpose, combat-capable soldier is no longer
appropriate, if it ever was. While combat training remains essential for UN
soldiers, much additional and specialized training is required. In Canada, the last
fifteen years have seen a particular focus on training for NATO-style international interventions, given the
CAF’s high-profile role in Afghanistan. However,
modern peacekeeping missions involve fundamentally different dynamics facing
personnel deployed on the ground, where there is greater emphasis on
negotiation and mediation, and greater restrictions on the use of force”.
The authors appear to be
unaware of the reality that modern military organizations, like the Canadian
Armed Forces, are fully conversant with the theory of ‘the three block war”.
The idea that a conflict may involve distributing aid on one block, fighting
terrorists on the next and conducting full scale military action against a near
peer enemy on the third is exactly what they trained for and executed in Afghanistan.
The Forces also understand that the
key to operating in all three conditions simultaneously is leadership training
at all levels, with low-level unit leaders given the ability to take major
decisions and undertake independent actions. The Canadian force are well
acquainted with advantages gained in all situations by this ‘devolved’
leadership and train accordingly.
The notion that the Canadian Forces should place “greater
emphasis on negotiation and mediation, and greater restrictions on the use of
force” is, based on the historical successes of the ‘muscular’
nature of Canadian missions, a mistake. One of the reasons for the success of Canadian
troops on ‘peace keeping’ missions is that, to quote Quinn Dyer, “Canadians
always shoot back”.
The first thing that
typically happens when peace-keepers take up new posts along a ‘demarcation’
line is that someone shoots at them. It’s nothing personal; if anything it’s a
traditional welcome for the new guys by the local thugs and their attempt to
find out the caliber of the troops they are now dealing with. Survivors among
those who visit these greetings on Canadian troops are amazed to discover just
how much weaponry Canadian Forces feel is appropriate for peace keeping and
surprised to find out that, unlike local “freedom fighters” Canadian soldiers
apparently don’t have to pay for each bullet out of there own pockets.
In the case of persistent
trouble makers, habitual bomb makers, pot shot artists and the like, the
practice is to have intelligence identify the individual and then have
battalion snipers deal with them on a personal level.
Another common custom in
these situations is for local dignitaries and elders (never to be referred to
as warlords) to be invited over for tea and firepower demonstrations. Again,
even those hardened by years of simmering warfare can be surprised by the kinds
of heavy weapons, (TOW missiles, really?) Canadians feel it is necessary to
bring with them, ‘just in case’.
It would be a mistake for Canada,
and Canadians, to think they can impose their will on others without making it
clear that they are willing to fight to achieve their goals, even goals that
include peace keeping.
This study indicates that Canada
is currently far behind other nations in its readiness to support the United
Nations and train for modern peacekeeping.
Here we come to the one of
the real points of the study. The peace keeping industry, like any other,
believes that it must constantly grow or else it will die. Unlike most other
business models there is not a lot of income to be derived from private
enterprise so alternative sources must be found.
The major sources of funding
are academia and the government. Of these government is can be the most beneficial.
One source of income for many
years was the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre. The centre was established in 1994 using facilities made available by
the closure of CFB Cornwallis. Its mandate was to support Canada's
contribution to international peace and security. At its peak the center
supported an administrative staff of up to 200 ‘facilitators’ and experts with
another 17 staff in Ottawa.
After being moved to Ottawa,
in 2008, the center lost government support. In June 2011, the centre announced
it would be closing its Cornwallis offices as a cost-saving measure. At that
time, the Cornwallis office had a staff of 12.The centre lost its annual core
funding of $4 million from the federal government in 2012.
Obviously the provision of
suitable training for peace keeping can only be provided by the right sort of
people. They must be people who understand that “modern peacekeeping missions involve fundamentally different dynamics
facing personnel deployed on the ground, where there is greater emphasis on
negotiation and mediation, and greater restrictions on the use of force”
Needless to say it is
important to insure that those who receive monies from the Department of
National Defence, or any department of government, are not tainted by the
experience. Fortunately experience teaches us that members of the appropriately
progressive organizations can not be influenced, or even be accused of being
influenced, by the source of their income.
It stands to reason that
these are the people who should organize and run the training so it is not a
coincidence that one of the recommendations of the report is that Canada
move immediately to develop a new peace operations training centre, noting that
“the loss of the Pearson Peacekeeping
Centre was a devastating setback to Canadian preparedness”
Sarcasm aside, there is
another point to this study. The Rideau Institute makes clear in its mission statement that” Our mission
is to help restore Canada to its former peacekeeping, peacemaking and
peacebuilding role in the world, through creative and innovative
multilateralism, strengthening the UN and building international law.’
What is not so clear is that
the Institute, like the Centre for Policy Alternatives, seeks to achieve its goals by influencing the
media and policy makers in an attempt to reshape the Canadian Armed Forces.
While many would assume that
spending all that money on Defence is to give Canadians the widest possible
number of options, it is the goal of the writers of this report and their
patrons to limit the options available to the Government of Canada.
By shaping the size, composition,
equipment and training of our Armed Forces they hope to give us an organization
that is only capable of the kinds of missions that they feel Canada should
undertake.
This is a policy based on
hope. Hope that others feel the same way do. Hope that the events will unfold
the way we want them to. Hope that ‘full coverage’ insurance is not really
necessary. As much as we would prefer it otherwise, experience teaches that
these are false hopes and that purposely limiting our military options is bad
policy.
Canadian military
ill-prepared for modern peacekeeping: report
Unprepared for Peace? The Decline
of Canadian Peacekeeping Training
(and What to Do About It) A. Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben
Pearson Centre
The Rideau Institute
Centre for Policy
Alternatives
