Paul Dibb is an English-born Australian strategist,
academic and former defence intelligence official. He is currently emeritus
professor of strategic studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
which is part of the Australian National University.
From 1985 to 1986, Dibb was a ministerial consultant
to Defence Minister Kim Beazley. During this time, he formulated a review of
Australia’s defence capabilities known as the Dibb Report. His inclusion of a
map centered on Darwin provided new insights into Australia’s strategic
realities.
His most recent paper, from the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, is entitled “Australia’s management of strategic risk in the new era”, co-authored by Richard
Brabin-Smith. In it he makes the case that Australia’s strategic outlook is
deteriorating. Many of his conclusions are equally applicable to Canada.
Canada’s strategic
outlook is also changing and, for the first time in a generation we face an
increased prospect of threat of an actual attack on Canada. This means that a
major change in our approach to the management of strategic risk is needed.
Strategic
risk is a subjective field in which governments need to make critical
assessments of capability, motive and intent. These factors are inherently
ambiguous and uncertain. Over recent decades judgements in this area have
relied heavily on the conclusion that there was no creditable entity inimical
to Canadian interests with the capability required for a serious assault on the
country or our infrastructure.
This is no
longer true. It is critical that we understand that the development of new
weapons and new technologies means that we are at risk and that we can no
longer rely on long lead times that will provide us with adequate warning of
conflict.
Instead of conceiving
of the defence of Canada by making the comfortable assumption that our defence
starts in Latvia or Afghanistan we have to consider that the place we need to
protect begins at Tofino and Tuktoyaktuk and Torbay.
The reassuring certainties of the past; that we were
bounded by to the west and east by vast oceans, to the north by an unpassable
wilderness and to the south by a strong, reliable neighbour are no longer
valid. The comfortable judgements of previous years about the limited threats
to our region and our country are no longer appropriate
For example,
China’s economic and political influence continues to grow while at the same
time it maintains an ambitious program of military modernisation and expansion.
At the same time Russia continues to devote a disturbing proportion of its
admittedly limited resources to their military, particularly in the northern
reaches of that country which border on Canada.
The power of
non-state actors to engage in activities that range from infringements of
Canada’s sovereignty to kinetic attacks has never been greater. All of these
threats are informed by the ability of cyber warfare to inflict massive damage
to our country.
In future the level of capability that can be
brought to bear against Canada by a large range of state and non-state actors
will increase while at the same time warning times will decrease. The potential
warning time is now shorter, because capability levels are higher and will
increase yet further.
How should Canada respond to military contingencies
that are now credible in the shorter term and which could now be characterised
by higher levels of intensity and technological sophistication?
Dibb would argue that readiness and sustainability
need to be increased: we need higher training levels, a demonstrable and
sustainable surge capacity, increased stocks of munitions, more maintenance
spares, a robust supply system, and modernised operational bases, especially in
the north.
We need to examine preparedness levels, the lead
times for key elements of the expansion base and the resources we devote to
‘homeland’ defence.
The prospect of shortened warning times along with
the possibility of an actual attack on Canada needs to be a major factor in
today’s defence planning.
Just as important we must not allow the conduct of
operations further afield, and our involvement in counterterrorism, to distract
either from the effort that needs to go into this planning or from the funding
that enhanced national defence capabilities will require.
Australia’s deteriorating
strategic outlook
15 Nov 2017|Paul Dibb and
Richard Brabin-Smith
