In their latest Defence policy "Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence" the government announced that they would " provide the Canadian Armed Forces with the
speed and airlift capacity to assert Canada’s sovereignty and respond to natural disasters and emergencies throughout the country, we will acquire
a more modern, mobile and effective tactical
helicopter capability."
There are several obvious candidates to fill the tactical helicopter role for the Canadian Armed Forces.
One would be the Bell UH-1Y "Venom". The Bell UH-1Y is a twin-engine, medium-sized utility helicopter built by Bell Helicopter as one of the latest members of the numerous Huey family of helicopters, a family which includes the Bell CH-146 "Griffon", the current tactical helicopter used by the Canadian Armed Forces.
As an evolved version of the aircraft currently in use it would be a natural and comparatively easy transition for pilots and maintainers. As it is currently in service with the U.S. Marines it can be expected to be in service for many years with spares, upgrades, and even doctrine being easily available. Costs for both initial purchase and maintenance should also be relatively straight forward given U.S. experience.
The other obvious choice to fill the role would be some variant of the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk. In wide spread use in a number of countries as well as the U.S. Army, it is in production with upgrades and spares available for decades to come. Sharing engine commonality with the currently in service Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone it would a safe and cost effective choice.
Another reasonable choice to fill the role of a modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability would be a troop carrying variant of the CH-148 Cyclone. Currently in service with the RCAF, the CH-148 is a military variant of the Sikorsky S-92 designed for shipboard operations, it replaced, after much time and money was spent, the CH-124 Sea King.
The H-92 is the military version of the S-92 from which the CH-148 is derived. In the utility transport role it is capable of carrying 22 troops and can also be configured for specific missions, including search and rescue and executive transportation. The choice of a CH-148 variant to fill the role would bring the commonality of spares, equipment and even training that comes with a bigger fleet. This acquisition, with its concomitant savings, could even include a few aircraft, configured for search and rescue, to augment our hard worked and under resourced CH-149 Cormorant SAR fleet.
A less likely but still viable choice would be to purchase more CH-147 heavy lift helicopters. In 2009, Canada signed a contract for 15 of the F model of the aircraft which, inevitably and at great expense, were extensively modified and upgraded for the Canadian Forces, they were delivered in 2013–2014 with the Canadian designation CH-147F.
While not thought of as a 'tactical' helicopter they are often used as such. More to the point, heavy lift helicopters are almost a national asset, as useful for disaster relief as they are for logistic support, you really can't have enough of them. While such a procurement might seem more expensive, in terms of initial purchase cost, savings would be found in the commonality with an existing fleet and its attendant logistics and training infrastructure.
If a purchase of CH-147 Chinook helicopters was paired with a purchase of Bell 429 'Global Rangers' , the same aircraft in service with the Canadian Coast Guard, to be used as a more economically viable aircraft for the purely utility role, there could be further savings. It doesn't hurt that these useful aircraft are manufactured in Canada.
All of the above would be viable choices for the Government intention to "acquire a more modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability" which they suggest in the new Defence policy is a priority. If the procurement was pursued with any sense of urgency the aircraft could be in service within five years at an affordable price.
This will not happen. In five years the Department of National Defence will announce that they are five years away from an option which involves a bespoke aircraft, highly modified for Canadian use and in service no where else in the world which costs twice as much as any of the above options. They will be mistaken, it will take twice as long as predicted and cost three times more then it should.
This last is not a cynical prediction, based on all previous performance and the lack of any real change in our procurement policies, it is a fact.
