MAYBE IT'S THE AIRFORCE, NOT THE AIRPLANES

A lot of time and energy is being spent trying to decide how to replace Canada’s F-18s. The question of just which of the various candidates is the right choice has focused attention on the technical merits of the aircraft. Is this really the question we should be asking?

In a July 08 post James Hasik pointed out that the F-35 is acquiring the economic status of a ‘staple’… the Canadian government has been planning to buy-to-budget with its fighter program (assuming that it sticks with the F-35). This means that as the price goes up, the number of planes bought goes down, even if the total outlay remains the same. So what does that suggest about how they value the F-35? The buy-to-budget idea is arguably a domestic political stratagem for emphasizing certainty in military budgets over certainty in military capabilities. But if it has a classical economic interpretation, one could put Canadian demand for the F-35 right on the line between normality and inferiority.”

“.. It’s an assessment of how the primary buyer values it. Alongside steak, it’s the potato—the thing that you’re going to buy regardless, and on which you’ll double-down if you don’t think that you have options. In short, it’s a staple of the pantry. Indeed, the appropriate characterization of demand may be stronger than that. For until recently, as the forecast price kept rising, the Pentagon kept allocating more future monies to the purchasing plan for the F-35. Does that make the Joint Strike Fighter a Giffen good? A Giffen good is a rarely-seen thing, an inferior good of which one buys more when the price increases. It’s something you’ve just got to have regardless of what it costs, and how much or little you actually like your predicament. The classic example in the textbooks is (again) potatoes during an Irish potato famine...”

One of the things that makes the staple argument interesting, from an economics point of view, is that staples can be replaced. Sometimes pasta can replace potatoes, sometimes it turns out that eating too many potatoes isn’t even good for you.

In his September post Richard Aboulafia of the Teal Group explains why Korea has done a u-turn on its F-15 purchase and is now expected to buy F-35’s. He writes that,” South Korea faces two divergent strategic requirements. The first is the nut job regime that has hundreds of artillery tubes and thousands of tanks positioned just a few miles north of Seoul. A large force of F-15s, with their massive weapons payload, is the ideal weapon for that threat. The second is the long-term threat of being in a dangerous neighborhood with lots of technologically advanced regional rivals (China, Japan, and Russia). Something able to deal with the Anti-Access Area-Denial (A2AD) environment is essential for that, which means F-35s. Thus, as South Korea’s perception of these threats (in terms of timing and severity) change, preference for one plane over another shifts. One of them offers ordnance, the other emphasizes survivability”

Fortunately Canada does not share Korea’s security situation. Like Korea however, we do have mixed security needs. We need aircraft for ‘homeland defence’ and aircraft for alliance participation in expeditionary warfare. These divergent needs can not necessarily be met by just one aircraft type.  The problem of buying just one kind of, expensive, aircraft to meet our diverse needs is that, as Hasik points out “as the price goes up, the number of planes bought goes down”.

It is important to remember that for all the attention that has been focused on the technical aspects of various aircraft, it is Air Forces that fight the wars. It is the organization and planning ability of your Air Force that typically determines the outcome of the battle. The most obvious example is the Battle of Britain. Often celebrated as the victory of Spitfires and Hurricanes over Messerschmidt Bf-109s and Heinkel bombers, it was the triumph of one organization over another.

In many ways Britain's preparation for the battle actually began in the early 1920s. A committee, created by Air Commodore Steel and Colonel Bartholomew in 1923, produced a plan of defence based on the assumption that any attack on Britain would come from France and concentrate on the South coast. The plan, based on various defence zones, was modified over time to allow for changes in technology, such as radar and aircraft speeds. What didn’t change was the understanding that it was the organization, not what we would now call hardware, that mattered most.

The truth is that getting a Canadian government to spend money on defence is never going to be easy. As Eric Morse pointed out in the Ottawa Citizen, “All our wars have been expeditionary, therefore by strict definition optional, and all have been fought as mid-level members of coalitions. It is very hard to imagine Canada fighting any other kind of war. That makes an easy recipe for strategic isolationism, if only because it makes such a hard sell for peacetime defence spending”.

Given a choice Canadian politicians will always keep defence spending down to the lowest level they can get away with. But as Morse writes,” Canada is trying to plan in a geopolitical vacuum it cannot afford to fill. Going by history, that situation won’t last forever, and when at last war happens, it still won’t happen when we can afford it. In the meantime, the best preparedness is not hardware but brains. Whatever equipment a nation has or doesn’t have, trained and educated men and women are never wasted in or out of the military”

The question should not be, ‘What kind of Fighter should Canada buy?’ but rather “what kind of Air Force does Canada need?’

How to Kill the Joint Strike Fighter, Part III: Marketing against a Staple Product, 08 July 2013

http://www.jameshasik.com/weblog/2013/07/how-to-kill-the-joint-strike-fighter-part-iii-marketing-against-a-staple-product.html

Dear Fellow Fighter Requirements Aficionados

http://www.richardaboulafia.com/shownote.asp?id=384

Behind the Battle of Britain

http://h2g2.com/approved_entry/A733565

The hard sell for peacetime defence spending

 Eric Morse, Ottawa Citizen November 10, 2013

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/opinion/op-ed/hard+sell+peacetime+defence+spending/9149084/story.html

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE C-27J SPARTAN

 

 The C-27J Spartan has been in the news of late and as a prime candidate to fill the Fixed Wing Search & Rescue program we can expect to hear more about it. 

 The C-27J Spartan started off as a perfectly respectable twin engine military cargo plane made in Italy. Originally designed in the 1960’s, The Aeritalia G.222 (formerly Fiat Aviazione now Alenia Aeronautica) evolved over the years into the C-27. Alenia was in alliance with Lockheed-Martin to sell the aircraft as an adjunct to the Hercules transport. The C-130 Hercules is essentially the worlds standard military air lifter.With the same engines and a cockpit featuring a similar layout the two aircraft  were seen as  complementary. Lock-Mart gave up on this idea when they realized that in some markets the Italian product was competing with there own offering. Alenia didn’t give up and with the U.S. firm L-3 Communications as their partner re-branded the product as the C-27J to emphasize its commonality with latest Hercules model, the C-130J.

 In the United States, the U.S. army wanted tactical airlift for its troops. The Army believed that this was not a high priority for the U.S. Air Force which it saw as preferring zoomey high performance jet fighters. The USAF, on the other hand, believed that it was fundamentally wrong for the Army to fly airplanes. The Air Force compromise was that they would purchase and operate the C-27J’s. Everybody happy, especially the folks in the town where Alenia had promised to build the aircraft if the USAF brought the 145 planes the army felt were needed. Even the National Guard was happy as it meant new aircraft and new missions for them. Unfortunately for all, the wars were ended, the budget was cut, and something had to give. It turned out that the Air Force, in its wisdom, felt that the most expendable item in its inventory was the C-27J. On January 26 2012, in a paper entitled “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices” the US Department of Defense announced plans to sell off all C-27Js on order as “their niche capabilities are no longer required”. By cancelling the purchase, and moth balling the aircraft that had already been manufactured they felt they could save a lot of money.

 When U.S. Air Force announced it would end its C-27 program there were twenty-one aircraft involved. Twelve aircraft had been delivered, four were going through their final assembly and testing, and five were in production. It was suggested in some quarters that Canada, as well as some other countries might be able to pick up a good deal on very lightly used C-27J’s from the USAF. Alenia, already stung by the loss of the order, responded to the suggestion by announcing that any of the US aircraft that were resold by the USAF could expect no support at all from the manufacturer.

 In Australia, they were also looking for tactical air lift. The previous aircraft filling the role, the de Havilland Canada built Caribou, had been out of service for some years, but its short take-off and landing (STOVL) capabilities were still missed. On May 10, 2012, even though for all its other sterling attributes the C-27J lacked STOVL abilities, it was announced that:

 “Australia has confirmed that it will obtain 10 Alenia C-27J Spartan tactical transport aircraft for A$1.4 billion ($1.4 billion) through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Mechanism. The C-27J was assessed by Defence as the aircraft which best met all the essential capability requirements and provides the best value for money," Australia's Department of Defence said in a statement. "It was assessed as being able to fly further, faster, higher while carrying more cargo and requiring a smaller runway than the other aircraft under consideration, the Airbus Military C-295."

It should be pointed out here that the Airbus C-295 is also another leading contender for the Canadian Fixed Wing Search & Rescue (FWSR) program. It is a somewhat smaller, somewhat less capable, aircraft with a somewhat smaller price tag. In general countries with money who want more air transport capability have chosen to buy the C-27J. Countries with less money or more specific Search & Rescue requirements have purchased the C-295. It is not considered to be suitable for Search & Rescue in Canada (at least by the RCAF) as it lacks the range and speed called for by a Search and Rescue system based on a few, southern, airfields in a very large country with a very large northern area to cover.

 In Canada, we are looking for an aircraft to fill the Fixed Wing Search & Rescue program.  Canada’s insistence on labelling them as a Search & Rescue aircraft can be a slight embarrassment. As well as replacing aging C-130’s they are also replacing Buffalo aircraft in Canadian service. The original replacement for the Caribou, the de Havilland Canada Buffalo is no longer in production, although the current Canadian licence holder (Viking Canada) has offered to produce an updated model, the Buffalo NG. 

 To see Vikings position check out, http://www.vikingair.com/uploadedFiles/News/News_Item/DHC-5NG%20versus%20C27J%20January%202009.pdf

 The C-27J also suffers from a widely held belief the RCAF has tilted the field in favour of purchasing C-27J’s rather then any other aircraft by tailoring the statement of operational requirements with the object of increasing the possibility that the C-27J would be acquired.

 What the C-27J does provide is air transport. It’s a smaller, slightly cheaper, Hercules. Getting more of that capability is what Air Forces want. There are other alternatives to the C-27J, buying more Hercules aircraft for instance. C-27J’s, however, can be sold to governments on the basis that they are less expensive, and can be seen as filling a variety of roles.

Specifications C-27J  
Data from Alenia Aeronautica C-27J facts

Performance

• Maximum speed: 602 km/h (374 mph; 325 kn)
• Cruising speed: 583 km/h (362 mph; 315 kn)
• Minimum control speed: 194 km/h; 121 mph (105 kn)
• Range: 1,852 km (1,151 mi; 1,000 nmi) with 10,000 kilograms (22,000 lb) payload
• Range at 6,000 kg payload: 4,260 km (2,650 mi; 2,300 nmi)
• Ferry range: 5,926 km (3,682 mi; 3,200 nmi)
• Service ceiling: 9,144 m (30,000 ft)

General characteristics

• Crew: Minimum two: pilot, co-pilot, (plus loadmaster when needed)
• Capacity: 60 troops or 46 paratroops or 36 litters with 6 medical personnel
• Payload: 11,500 kg (25,353 lb)
• Length: 22.7 m (74 ft 6 in)
• Wingspan: 28.7 m (94 ft 2 in)
• Height: 9.64 m (31 ft 8 in)
• Wing area: 82 m² (880 sq ft)
• Empty weight: 17,000 kg (37,479 lb)
• Max takeoff weight: 30,500 kg (67,241 lb)
• Powerplant: 2 × Rolls-Royce AE2100-D2A turboprop, 3,460 kW (4,640 hp) each
• Propellers: 6-bladed Dowty Propeller 391/6-132-F/10, 4.15 m (13 ft 7 in) diameter

SEARCHING FOR SEARCH & RESCUE

Canada needs search and rescue aircraft.  Between long distances, aging aircraft and public displeasure measured in Media reports of SAR failures, we are long overdue for new aircraft and an improved search and rescue organization. Its importance is even higher considering that a new multilateral SAR treaty, a legally binding agreement, commits Canada to meet its Arctic SAR responsibilities. 

Right now the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft (FWSAR) Project is wending its way through the byzantine labyrinth of government and military approval. The favoured aircraft is the Alenia C-27 Spartan, a twin engine military transport with a high degree of commonality to the Hercules C-130J. In fact it has long been believed in some quarters that the RCAF statement of operational requirements for the role was tailored with the object of increasing the possibility that the C-27 would be acquired.

 The other main contender for the role is the EADS CASA C-295, a similar twin-turboprop tactical military transport aircraft manufactured by Airbus Military in Spain. Unfortunately for Airbus the C-27J Spartan is the favoured FWSAR aircraft because it meets requirements for high transit speeds between southern air bases and the Arctic for SAR missions.

 The current model for delivery of Search and Rescue services to the Canadian public revolves around using RCAF aircraft. These aircraft have a dual use. By using military grade cargo aircraft for FWSAR the Air Force improves its military capabilities at the same time that it provides the bulk of our national Search & Rescue assets.  The same model predicates their use from southern bases, an incredibly long distance from Canada’s North. (3500 km, more than the distance from Victoria to Toronto)

  If civilian style cargo aircraft, which are less expensive, were procured by the Armed Forces for the FWSAR program they could meet the requirements for Search and Rescue and save money but they would not provide the airlift capabilities needed by the Armed Forces. If military style cargo aircraft had to be procured by the Forces in addition to Search and Rescue aircraft any savings would be lost. If no military cargo aircraft were procured for the RCAF.  then military capability would be lost.

 This impeccable logic leads directly to the C-27 as the favoured aircraft for the FWSAR program. The logic only holds, however, if one favours the model for Search & Rescue held by the Department of National Defence.  It is considered to be a high profile job for the Armed forces and they would hate to lose it. High profile it may be with the public, but Search and Rescue has seldom been accorded the same priority with the Forces as it has with that public. It is difficult to even ascertain from the Departments website who is responsible for Search & Rescue, other than the senior officer for Canada Command (a headquarters unit soon to disappear).  It might even be said that its importance to the Armed Forces only becomes noticeable when it is suggested that some other agency take the lead in providing the service.

 In many countries much of search and rescue is performed by private companies or government supported volunteers. There are many possible whole of government approaches to providing Search & Rescue services. The Canadian Armed Forces are only part of the puzzle.

  

  One answer is to upgrade Northern Search and Rescue by procuring more, new, Viking Twin Otters for use in the north. They could easily, and far more cheaply, be flown by reserve squadrons.  A small number (four?) C-130 Hercules aircraft could be refurbished with at least two of them being based in rotation in the north. In the south, Government supported volunteers based on the successful U.S. Civil Air Patrol could be complemented by  larger civilian style aircraft run by which ever department of  government  is considered appropriate and using military aircraft as necessary.

 The military should get on with their real job of providing military capability for Canada and leave Search & Rescue to organizations that can treat it as their number one priority.

FIFTH GENERATION?

Mosquito fighter-bomber, the first "fifth-generation"fighter?

 It has been said that one of the most important reasons for Canada acquiring the F-35 is that it is the only fifth-generation fighter available. So just what is a “fifth generation” fighter anyway?

 By at least one count,  “The US Air force’s first operational jet fighter was the F-80; it was followed by the F-86 Saber, F-100 Super Saber, F-104 Starfighter, F-4 Phantom, F-15 Eagle, F-117 Nighthawk, and F-22 Raptor, each of which represents a generational leap over its predecessor. So, in fact, the F-22 Raptor represents the 8th generation of US jet fighters.” Which, in theory, makes the F-35 something like a 9th generation aircraft!

 Using the same logic it could be said that in Canadian service the Vampire F.3 was our first generation jet fighter, the Canadair F-86 the second generation. This makes the Cf-101 Voodoo the third generation, the Cf-104 the fourth, the Cf-5 alliteratively becomes our fifth generation fighter, which makes the Cf-18 our sixth generation and whatever comes next (F-35?) a seventh generation fighter in Canadian terms.

 Of course if you use the notion of a “generational leap” one might conclude that the Vampire and the Canadair F-86 represented our first generation of jet fighters. Which would make the Cf-104’s, Cf-5’s, and Cf-101’s our second generation; this in turn marks the Cf-18 as our third generation jet fighter. If we buy fifth generation F-35’s, what happened to our fourth generation? Have we skipped a whole generation? 

So what is the “fifth generation”?

 Lockheed Martin’s F-35 website has a page on fifth-generation technologies and recent statements by US Air Force generals, the Canadian Auditor-General and others provide definitions of what a fifth generation fighter is supposed to be. 

From these definitions, it appears that a “fifth-generation” fighter is supposed to have:

-- Stealth; 
-- High maneuverability; 
-- Advanced avionics; 
-- Networked data fusion from sensors and avionics

-- Multi-role capability

The problem with this laundry list of capabilities is that most modern warplanes contain some or even all of them to a greater or lesser degree.

Stealth The F-35’s low radar cross-section and radar-absorbent surface coatings (i.e., paint) make it more difficult to detect by radar, but they do not make it invisible. As well, this is a capability that degrades as sensors used to detect aircraft improve. Most modern fighters are designed to minimize radar returns from at least some angles. This is true, for example, of the latest model F-18 Super hornets and the F-15 Stealth Eagle.

High maneuverability The F-35 has no special maneuverability-enhancing design features such as canard forward surfaces, vectoring nozzles or “super cruise”. Its thrust-to-weight ratio is limited and unlikely to improve. These capabilities do exist on other fighters already in service. Aircraft such as Tornado and Rafale are in fact more maneuverable.

Advanced avionics The F-35 is being equipped with the APG-81 electronically-scanned radar, but this technology is already being retrofitted to previous-generation US fighters like the F-15E and the F-18E Super Hornet. The F-35 also supposed to feature an innovative Distributed Aperture System (DAS), which consists of sensors mounted around the aircraft that will provide the pilot with a 360-degree, spherical view of his surroundings. Unfortunately the pilot’s Helmet-Mounted Display System (HMDS) designed to present this information does not work despite a decade of design and testing. In fact Lockheed has asked BAE Systems to adapt its existing Eurofighter helmet display as an interim solution. 

Networked data fusion from sensors and avionics The idea of fusing data from all on-board sensors is not new, as it has been operational for several years on the latest European fighters in service. French Rafales, for example, use their MICA missiles as additional sensors, and combine their data with that provided by their SPECTRA self-protection suite, radar, IRST, other on board sensors and data received from other friendly aircraft, AWACS, or ground control centers to present a single, unified and constantly updated tactical picture to the pilot. Boeing and the Naval Air Warfare Center plan to add a networking capability to the Distributed Targeting System which will soon be operational on the Super Hornet. Most western combat aircraft are already networked through the Link 16 datalink, which is already in service and being retrofitted to many NATO and allied fighters. 

Multirole capability There is no modern combat aircraft that doesn’t claim to be capable of carrying out multiple roles. U.S. and European fighters routinely carry out widely diverse missions: F-15C interceptor and F-15E multirole/strike, F-18E Super Hornet (Air-to-air; strike/attack and electronic attack), and the F-16 which carries out both strike and interceptor duties. The Rafale is capable of interception, ground attack, nuclear and conventional strike, and reconnaissance missions; it also has a naval variant. The Eurofighter Typhoon is capable of interception and ground attack missions. The Saab JAS-35 Gripen is tasked with interception, ground attack, strike, reconnaissance and naval missions, including anti-ship.

 In fact AESA radars, sensor fusion, networked operations, precision-guided weapons, low observables and other capabilities are relatively common now, and will be widespread once the F-35 finally enters operational service sometime in the next decade. Are they all fifth generation? If they are all fifth generation why are they not being considered for Canadian use? Before our politicians, both in and out of uniform, start throwing PR buzzwords around maybe they should figure out what they mean.

DUE DILIGENCE

Bill Sweetman, a long time critic of the F-35, has written in Defence Technology International that;

 “If you make the right decision based on inadequate information, you are lucky rather then intelligent. Although many planning decisions (including big ones, where the horizon is years off) must be made on partial information and rely on estimates, “due diligence” involves learning as much as you can.

       ****************************************************************

Meanwhile, the insistence of Canada’s government that the JSF was the only aircraft that met the nation’s requirements, combined with sullen refusal to release the (unclassified) summary of those requirements that the DND presented to the government, has raised suspicions about the process.

 An April 3 report from Canada’s auditor-general, plus a few leaks, confirmed those suspicions in spades.

 The DND had cobbled the requirements together after it found that the only way to avoid a competitive selection was to declare the F-35 uniquely capable of meeting its needs. Inconveniently, its only previous study showed three qualified candidates.

 DND assembled anew document that compromised a couple of dozen mandatory requirements that anything on the market could meet, plus a handful that were written around the F-35.

 One of those described the F-35’s complicated night-vision system. It is an open question whether it will work.

  Another concerned stealth (with detailed specs in a classified annex). You can debate the value of stealth in some missions, such as intercepting Russian bombers that have no air-search radar, but it is a legitimate requirement. But for the DND to assert that the F-35 is uniquely able to meet it is disingenuous.

 Could the Rafale or the stealth-modified Super Hornet meet the radar cross section target? Could they hit it by the 2020 in-service date specified by Canada? I don’t know the answer, and neither does DND, because they didn’t ask; no competitors were invited to give formal briefing.

 In terms of due diligence, that’s a big question to forget.”

 On the question of due diligence Philippe Lagassé in Macleans Magazine writes;

“The key question that must be asked is why the F-35 is the only possible future fighter aircraft for the Canadian Forces, on what grounds the air force makes that claim and based on which defence policies and priorities. The Canadian military lacks many capabilities that larger powers possess; the Canadian Forces are not equipped to meet every possible threat or eventuality. Why was it judged absolutely necessary for the military to have this particular aircraft and to write a statement of requirements that excluded any alternatives? Why were trade-off considerations and cost-benefit analyses not entertained in this case? How does the defence department explain the Auditor General’s finding that due diligence was not performed when addressing these concerns? And the most important question: did the defence minister or Cabinet allow the department to brush aside its duty to perform this due diligence”

 At the same time Dan Ward has said;

 “There are basically three reasons to cancel an acquisition program. In no particular order, the reasons are:

We can’t afford it.

We don’t need it.

It doesn’t work

This means Defense Department leaders have to continually ask three important questions throughout the development of a new military system:

Can we afford it?

Do we need it?

Does it work?

The wording of these questions is quite deliberate. Note that question #2 is not “Will we someday possibly maybe need it for some hypothetical future against an opponent who may or may not exist?” Question 2 is also not asking if we need it right this minute – no need to get all short-sighted here. The question is whether we need (present tense) to build it – and the answer might very well be “Yes, we have to build it now because we’ll need it three years from now.”

The other questions are similarly posed in the present tense. Thus, question #3 is not asking “Will it eventually work some day, assuming several breakthroughs and discoveries and new technologies?” No. It’s asking “Does it work?” I think that’s the right question. Developing new technologies is important, but it’s an activity that should be kept separate from developing new systems.

If the answer to any of the three questions is No, then it’s time to seriously consider cancelling the program. If the answer to all three questions is No, we’re definitely in the process of building an unnecessary, unaffordable, unworkable waste of space.

That’s nobody’s idea of a good time.

Of course, life is more complicated than that. Given the uncertainties of world events, political realities and technical developments, these questions don’t always have binary yes/no answers, much less a wide consensus on what the answers are. Further complicating the equation, the answers are seldom static. Today’s no could easily become tomorrow’s yes… and vice versa.

What makes it particularly difficult is that systems in development tend to accumulate hordes of advocates willing to swear on a stack of Constitutions that the republic will not survive without this particular piece of gear. These true believers are inevitably countered by critics who insist with equal enthusiasm that spending another dime on the thing will push our nation into bankruptcy. Each side of the debate is well-armed with stacks of competing data, various assumptions (stated and unstated) and detailed analyses which prove they are right and their opponents are stupid.

So yes, it can be difficult to determine the right answer. But the difficulty should not prevent us from continually asking the questions.”

 One more thing to think about. At somewhere around 25 billion dollars over something like thirty years the F-35 is going to suck up about five percent of our defence budget annually. Is it worth it to spend five percent of our entire military spending to get 65 fighters? I don’t know the answer, but I hope that someone out there is doing their “due diligence”.

                                                    

THOUGHTS ON DRONES

Drones, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned aircraft system (UAS), remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) or autonomous aircraft; they go by a variety of names and have a variety of features but whatever you call them what we are talking about are combat aircraft with no people in them.

 There are those who believe that they herald a revolution in Air Power (people who care about these things always use capitals when writing about Air Power). The truth is that like most military revolutions, particularly those based on new technology, more is promised then can be delivered. Drones bring little that is new to air warfare other then the promise of lower casualties, at least among the fliers. In terms of effects they are not much different from piloted aircraft. Already the siren call of lower cost is fading under the harsh light of reality. It turns out that it costs just as much to fly and maintain a modern drone as it does any other aircraft and the longer hours that can be flown by these aircraft make up for any savings to be found in not employing pilots.

 One new capability that drones do bring to the application of Air Power is persistence. Formerly the preserve of Navies and Armies it is now possible for aircraft to maintain a long term presence. Once nations used the ability of warships to remain off the coast of an adversary to influence events, now it is possible to imagine an aircraft in international airspace maintaining station for long periods adjacent to “countries of interest” for the same purpose.

 Oddly enough it is the legal ramifications of their use, rather then technical issues, that may be the greatest limit on the use of drones. Nobody knows who will be responsible in the event of a crash, mid-air collision, or death resulting from the misuse of munitions. To deal with some of these issues some manufactures are even designing optionally piloted aircraft. A pilot can take responsibility on the way to the war and after that it’s up to the lawyers.  Until someone, or some responsible organization, decides the answers to these questions, the use of drones is going to be strictly limited in any non war-zones.

 It’s interesting to consider that if these legal issues should be settled in a manner that suits the manufacturers and the courts it will create a new age of air travel. Private aviation would take off, literally, in a world in which non-pilots could dial in a destination and leave all the flying to the autopilot. If this is the case then paradoxically  one of the most important effects of the development of unmanned aircraft may be to increase the number of people flying.

AIRCRAFT CHOICES

CHOICES                   

 If at some point it becomes apparent that the F-35 is unaffordable, or the program is so compromised that they become unavailable, some choices will have to be made. Contrary to what appears to be common wisdom, there are some choices.

F-16: The F-16 is still in production and the latest variants include advanced radars and options for advanced communications. As used examples come on the market the ubiquitous F-16 looks likely to be the aircraft of choice for second and third rank military powers. The newest models will be in service in one form or another for decades. An unlikely choice for Canada, a case could be made for them if the costs involved allowed a comparatively large number of aircraft to be purchased. Quantity, as they say, has a quality all its own, and the ability to deploy a significant number of aircraft, as opposed to the token numbers we do now, would be of value to any coalition which it suited Canada to join. At the same time larger numbers of aircraft would allow for real air-defence of Canadian cities.

 Saab JAS 39 Gripen NG: Arguments in favor of the Gripen are similar to those for the F-16. Its shorter range and single engine, like the F-16, may not recommend it for long patrols over arctic wastes but in sufficient numbers it would be perfectly capable of mounting an air defence over major cities or supporting Canadian troop contingents overseas. Some, undoubtedly misguided, parties might even consider these efforts to be more important than protecting the tundra. The Gripen is a modern aircraft, a relatively new design capable of being refitted with all the latest bells and whistles as they become available.

Dassault Rafale:  For several generations of fighters, Dassault specialized in relatively inexpensive (the word cheap can never be applied to modern jet aircraft) and relatively light fighters which found favour all over the world. A Combination of high performance and strong commercial instincts resulted in the sales of a lot of Mirage jets. With the Rafale the French have taken a leap of faith into the world of heavier and more expensive aircraft that were previously the preserve of U.S. and multi-national companies. The Rafale is an excellent multi-purpose fighter which proved its worth over Libya and won a recent Indian contract which was disputed by all the major manufacturers.  The unlikelihood of the French fighter being purchased for the R.C.A.F. is balanced against just how attractive an offer Dassault would be willing to make to secure a North American sale.

Eurofighter Typhoon:  The Typhoon is probably the best pure interceptor available on the market. Its strong suit is shooting down other airplanes. Strike missions are secondary and as such the aircraft has suffered from a slower pace of development in the all-important field of dropping bombs accurately on people who don’t do what we tell them to do. These are problems which can be rectified and the Typhoon will undoubtedly achieve its intended status as a modern multi-role fighter. The Europeans are motivated to sell and keep production lines open. If the price was right a case could be made that a very good cost to benefit ratio could be achieved by buying this very advanced aircraft.

Boeing F-18E (Super Hornet): This aircraft is a strong contender for any Canadian default purchase of fighters. If the F-35 should prove too expensive or too controversial the F-18 in its latest form would make an acceptable and economic replacement for the older model F-18’s currently serving the R.C. A.F. A recent (May, 2010) U.S. Navy order for 124 F-18’s in both the strike-fighter and Growler electronic warfare variants for some five and a half billion dollars seems like a very good deal in comparison to projected F-35 costs. It has been argued that procuring an electronic warfare capability would offset the loss of stealth promised by the F-35 and insure a viable role for a CF-18 Super Hornet well into the future. It should also be noted that Boeing is offering enhanced low-observable (stealth) features for future versions of the Super Hornet.

A note here, so far these aircraft choices have been arranged in roughly the order that they are likely to be chosen by the R.C.A.F in lieu of acquiring the F-35 with the least likely being the F-16 and the most likely being the F-18E or some other variant of the Super Hornet. Less likely, but still not impossible, is an aircraft type not now in production, a new version of the F-15 Eagle.

Boeing F-15SE: The Silent Eagle is a proposed upgrade of the F-15E (itself an upgrade of the original single seat F-15C fighter) by Boeing using stealth features, such as internal weapons carriage and radar-absorbent material. It is a two seat aircraft and as such would represent a large added cost to the R.C.A.F. in the form of training and personal. If a single seat modernized F-15 using the stealth features of the proposed Silent Eagle and the latest Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar were to be made available (at the right price, needless to say) it would be a strong contender for any non-F-35 Canadian fighter purchase.  Boeing take note.

HOW DO YOU BUY A FIGHTER?

A lot of people have pointed to the Canadian governments procedure for buying F-35’s as badly flawed.  The question is, how do you buy a fighter? This is how India does it.

Approval to go ahead with a formal  requests for proposals (RfP) for 126 medium mufti-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) to replace Indian Air Force (IAF) MiG-21s, Jaguars, and MiG-27’s was granted by India’s Defence Acquisition Council on June 29, 2007. The RfP, which included options on a further 64 aircraft was issued on August 28, 2007 to six potential vendors. Candidates were the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault Rafael, Eurofighter Typhoon, Lockheed Martin F-16N, RAC MiG-35, and Saab JAS 39 Gripen. The deadline for responses was set as March 3, 2008, but this was later extended after some bidders said that they did not have sufficient time to respond to the request and final bids were submitted on April 28, 2008.

 After technical evaluation of the bids, in-country field trials of the six MMRCA contenders started in August 2009 and continued into 2010. After these extensive evaluations had been completed India’s Ministry of Defence announced on April 27, 2011 that it had short listed the Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon and eliminated all other contenders for the requirement.

The commercial bids from the two competitors were opened on November 4, 2011, following which there was a period of evaluation of both offers. This evaluation assessed various parameters that would affect the final selection, not only including the lowest bid, but also taking into account life-cycle costs and potential off-set agreements.

 Off-set agreements were given particular emphasis in the MMRCA competition as it is a normal requirement in Indian defence deals with foreign contractors to ask for a 30% offset. In this case, however, a 50% offset was stipulated. Approval of the evaluation report on the offset proposals from both finalists was granted on October 7, 2011 by the Defence Acquisition Council.

Final selection of the Rafale was made on January 31.2012 and on February 17, 2012 the Defence Minister confirmed that the Contract Negotiations Committee has now commenced negotiations to finalize the deal.

There is likely to be six month of further contract negotiations after which eight stages of scrutiny will have to be passed before the deal can be signed. This will include approvals by the Defence Ministry and Defence Finance followed by examinations by the independent monitors of the Central Vigilance Commission, National Security Council Secretariat, Finance Ministry and the Cabinet committee for Security. It is believed that final contract can be signed within nine months.

 It should be noted that this is a long and ponderous process. It should also be noted that the Indians’ are actually going to get airplanes within the foreseeable future. More then the Canadian government can say. It’s true that the F-35 was not included in the selection process; it’s also true that aircraft manufacturers (“coff coff – Eurofighter) are still lining up offering better prices in an attempt to steal the deal from Dassault. Manufacturers actually have an incentive to offer their best prices and they do. A long and ponderous process, but one the Canadian government might learn from.