Showing posts with label NAVAL. Show all posts

Sunday, 4 August 2024

A FEW THOUGHTS ON THE RIVER CLASS DESTROYERS

On June 28^th of this year it was announced that construction had officially begun on Canada’s fleet of Canadian Surface Combatants.

Given that the design and design team contract was originally awarded in February of 2019, the announcement focused largely on federal government messaging about the naming of the class, in the future the CSC will be known as the River-class.

While the Miriam-Webster dictionary defines a destroyer as “a small fast warship used especially to support larger vessels and usually armed with guns, depth charges, torpedoes, and often guided missiles” the Canadian government, in their press release, have defined destroyers as “a powerful and multi-functional ship, that is a fast, maneuverable, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine long-endurance warship, which can escort larger vessels in a fleet, convoy, or carrier battle group and defend them against a wide range of general threats.”

This is a definition which more accurately describes the 8,800 ton displacement, missile armed ship previously know as the Canadian Surface Combatant.

As the Royal Canadian Navy’s next generation combat ship the CSC, or River class destroyers, will replace both the Iroquois class destroyers and the Halifax-class frigates.

While the Iroquois class ships have long been retired, the Halifax class ships, the first of which was launched in 1988, are still in service. HMCS Ottawa, the most recently built unit of the 12 ship class, was launched in May of 1996. In the year 2050, the currently projected in service date for the last of the River class destroyers, she will be 54 years old.

When in service there were 4 Iroquois class destroyers, with a displacement of 5,100 long tons each, along with the currently serving 12 Halifax class frigates which displace 4,690 long tons each. The total tonnage of all 16 vessels being replace is 76,680 long tons.

Compare this to the River class destroyers which, at a displacement of over 8,000 long tons each, come to a total of 121,200 long tons for the fifteen ships currently envisioned.

As a note of interest, the 14 original River class destroyers of WW II fame displaced approximately 1,340 long tons each for a total of 18,760 long tons.

The graphic provided with the announcement indicates that the government in continuing with the choice of the Leonardo 127mm gun rather then the BAE MK 45 as used by our allies. Explanations of this choice have been less then coherent.

It has been noted that there appears to have been a reduction in weapons on the CSC. Originally the RCN appeared to suggest that there would be 32 Missile Vertical Launch Systems on each combatant. Now, that has been reduced to 24. No explanation was provided.

With only 24 VLS systems the River Class will be seriously under-armed by modern AAW destroyer standards, and will likely be one of the expensive in terms of missile cells/launchers by platform cost and size.

One of the reasons for the loss of VLS tubes is explained by fact sheet published with the June 28 announcement showing the Rolling Airframe Missile replacing the previously selected CAMM Sea Ceptor for the close in defence role.

While it is true that there was an overlap between the capabilities of the CAMM and the RIM-162 ESSM Sea Sparrow air defence missiles that are to be carried in some of the VLS launchers, with the loss of CAMM it means that more of the relatively few VLS tubes may have to be devoted to the Sea Sparrow missiles leaving fewer tubes available for other weapons.

Aft of the RAM launcher are two Leonardo Lionfish 30/X 30mm stabilized rapid-fire guns. While having some point defence capabilities it is assumed that the choice of these weapons was also driven by the emerging threats of attack drones, both airborne and naval.

What is not clear is why it was decided that these weapons were so superior to the BAE Mark 38 25 mm machine gun system currently used on the Canadian Navy's Harry DeWolf-class offshore patrol vessels that the advantages outweighed the costs of introducing a new and untried weapons system with all its entailed logistic, training and operational costs.

Of course all of this is speculation. As unlikely as it seems, nobody, including the Navy and the Government, really know exactly what their new warship will look like or how it will be equipped.

It has been reported that government officials acknowledged they don’t have a final cost for the project. It is an indictment of the entire procurement process that is producing these ships that even though ship design started in February 2019 and the preliminary design review was completed in December 2022 they also still don’t have a final design.

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2024/06/construction-begins-for-canadas-new-warship-fleet--the-river-class-destroyers.html

https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/navcom-surfcom-eng.html#a2

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMCS_Ottawa_(FFH_341)

https://www.naval-technology.com/news/canadas-new-river-class-destroyers-begin-construction/

https://vanguardcanada.com/canadas-next-generation-warship-fleet-the-river-class-destroyers-set-sail/

https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/fleet-units/surface/river-class-destroyer/fact-sheet.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_River-class_destroyer

https://jgmjgm516.blogspot.com/2023/10/why-is-canada-procuring-5-inch-naval.html

https://jgmjgm516.blogspot.com/2023/12/does-anyone-really-know-what-is-going.html

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/11/royal-canadian-navy-unveils-new-details-on-csc-frigates/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAMM_(missile_family)#Operators

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-116_Rolling_Airframe_Missile#Service

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aegis_Combat_System#Operators

https://www.espritdecorps.ca/feature/introducing-the-river-class-destroyer-the-rcns-new-warship

Saturday, 16 December 2023

WHAT THE CLOSING OF THE RED SEA TO COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC MEANS FOR THE FUTURE

Forbes Magazine, among other sources, has reported that "Maersk Pauses Shipments Through Red Sea After Recent Houthi Attacks".

Earlier it had been reported that in reaction to continued attacks on shipping " White House officials said they were working to create an international force to tamp down attacks"

There are those who saw the actions of the Maersk line as a direct reaction to Washington's decision not to respond with over whelming unilateral force. There has been a lot of speculation as to Washington's strategy.

Strategy is, at best, a strange beast. In the words of Sun Tzu "Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat."

In the western tradition the belief is that governments (hopefully, but not necessarily, democratic in nature) determine war time strategy and then communicate it to the generals who then decide how to achieve the goals they have been given.

This belief is, necessarily, a myth.

In fact, just as military operations and tactics change in reaction to the enemies actions, strategy changes in the face of shifting political, economic and military circumstances. The same adaptable generals who can easily adjust to changes in enemy tactics can find it difficult to understand changes in direction from the political leadership. By the same token few politicians have much expertise in operational and tactical military matters.

In the end Strategy (at least in the western political/military sense) becomes a complicated dance between partners who are not really very good at it.

I do not believe that what we are seeing in relation the attacks by Houthis, and others, could be deemed as Strategy. What we are seeing is evolution.

The United States, having grown weary of their role as world policeman and having entered into a political/economic phase in their history where they do not believe they can afford that role, are stepping back. Consumed with internal politics and suspicious of a world they no longer recognize or understand they are leaving the post World War II order they created and which has for so long sustained global order and prosperity.

We are entering a new world. A world in which, almost alone among nations, the United States, since achieving energy self-sufficiency, does not need the rest of the world to survive. We are entering, perhaps re-entering, a period in world history when the complex global interconnections we have grown used to are no longer functioning.

In this world the United States, and with luck a few of their close neigbours, will be able to provide internally or through a combination of economic and military strength, most of the goods and services they need to survive, if not thrive. A world in which for a few favoured nations the situation is ,while perhaps not as good as it used to be, still demonstrably better then the status of other nation states which will neither thrive or, if worst comes to worst, survive.

The closing of the Red Sea to commercial traffic, and the response to it, are harbingers of the future.

Tuesday, 5 December 2023

DOES ANYONE REALLY KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON WITH THE CANADIAN SURFACE COMBATANT PROGRAM??

On October 24th of this year a letter was sent to the Minister of National Defence questioning the choice of the Leonardo 127/64 Main Gun System for the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) program. Rather to my surprise a reasonably sounding letter was received in reply

Dear J. G. Murray:

I am writing in response to your email addressed to the Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of National Defence, about the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) program and the choice of deck guns. The Minister has asked the Department of National Defence to review your correspondence and reply on his behalf.

Thank you for providing your input and comments on this important matter. I have consulted departmental staff and they have advised me on the following.

The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) requirements include the need for a 127mm/5in Main Gun System (MGS). The selected Leonardo 127/64 Vulcano MGS fully meets the RCN’s requirements, and it is a proven weapon system that is in service with various allied navies.

There are obvious benefits to have commonality between CSC, the United Kingdom Type 26 and Australian Hunter Class Frigate, all of which are based on a common Type 26 parent ship design. However, in this case it was not feasible for Canada to procure the same MGS being used by the other two nations due to a lack of production line for such gun systems, namely the BAE Mk 45 MGS. While the United Kingdom and Australia are able to reuse existing guns currently in-service within their fleets, Canada does not currently employ a BAE Mk 45 MGS. Accordingly, reusing existing weapons was not possible and it was infeasible to purchase used weapons from other navies to be refurbished for CSC.

Canada is confident that the selected MGS is the right solution for the RCN.

Thank you for writing, and I hope that this information is helpful.

Yours sincerely,

Taylor Paxton

National Defence Corporate Secretary

Needless to say this response raised more questions then it answered. I replied as follows.

Taylor Paxton,

Thank you for your reasonable response to what, in retrospect, seems to me to be an unnecessarily sarcastic letter. Your note does raise several points however. It is still not clear why the RCN requires such a large calibre weapon when they do not seem to have needed one in the last thirty years. Also, on a point of clarification, the Royal Navy has never used a similar weapon and, as they have no such used weapons to update, it must be assumed they are procuring new systems for their Type 26 frigates.

I am pleased that "Canada is confident that the selected MGS is the right solution for the RCN." but I would be more confident if my last letter to the minister had not been responded to with the following automated reply:

Contact the Minister - Thank you

Thank you for writing to the Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of National Defence. Please be assured your correspondence will be reviewed in due course. However, the whole-of-government approach to limit the spread of the Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) could affect the handling of correspondence, and there may be delays.

Your patience is appreciated.

Thank you again for your reply and I look forward to hearing from you again regarding this matter.

Kind regards,

J. G. Murray

It is hard to understand how it is possible for the Department of National Defence can believe that there is no production available for the BAE Mk 45 MGS. It is even harder to understand why BAE who are both the manufacturer of the gun and part of the design team for the CSC would not have made this clear to them.

In an attempt to find some answers I have written to BAE as below.

To Whom It May Concern,
I have recently been in correspondence with the office of the Minister of National Defence regarding the choice of main gun armament for the Canadian Surface Combatant frigate program. Specifically, I questioned the choice of the Leonardo 127/64 Vulcano MGS over the BAE Mk 45 MGS as used by our allies on the frigates they are building based, as the CSC is, on the British Type 26.
I was told that “it was not feasible for Canada to procure the same MGS being used by the other two nations due to a lack of production line for such gun systems”. Further it was suggested that those nations were “able to reuse existing guns currently in-service within their fleets”, which struck me as unlikely.
As BAE Systems is the warship design partner on the Canadian Surface Combatant programme and as BAE Systems appears to be marketing the Mk 45 MGS to prospective customers, and providing it to the Australian and British frigate programs, can you tell me if the Department of National Defence is correct in there belief that there is a lack of a production line for these systems.
I look forward to hearing from you with respect to this matter.
Kind regards,
J. G. Murray

In the event any answers are forthcoming I will pass them on.

Sunday, 2 December 2018

SUBMARINES VS SURFACE SHIPS IN THE CANADIAN NAVY

It has recently been announced that, at least provisionally, the Type 26 frigate from BAE Systems has been chosen as the winner of a competition to provide a design for Canada’s next generation of warships. In keeping with the finest traditions of Canadian procurement programs this announcement was followed shortly afterward by a court order to postpone the award of the $60B contract because the warship design selected may not meet the stated requirements.

The Department of Defence (DND) and the government had originally decided that budget constraints necessitated the selection of a "Military Off-The-Shelf" (MOTS) product to limit the risk of escalating costs and delays. In such a competition, a government chooses amongst existing designs. This strategy suggested that a fixed-price contract for an adaptable MOTS product would be pursued.

As James Hasik has pointed out the Type 26 frigate from BAE Systems is not a MOTS product. No Type 26s are yet in service anywhere, so the risks and costs that typically attend the selection of an unproven and untested ship should have been considered as critical determinants in the competitive process.

At this point it would appear that those doing the selection have undermined the integrity of the process by choosing a design which will inescapably multiply the risk, cost and delays to the largest defence procurement in Canada's history.

Warships are expensive investments in national security. Today, a multi-purpose frigate can cost more than $2 billion; a price that most navies find puts constraints on the number of warships which can be procured. This is particularly true of the Royal Canadian Navy which is restricted by government edict to ships built in Canadian ship yards at what are, in international terms, uncompetitive rates.

It has become obvious that Canada will never have the navy which our military professionals believe we need as long as Canadians continue to elect governments which will not budget the amounts necessary to achieve the goals of either self-sufficiency or national security. This is particularly true of governments who prise political expediency over fiscal responsibility.

Given that our navy must be built within the narrow budget allocated for maritime defence the question becomes not “can we build the navy we need” but rather, “what is the best navy we can get for the money available”? This means looking at the mix of ships that budget and personal and politics allow for and deciding which will come closest to achieving the goal of having sufficient naval forces.

Currently the government plans to build 15 surface combatants designed to be capable of meeting multiple threats in both open oceans and complex coastal environments, ensure that Canada continues to monitor and defend its waters and contribute significantly to international naval operations. It has been stated that these ships are to replace the Royal Canadian Navy's Iroquois-class destroyers and Halifax-class frigates. No coherent rational has ever been given to explain how the number of frigates deemed necessary was arrived at. The suspicion is that it is simply the largest number the Navy thought they could get.

The RCN needs more than surface ships however. In order to meet Canada’s defensive needs, the RCN must have an effective submarine capacity. Canadian submarine interests can be divided into three categories: the defence of Canada and North America; supporting Canadian expeditionary deployments; and supporting Canada’s interest in global maritime stability. In the final analysis without submarines Canada cannot have the vital maritime situational awareness as to who is operating in our waters.

According to a 2017 Senate Report “Submarines are likely to remain the dominant naval platform for the foreseeable future, and hence are an essential component of a balanced combat effective navy.” According to that same report “An enhanced submarine capability is vital for the Royal Canadian Navy. The current fleet of four Victoria-class submarines is inadequate to provide an effective presence in three oceans and a much larger fleet is required. Since about one-quarter of any submarine fleet is often in a scheduled refit or maintenance period, only three out of four vessels are operational. This modest capability is divided between two coasts. Moreover, the Victoria-class submarines do not possess an under-ice capability making them an ineffective instrument in Canada’s Arctic. A modern submarine fleet will allow Canada to defend its own coasts, sea lanes, ports and harbours from sea mines and under water threats, while simultaneously contributing to NORAD and NATO operations in a high readiness state.”

Undeterred by these facts it is reported that the government has rejected a Commons defence committee recommendation that the Victoria-class subs be replaced with new submarines capable of under-ice capabilities. They are quoted as saying that: “The government has also committed to modernizing the four Victoria-class submarines to include weapons and sensor upgrades that will enhance the ability of the submarines to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and deliver necessary improvements of platform and combat systems to extend operational capability to the mid-2030’s”.

Writing in the Canadian Naval Review Michael Byers has noted that “Instead of hiding behind another round of refits, the government should face up to the fact that Canada’s submarine capability is running out of time. As Chief of Maritime Staff Paul Maddison told the Senate National Security and Defence Committee in 2012“I would envision initiating a next-generation submarine discussion within the next three or four years to ensure there is no gap in submarine capability, which is what we faced in the 1990s.” In other words, a decision is urgently needed.”

The enforced halt to the Canadian Surface Combatant program may give us a last chance to reconsider the mix of ships appropriate to Canada’s needs and budget. In the same article Byers points out that the cost of a modern submarine is approximately one quarter that of the kinds of frigates Canada is procuring. This would suggest that by cutting just one or two surface ships from our current program of record would give Canada a force of up to 8 modern submarines along with more than a dozen multi-purpose surface warships. Such a force would appear to be at least as useful as, and much more militarily effective than, the force we are currently on track to acquire.

Unfortunately submarines are not built in Canada. Nor, after watching Australia’s example, is it likely that we should wish to do so. It would of course be perfectly possible to purchase submarines from Western allies and ensure that servicing and maintenance could be done in Canada by Canadian based companies.

The reason that this is unfortunate is because it has become obvious that the government regards military procurement programs as job creation programs. As long as the government and the public are content with this state of affairs than there is little hope that a rational and balanced naval fleet can be achieved.

If national security and military efficiency were ever found to be of use in determining military budgets then maintaining an increased submarine fleet, even if at the expense of the surface fleet, would become a valid option.

Lockheed Martin selected as preferred designer for Canada's next generation of warships

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/frigate-designer-canada-defence-1.4869268

Feds ordered to postpone award of $60B contract because warship may not meet requirements such as speed

https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/feds-ordered-to-postpone-award-of-60b-warship-contract-because-of-allegations-the-ship-they-want-to-buy-cant-meet-the-navys-requirements

Commentary: Getting It Right For The RCN And Canadian Taxpayer - By James Hasik

http://espritdecorps.ca/edec-online/october-2018-future-navy-canadian-surface-combatant

Shipbuilding projects to equip the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard

https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/projets-projects-eng.html#s7

REINVESTING IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES: A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE

https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/SECD/reports/SECDDPRReport_FINAL_e.pdf

Canadian Forces says submarines can operate until mid-2020s - but still no details on how fleet will be upgraded

https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-forces-says-submarines-can-operate-until-mid-2020s-it-is-still-determining-how-to-upgrade

Canada’s Submarines are Sunk Costs

Michael Byers

http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/Vol12num4/Vol.12%20No.%204%20art%204.pdf

$100 billion babies: Defence reveals true cost of new submarines for taxpayers

https://www.afr.com/news/100-billion-babies-defence-reveals-true-cost-of-new-submarines-for-taxpayers-20180529-h10ohc

Babcock receives extension to Victoria In-Service Support Contract

https://babcockcanada.com/babcock-receives-extension-to-victoria-in-service-support-contract/

Sunday, 1 January 2017

CHINESE WARSHIPS VISIT VICTORIA

The Department of National Defence announced on December 13^th of this year that three ships from the China’s People’s Liberation Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) would arrived in Victoria as part of a scheduled port visit.

The visiting People’s Liberation Army (Navy) ships consisted of a Type 903 Replenishment Ship, the Taihu, and two Type 054A Guided Missile Frigates the Yancheng and the Daqing.

The last time ships from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Navy) visited Victoria was in 2006, on this occasion the ships were open for tours on several days of their scheduled visit.

It may have come as a surprise to the Chinese sailors to be welcomed by an unusual Victoria snowfall, but at least it will have reinforced Canada’s reputation for serious winters.

In their press release the RCN noted that “Foreign navy vessels routinely visit Canada, helping to strengthen cooperation, goodwill and trust.” They go on to state that “Canada and China have a defence relationship based on senior-level dialogue as well as discussions and cooperation on defence issues including Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response, peace support operations, and military education.” And that “As Pacific countries, our navies have a shared interest in maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region.”

According to the press release visits of foreign navy vessels are seen as an important part of Canada’s commitment to collective security on the world’s oceans and an integral part of strengthening relationships and promoting cooperation among world navies. They state that they believe that they are building their relationship with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by promoting bilateral cooperation and an ongoing defence dialogue between the two nations

In terms of size and displacement, a comparison of the type 504a frigate and Canada’s Halifax class frigates shows that they are vessels of a similar class.

Canada’s Halifax class displaces 4,770 tonnes, has a length of 134.1 m (439.96 ft) a beam of 16.4 m (53.81 ft) and is powered by two General Electric LM2500 gas turbines for a total of 47,500 shp, and a SEMT Pielstick diesel engine which gives it a top speed of 29 knots and a range of 9,500 nautical miles. The ships have a crew of which numbers 225.

Halifax class ships are armed with eight MK 141 Harpoon SSM, sixteen evolved Sea Sparrow Missile SAM/SSM, one Bofors 57 mm Mk 2 gun, one Phalanx CIWS and twenty four Mk 46 torpedoes as well as six M2 Browning machine guns and a CH-124 Sea King or CH-148 Cyclone helicopter.

A type 504A frigate, such as the Taihu has a reported displacement of 4,053 tonnes with a length of 134.1 m (440 ft), a beam: of 16 m (52 ft) and is powered by a CODAD arrangement of 4 x Shaanxi 16 PA6 STC diesels giving 5700 kW (7600+ hp @ 1084 rpm) each for an estimated maximum speed of 27 knots and a range of approximately 8,025 nautical miles. These ships are reported to carry a crew of 165 sailors and marines.

The Type 054A (NATO codename Jiangkai II) frigates first entered service in 2007. The class is planned to comprise 24+ vessels. As of 2016, 22 are in service, 1 is fitting out, and 2 are under construction.

The Type 054A carries HQ-16 medium-range air defence missiles and various anti-submarine rockets in a VLS system. The HQ-16 provides area air defence from all engagement angles up to a range of 50 km. HQ-16 launcher, with 32 cells, appears to adopt a hot launch method with the same design principle of US Mk 41 VLS: a shared common exhaust system is sited between the two rows of rectangular launching tubes. The VLS system is also capable of firing Yu-8anti-submarine missiles, a weapon believed to similar in operation to the U.S. Navy ASROC.

The ships also carry 2 Type 730 CIWS. The autonomous Type 730 provides defence against close-in threats.

The main gun armament is an H/PJ26 stealthy 76 mm dual purpose gun mount, which is a Chinese development of Russian AK-176. H/PJ26 utilizes advanced synthetic material such as fiber glass to achieve a lowered radar cross section and the gun is capable of a high rate of fire for air defense, including defence against sea-skimming anti-ship missiles.

Other armament consists of 2 × 3 324mm YU-7 ASW torpedo launchers, these torpedoes are carried inboard so as to maintain the ships stealthy profile.

These ships are also armed with 8 YJ-8 "Eagle Strike 83” subsonic anti-ship cruise missile. A turbojet powered anti-ship / land attack cruise missile sometimes referred to as the C-803 it in similar to the Harpoon missile, although it trades a somewhat smaller warhead for a longer range, reported to be 180km.

The ship also carries 2 × 6 Type 87 240mm anti-submarine rocket launcher for a total of 36 rockets carried, an older but still effective weapons system.

Counter measures include Type 726-4 18-tube decoy rocket launchers on both port and starboard sided of the ship

Chinese marines, equipped with bullpup Type 95 (QBZ95) 5.8x42mm assault rifles, appeared to be a part of the ships complement.

It is also possible that the Chinese navy has adopted the odd US. Navy practice of wearing seagoing “camouflage” fatigues.

The Taihu, like the other ships of her class, have facilities to carry 1 Z-9C ASW helicopter. The Harbin Z-9C (NATO reporting name "Haitun") is a the Chinese licensed variant of the French Eurocopter AS365 Dauphin. The naval version, introduced in the 1990s, is known as the Z-9C. As well as SAR and ASW duties, the Z-9C can be fitted with an X-band KLC-1 surface search radar to detect surface targets beyond the range of shipborne radar systems. The helicopter is normally outfitted with a pulse-compression radar and low frequency dipping sonar to aid in ASW operations.

With a maximum take-off weight of 4,100 kg (9,039 lb) and powered by two 632 kW (848 hp) turboshaft engines, the Z-9C is not really in the same class as the Canadian CH-148 Cyclone whose takeoff weight of 12,993 kg (28,650 lb) and powerplant consisting of two 28,650 lb (3,000 shp) each engines, along with advanced sensors and electronics, puts in an entirely different category then the Z-9C. Of course, another difference is that Z-9C’s are actually flying on active service which is more than can be said of the Cyclone.

The Type 054A with a design like that of advanced western ships, such as the French La Fayette class, has a number stealth features, including sloped hull design, radar absorbent materials, and a clean profile. It is reported that the ship also features information systems (IS) for maintenance and inventory control, which automatically provides information to shore based facilities or supply ships so that parts in need can be provided more quickly.

These frigates come with an impressive array of sensors and processing systems which includes: a Type 382 Radar 3D air/surface search radar, a Type 344 Radar OTH target acquisition and SSM fire control radar, 4 Type 345 SAM fire control radars, an I-band MR-36A surface search radar, a Type 347G fire control radar for the 76mm gun as well as 2 Racal RM-1290 navigation radars. ASW sensors include an MGK-335 medium frequency active/passive sonar system.

The ships include a modern combat data system in the form of the ZKJ-4B/6, which was developed from Thomson-CSF TAVITAC. Communication systems include an HN-900 Data link (the Chinese equivalent of Link 11A/B) as well as SNTI-240 and AKD5000S Ku band SATCOMs.

Known electronic warfare systems comprise a Type 922-1 radar warning receiver, the HZ-100 ECM & ELINT system and the Kashtan-3 missile jamming system.

Sadly the visiting Type 903A replenishment Ship, the Taihu, has no equivalent in the RCN. These Qiandaohu-class ships (NATO codename: Fuchi) have a displacement of 23,400 tonnes, a length of 178.5m, beam of 24.8m and draught of 8.7m. Propulsion consists of 2 diesels generating 24,000 hp. through 2 shafts for a maximum speed of 20 knots and a range of 10,000 nm at 14 kts. It has a capacity for 10,500 tons of fuel oil, 250 tons of fresh water and 680 tons of cargo and ammunition. These ships have a complement of 130 personal and carry an armament of 4 x H/PJ76F twin 37mm dual purpose guns. The ships come equipped with a hanger and flight deck and can embark one Z-8 helicopter or one Z-9 helicopter.

By all accounts the visit to Canada by this Chinese Navy squadron was well received and attracted many visitors. The ships themselves made a first rate impression. It was the newness of the ships and their excellent condition that was so striking.

It was Mao Tse Tung who said that power grows out of the barrel of a gun, but just as notable as the firepower on display was the demeanor and professionalism of the Chinese service personal. It is in the small things that one can sometimes judge abilities and so it was the complete lack of noticeable corrosion on board the ships and the traditional bosun's whistle cupped in the hand of the petty officer at the head of the boarding gangway with its suggestion that, as unlikely as it was with a crowd of tourists pushing their way on board, if an officer should show up he would be rendered appropriate honours that struck this observer as a sign of just how capable a force the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) has become.

What also must have been obvious to any observer was that these ships and their capabilities exceed those available to the Royal Canadian Navy. It is not just the lack of new ships but the complete lack of any form of replenishment ship that makes it impossible for Canada to send a similar delegation to China or even hard pressed to match this squadron with a comparable force in Canadian waters.