PEACE KEEPING AND THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

The CBC, among others, has reported that “The Trudeau government has promised to get Canada back into the peacekeeping business, but a new report from two independent think tanks says the military is ill-prepared for the task”. They go on to report that the study comes to us from the Rideau Institute and the Centre for Policy Alternatives.

It would be easy to be so astonished with the inconsistencies in the previous statement that one could completely miss the point of the story.

Even after getting by the oxymoron involved in referring to the Rideau Institute and the Center for Policy Alternatives as two separate bodies, one is dumbstruck by the suggestion that they constitute an “independent” think tank.

Of course this may all depend on how one defines “independent’. It does not seem to conform to the normal dictionary definitions, which include:

(1) not influenced or controlled by others in matters of opinion, conduct, etc.; thinking or acting for oneself:

(2 )an independent thinker.

(3) not subject to an other's authority or jurisdiction; autonomous; free:

an independent businessman.

 (4) not influenced by the thought or action of others:

independent research.

 (5) not dependent; not depending or contingent upon something else for existence, operation, etc.

 (6) not relying on another or others for aid or support.

However, a close examination of the paper itself helps to re-assure the uniformed as it clearly states, “The CCPA is an independent policy research organ­ization. This report has been subjected to peer re­view and meets the research standards of the Centre.” And to be fair, the Rideau Institute and the Centre for Policy Alternatives and their publications may well meet the standard contained in the alternative definition of independent; “expressive of a spirit of independence; self-confident; unconstrained”.

The point of the story, which should not be missed, is a report entitled Unprepared for Peace? The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training (and What to Do About It) A.Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben The authors believe that for the last decade the Canadian army has specialized in counter-insurgency warfare, because of the combat mission in Kandahar, and neglected the specialized skills that they feel are necessary for successful peacekeeping.

They make the point that: "Particularly important is learning effective co-operation with the non-military components of modern peacekeeping operations, including police, civil affairs personnel and humanitarians, as well as UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the local actors engaged in building a viable peace: "

The study recommends the reinstatement and updating of the many training programmes and exercises that have been cut, as well as the introduction of new training activities to reflect the “increasing complexity of modern peace operations.”

The authors refer to the belief that general combat Training is sufficient to prepare troops for peacekeeping deployments as a myth. They argue that, “If the idea that peacekeeping is a low-intensity, “easy” deployment of armed forces is false; it is also untrue that soldiers trained for combat operations are sufficiently trained to be peacekeepers. The complex environment faced by UN peacekeepers means that the old notion that the best way to train a peacekeeper is to train a general-purpose, combat-capable soldier is no longer appropriate, if it ever was. While combat training remains essential for UN soldiers, much additional and specialized training is required. In Canada, the last fifteen years have seen a particular focus on training for NATO-style international interventions, given the CAF’s high-profile role in Afghanistan. However, modern peacekeeping missions involve fundamentally different dynamics facing personnel deployed on the ground, where there is greater emphasis on negotiation and mediation, and greater restrictions on the use of force”.

The authors appear to be unaware of the reality that modern military organizations, like the Canadian Armed Forces, are fully conversant with the theory of ‘the three block war”. The idea that a conflict may involve distributing aid on one block, fighting terrorists on the next and conducting full scale military action against a near peer enemy on the third is exactly what they trained for and executed in Afghanistan.

The Forces also understand that the key to operating in all three conditions simultaneously is leadership training at all levels, with low-level unit leaders given the ability to take major decisions and undertake independent actions. The Canadian force are well acquainted with advantages gained in all situations by this ‘devolved’ leadership and train accordingly.

The notion that the Canadian Forces should place “greater emphasis on negotiation and mediation, and greater restrictions on the use of force” is, based on the historical successes of the ‘muscular’ nature of Canadian missions, a mistake. One of the reasons for the success of Canadian troops on ‘peace keeping’ missions is that, to quote Quinn Dyer, “Canadians always shoot back”.

The first thing that typically happens when peace-keepers take up new posts along a ‘demarcation’ line is that someone shoots at them. It’s nothing personal; if anything it’s a traditional welcome for the new guys by the local thugs and their attempt to find out the caliber of the troops they are now dealing with. Survivors among those who visit these greetings on Canadian troops are amazed to discover just how much weaponry Canadian Forces feel is appropriate for peace keeping and surprised to find out that, unlike local “freedom fighters” Canadian soldiers apparently don’t have to pay for each bullet out of there own pockets.

In the case of persistent trouble makers, habitual bomb makers, pot shot artists and the like, the practice is to have intelligence identify the individual and then have battalion snipers deal with them on a personal level.

Another common custom in these situations is for local dignitaries and elders (never to be referred to as warlords) to be invited over for tea and firepower demonstrations. Again, even those hardened by years of simmering warfare can be surprised by the kinds of heavy weapons, (TOW missiles, really?) Canadians feel it is necessary to bring with them, ‘just in case’.

It would be a mistake for Canada, and Canadians, to think they can impose their will on others without making it clear that they are willing to fight to achieve their goals, even goals that include peace keeping.

This study indicates that Canada is currently far behind other nations in its readiness to support the United Nations and train for modern peacekeeping.

Here we come to the one of the real points of the study. The peace keeping industry, like any other, believes that it must constantly grow or else it will die. Unlike most other business models there is not a lot of income to be derived from private enterprise so alternative sources must be found.

The major sources of funding are academia and the government. Of these government is can be the most beneficial.

One source of income for many years was the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre. The centre was established in 1994 using facilities made available by the closure of CFB Cornwallis. Its mandate was to support Canada's contribution to international peace and security. At its peak the center supported an administrative staff of up to 200 ‘facilitators’ and experts with another 17 staff in Ottawa. After being moved to Ottawa, in 2008, the center lost government support. In June 2011, the centre announced it would be closing its Cornwallis offices as a cost-saving measure. At that time, the Cornwallis office had a staff of 12.The centre lost its annual core funding of $4 million from the federal government in 2012.

Obviously the provision of suitable training for peace keeping can only be provided by the right sort of people. They must be people who understand that “modern peacekeeping missions involve fundamentally different dynamics facing personnel deployed on the ground, where there is greater emphasis on negotiation and mediation, and greater restrictions on the use of force”

Needless to say it is important to insure that those who receive monies from the Department of National Defence, or any department of government, are not tainted by the experience. Fortunately experience teaches us that members of the appropriately progressive organizations can not be influenced, or even be accused of being influenced, by the source of their income.

It stands to reason that these are the people who should organize and run the training so it is not a coincidence that one of the recommendations of the report is that Canada move immediately to develop a new peace operations training centre, noting that “the loss of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre was a devastating setback to Canadian preparedness”  

Sarcasm aside, there is another point to this study. The Rideau Institute makes clear in its mission statement that” Our mission is to help restore Canada to its former peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding role in the world, through creative and innovative multilateralism, strengthening the UN and building international law.’

What is not so clear is that the Institute, like the Centre for Policy Alternatives, seeks to achieve its goals by influencing the media and policy makers in an attempt to reshape the Canadian Armed Forces.

While many would assume that spending all that money on Defence is to give Canadians the widest possible number of options, it is the goal of the writers of this report and their patrons to limit the options available to the Government of Canada.

By shaping the size, composition, equipment and training of our Armed Forces they hope to give us an organization that is only capable of the kinds of missions that they feel Canada should undertake.

This is a policy based on hope. Hope that others feel the same way do. Hope that the events will unfold the way we want them to. Hope that ‘full coverage’ insurance is not really necessary. As much as we would prefer it otherwise, experience teaches that these are false hopes and that purposely limiting our military options is bad policy.

Canadian military ill-prepared for modern peacekeeping: report

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-military-ill-prepared-for-modern-peacekeeping-report-1.3429938

 Unprepared for Peace? The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training

(and What to Do About It) A. Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben

https://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports/unprepared-peace

Pearson Centre

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pearson_Centre

The Rideau Institute

http://www.rideauinstitute.ca/

Centre for Policy Alternatives

https://www.policyalternatives.ca/

THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND THE RIDEAU INSTITUTE

 

It can be hard to like the peace movement. The truth is that, for the most part, they aren’t very good at what they do. Many of the people on the “progressive” side of the political spectrum seem to believe that pointless gestures matter. Just showing up and chanting the slogan-de-jour seems to be enough for far too many of them.

A common example of the kind of useless group think found at rallies of all kinds is the aggressively casual clothing worn by most of the participants. It’s a symbol of many of the things that are wrong with the movement as a whole. There they are, trying to speak truth to power, trying to influence the largely apathetic majority, and they can’t even bring themselves to dress the way people we think are serious dress. The uniform of the day for marchers of most kinds is just that, an almost archaic counter-culture uniform worn to prove that they have nothing in common with the people they are trying to talk to.

Another common problem, symptomatic of so much is wrong with the peace movement, is the lack of consistency. When “Bush’s War” became “Obama’s War”, it didn’t. The expression was never used. In fact, most of the peace movement went strangely silent when Barack Obama was elected. U.S. military and security policies may be exactly the same as they were under a Republican administration, but apparently it is no longer polite to complain about it. This strange phenomenon is just as common in Canada as it is in the U.S.  Fortunately local activists still have Steven Harper to vilify.

It often seems that nobody in the peace movement cares about results, and it shows. If it’s enough to just show up, then nobody needs to notice that they didn’t actually end the war. Nobody needs to talk about success or failure, about what works and what doesn’t work if all you have to do is sign your name on the petition to call it progress.

This lack of competence is not completely pervasive, there are exceptions and one of them is the Rideau Institute. Steven Staples does show up in a suit and tie, he and the people around him do the hard work. They are not afraid to get there hands dirty by actually knowing what they are talking about. The reports by Michael Byers and Stewart Webb are an important part of the ongoing conversation we need to be having in this country.

The complaint that this blog and many others have is not with what they are saying, but how it is being said. It can be argued that much of this is due to lazy journalists who can’t be bothered to identify the goals of the Rideau Institute and the people who speak for them who, for the most part, do not try to hide their sympathies. Having said that, attempts to appear neutral in publications such as “Stuck in a Rut: Harper government overrides Canadian Army, insists on buying outdated equipment” and That Sinking Feeling Canada’s Submarine Program Springs a Leak” are a serious mistake on the part of the authors.

By trying to give the appearance of neutrality the authors of these reports find themselves contorting into untenable positions. In their last paper, on the Close Combat Vehicle acquisition program, the authors found themselves in the unlikely position of appearing to support the counter insurgency policy espoused by U.S. General Petraeus. It’s not the only obviously unlikely and/or outright incorrect statement in the paper and most of them are forced on the authors by the apparent necessity of not explaining why they are opposed to military spending of any kind, while opposing military spending of any kind.

What makes it hard to like the Peace movement is that so many of them are doing a very important job badly. If the subject at hand were not so important then the relative lack of ability shown by the Peace movement wouldn’t matter. But is important and it does matter. Because it does matter then it is especially important that those who are trying to do the job well to do it with integrity.

THE RIDEAU INSTITUTE AND THE CLOSE COMBAT VEHICLE

 

Canadian Defence Matters has commented in the past on the Close Combat Vehicle program. The conclusion was that the program was badly flawed and that the vehicles failed to demonstrate a strategic rational.

“Stuck in a Rut, Harper Government Overrides Canadian Army Insists on Buying Outdated Equipment” is the latest report by the Rideau Institute tag team of Michael Byers and Stewart Webb. In this case it is a report on the CCV project.

It will come as no surprise to readers of either Canadian Defence Matters or any of Byers and Webbs' previous efforts to learn that they are opposed to the purchase. It would be fair to say that they have never met an Armed Forces procurement proposal they did like or a defence reduction they didn’t support.

A more interesting, and measured report can be found from James Hasik. He has written” we should recall how the genesis of the requirement for that CCV flowed from the mixed performance of the LAV in Afghanistan. While the LAV III truly served as the Army’s workhorse throughout the war, its shortcomings became apparent as early as the late summer of 2006, during the epic Second Battle of Panjwai’i (Operation MEDUSA). Second Panjwai’i was very first large-scale land battle fought under the aegis of the NATO alliance, and the largest battle the Canadian Army had fought since the Korean War. Though the battle ultimately proved a lopsided victory over the Taliban, the advance of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry repeatedly bogged down in the corn fields, irrigation ditches, and marijuana groves of the district outside Kandahar. The Royal Canadian Engineers were frequently called upon to tear holes in the obstacles with both regular and makeshift armored bulldozers, but even so, the infantry’s wheeled fighting vehicle inevitably suffered problems in that very challenging terrain.

That December, fifteen Leopard 1 tanks of Lord Strathcona’s Horse arrived in Kandahar so that the infantry would have the benefit of all-terrain firepower. But in Afghanistan as everywhere, firepower was not protection per se, so the LAVs and the troops mounted in them continued to suffer through Canada’s final withdrawal from the battle. The CCV requirement thus called for heavier armor. But if the Army was to continue to deploy its tanks for effect, it would need something with better cross-country speed than the LAV III offered, as the infantry were needed to keep up in support of the tanks as well. Appropriately, the requirement was also written with off-road mobility in mind. And as protection tends to restrict mobility, the CCV would need to be much larger and heavier than those serving Light Armored Vehicles, to carry both the heavier armor and the larger engine required. It is unsurprising, then, that the weight of all the candidate CCVs is approximately twice that of the LAVs.”

All this is tactics. It does demonstrate, however, that the armed forces are not seeking CCV’s because of some outmoded desire to replay the cold war but rather as a response to real world events. The need for CCVs is generated as much by the desire for mobility, at no cost in protection, as it is by the need to support tanks. This point is in direct contradiction to Byers and Webb’s statement that.” The decision to procure CCVs for Canada today is directly linked to the flawed decision, taken in 2006, to retain and grow Canada’s fleet of Leopard tanks”

Byers and Webb conclusion, not surprisingly, is that,” For some, the Harper government’s recent cutbacks on defence spending have raised the spectre of another “decade of darkness” with regard to military procurement.146 But it is not as if the government has stopped spending on military equipment. The problem, instead, is that it is spending the money unwisely, on equipment including Close Combat Vehicles which are designed to accompany troops into the symmetrical wars of the last century. The impact of this mistaken approach is compounded when the billions of dollars being spent on outmoded and therefore not particularly useful equipment result in deep cutbacks to training for today’s complex counterinsurgency (COIN) missions. If the Canadian Army is to remain available for deployment, and if our soldiers are to be effective and safe, training must bean ongoing priority.

And so we conclude:

• The CCV is based on outdated Cold War tank doctrine.

• The CCV would duplicate a capability Canada already possesses as a result of the recent LAV III upgrades.

• The Canadian Army does not want this $2 billion procurement.

• The Harper government should not proceed with the CCV procurement.”

Canadian Defence Matters has commented in the past on the lack of Strategic thought guiding military purchases. Sun Tzu is quoted as saying in his seminal work The Art of War that “Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.”

Considering the difference between strategy and tactics can be instructive. For example, historically a strategic imperative for Canada has always been to keep the Americans happy with the security of their northern border.

In some eras this has meant reducing military expenditures,(“all the Brits are gone now, nothing to worry about here”) and in others it has meant increasing them (no need to send U.S. troops to help protect us from the German/Russian/Al-Qaeda hordes, we’ve got it covered”). In this case increasing or decreasing military spending is tactics; the strategic end remains the same.

Unlike some elements of our Defence establishment, Byers, Webb, the Rideau Institute, the Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives and all their various avatars are firm believers in the art of strategy. The strategic goal in this case is the reduction of the Canadian Armed Forces to the status of a constabulary force through gradual disarmament. The tactics used are to oppose any procurement which might increase Defence capabilities and to suggest that purchasing less expensive, and less capable, systems will be just as effective. An important component of these tactics is to never discuss the over riding strategic rational which drives their conclusions.

Fortunately for those looking for real insight into the need, or otherwise, for a close combat vehicle James Hasik notes that earlier this summer his team received funding to study the historical and economic basis for a Canadian CCV. Later this fall, they plan to publish a final report, “Canada’s Close Combat Vehicle: Evaluating the Need in Light of Campaign Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq”. At that time we can all look forward to a more balance assessment.

CANCELLING THE CLOSE COMBAT VEHICLE PROGRAM

http://jgmjgm516.blogspot.ca/search/label/CCV

Stuck in a Rut, Harper Government Overrides Canadian Army Insists on Buying Outdated Equipment

http://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports/stuck-rut

Why the Close Combat Vehicle is not the right place to cut the Canadian military budget.

http://www.jameshasik.com/weblog/2013/09/why-the-close-combat-vehicle-is-not-the-right-place-to-cut-the-canadian-military-budget.html

THE RIDEAU INSTITUTE REPORT ON ARTIC/OFFSHORE PATROL SHIPS

 

In 2007 the government announced a plan to procure six to eight Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships with a budget of $3.1 billion, with an additional $4.3 billion for operations and maintenance over a projected 25-year lifespan. (1)

The Rideau Institute and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives recently released a report examining the plan. The report, Titanic Blunder: Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships on course for disaster was written by University of British Columbia political science professor Michael Byers, and Stewart Webb, visiting research fellow at the Rideau Institute and research associate at the Salt Spring Forum. (2)

In the report Byers and Webb conclude that: The A/OPS are compromise vessels that will be ineffective in the Arctic and too slow and unstable for offshore patrol functions along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. They will cost 8 to 10 times per vessel what Australia and the United States are paying for purpose-built high-speed patrol ships and that further compromises can be expected, as the Department of National Defence struggles, within a budget that was set in 2007, to complete the procurement of vessels that are based on an entirely new design.

They make a number of recommendations, including: Canceling the procurement of Naval Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships, procuring 6 to 8 purpose-built high-speed offshore patrol ships based on a proven design and rebuilding the Coast Guard icebreaker fleet to take into account changing ice conditions and the need for the vessels to fulfill an additional, constabulary role.

A relatively dispassionate review of this paper can be found at the Naval Review website. (3) The authors content themselves with pointing out the large number of technical papers and the apparent misunderstanding by Byers and Webb of the concepts of operational requirements and design compromise. They also observe that even if the paper does not, or can not, answer the questions it raises, the questions need to be asked.

Canadian Defence Review is not inclined, or possibly not constitutionally capable, of being so dispassionate. While the A/OPS program is an easy target for criticism (4) this report is so rife with errors that at some point it becomes impossible to believe there is not some agenda other then ignorance at work. One of many examples is the comment from the report that: At 56 meters, Australia’s Armidale-class patrol boats are just slightly larger than Canada’s current MCDVs but can operate comfortably at Sea State 5” which would lead the uninformed to suppose that the 257 ton Armidale class boats (5) are larger then the 980 ton MCDVs. (6)

When considering this paper it is important to understand its purpose. On   their website the Rideau Institute (7) accurately describes itself by pointing out that, “Officially, the Rideau Institute is a non-partisan, independent research, advocacy and consulting group in Ottawa. Unofficially, it is known as one of the most active and influential progressive policy-focused organizations in town” (8)

In point of Fact the Rideau Institute is a registered lobby group, (9) one face of Ceasefire, (10) who are self-described on their website as,” Ceasefire.ca is a network of more than 20,000 Canadians who want Canada to be a world leader for peace, disarmament, and social justice. Ceasefire.ca is a network of more than 20,000 Canadians who want Canada to be a world leader for peace, disarmament, and social justice. It is written by a team of staff, interns, and volunteers at the Rideau Institute”

 In general Policy should inform requirements and in turn requirements should drive procurement. Canadian Defence Review has often pointed out the errors involved when this process is derailed. In its worst form, equipment available will influence policy. That is, we end up doing that which we have equipped ourselves to do, not those things that we wish to do.

The goal of the Rideau Institute is to reverse this paradigm and use procurement to drive policy. Having failed to convince a working majority of Canadians of the worthiness of their aims the Institute, and the people around them, hope that by limiting the capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces they can limit the ability of the nation to achieve policy goals that the Rideau Institute does not approve of.  One would think that if the Rideau Institute had faith in their own goals then they would have more faith in the Canadian public. Canada needs to have open, transparent, discussions about policy, about where we want to go and how we want to get there. What we don’t need is back room maneuvering and ingenuous “suggestions” designed to achieve policy goals by forgoing the awkwardness of engaging other citizens in the discussion.

(1) Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship (PMO AOPS)

http://www.materiel.forces.gc.ca/en/aops.page

(2) Titanic Blunder: Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships on course for disaster http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2013/04/Titanic_Blunder.pdf

(3) Titanic Blunder or a Good Compromise

http://www.navalreview.ca/2013/04/titanic-blunder-or-a-good-compromise/

(4) THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING NAVY

http://jgmjgm516.blogspot.ca/search/label/A%2FOPV

(5) Armidale-class patrol boat

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armidale-class_patrol_boat

(6) Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV) 

http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/marpac/1/1-w_eng.asp?category=24&title=1039 

(7) Rideau Institute, about

http://www.rideauinstitute.ca/about/

(8) Rideau Institute, internships

 http://www.rideauinstitute.ca/internships/

(9) Mark Collins – Government-funded Peaceniks: Ceasefire.ca and the Rideau Institute, or

 http://cdfai3ds.wordpress.com/2013/04/23/mark-collins-government-funded-peaceniks-ceasefire-ca-and-the-rideau-institute-or/

(10) Ceasefire.ca

http://www.ceasefire.ca/