SOME "ANSWERS" FROM THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA ABOUT DEFENCE

After posting I'D RATHER HAVE AN AIRFORCE THAN A NATIONAL PHARMACARE PROGRAM Canadian Defence Matters sent an abbreviated version of the post to a variety of politicians, it said;

I believe that as a citizen it is my duty to make my priorities clear to my representatives in government. I am contacting you to with these priorities in mind.

 I am not sure how many people realize that Canada doesn't really have an Air Force.

 We don't have enough transport aircraft to meet our stated needs. We don't have enough search and rescue aircraft for a country this size, nor do we have the numbers of long range reconnaissance/patrol aircraft our lengthy coastlines demand. Many of the helicopters we use are aging and we do not have a viable number of lift helicopters.  Even more important, we don't have the personnel to properly maintain and fly the aircraft we do have. All these shortcomings are most evident, and most troubling, in our fighter fleet.

 The fleet of operational Cf-18 Hornet jet fighters is currently down to about 37 aircraft.  This fleet size is sufficient only to sustain domestic NORAD operations. In fact it has been announced that the RCAF would withdraw from NATO commitments for the foreseeable future. Even more problematic is the lack of pilots and support personnel, which may even lead to the Air Force being unable to fulfill the NORAD alert mission requirements in full. This will only get worse as the F-35 transition gets underway in the coming years. It is more than likely that there will be insufficient personnel to staff both aircraft types, which will likely result in even fewer available CF-18s to meet the alert role.

Aside from the very real threats posed to Canadian security by this situation, what will happen when the United States loses confidence in its northern neighbour to be a stalwart, binational partner? What will happen if the U.S. believes that there is a serious security threat that needs to be met by NORAD and that Canada is not capable of fulfilling our obligations to continental defence?

I believe that there will be real world consequences that will impact Canada negatively. When that happens, when Canadians realize that not having an Air Force have consequences that affect Canadian sovereignty and security, we will blame the politicians for getting us in this mess. 

The politicians will blame the generals and the generals in turn will complain about the politicians. 

The truth is, it will be our fault. Canadian Citizens have not made Defence a priority for their leaders. We have chosen an illusory security and short term gains over real security and long term planning. We have taken the easy way and there will be no one else to blame but ourselves.

So I have decided that the time has come to tell our political leaders something different. If asked in the future I am going to tell anyone who will listen that: 

I'D RATHER HAVE AN AIRFORCE THAN A NATIONAL PHARMACARE PROGRAM

I received replies from James Bezan, the Conservative party shadow minister for National Defence and, eventually, from Pierre Poilievre, leader of the official opposition.

Dear J.G.,

Thank you for taking the time to share your concerns with me regarding our Royal Canadian Air Force.

 

I agree that Canada's Air Force is essentially unable to meet our NORAD and NATO partnership commitments, which degrades our standing amongst our allies who depend on us for binational and multilateral security.

 

Under the Trudeau Liberals, our fighter pilots and technicians have left in droves in response to Liberal politicking with fighter jet procurement. After a naive election promise never to purchase the F-35, Justin Trudeau ran a years long competition only to select the F-35 in the end. In the interim he spent a billion dollars purchasing used jets from Australia as old as our current obsolete fleet. 

 

When Canada finally takes delivery of the F-35 in the mid 2030's, barring further delays, we will not have the staffing necessary to fly or maintain them.  The fault lies at the feet of Justin Trudeau and his contempt for our men and women in uniform. 

 

Conservatives understand that rebuilding our Air Force and the CAF in general will not happen overnight, but we understand the national security implications of allowing our military to further erode. At a time of increased geopolitical instability at levels not seen since the Cold War, and increased great power competition, Conservatives will bring home security for Canadians.

 

Thank you again for sharing your thoughts with me, and for your concern for our Royal Canadian Air Force.

 Sincerely,

James Bezan, MP

Shadow Minister for National Defence

I replied as follows;

James Bezan,

 Thank you for your reply to my email. I appreciate your concern for our armed forces and agree with you that 'politicking' is a key reason for many of the problems we have. Unfortunately, blaming Justin Trudeau personally for all the problems our defence establishment suffers from is just another example of the kind of behavior that has handicapped the Canadian Armed Forces for so long.

 I understand that if you wish to bring in new policies you need to form a government, and I understand that the Liberal Party of Canada has worked long and hard to sell Justin Trudeau as their 'brand leader' so it becomes incumbent upon you, if you wish to attack the brand, to attack the spokesman. But phrases like "Justin Trudeau and his contempt for our men and women in uniform." are not just pointless,(and probably untrue) they suggest that you are more interested in politicking then in dealing with the real problems we face. 

We have real issues with recruiting and retention, getting rid of Justin Trudeau will not create more jobs for spouses of service personnel in places like Cold Lake or Bagotville. It won't help with unaffordable housing or the frequent moves that make military service so unappealing for so many. We have real problems that are going to need hard choices to fix. 

My main point was that I was willing to forgo spending on social problems so as to be able to put more resources into Defence. I know you want to "bring home security for Canadians." but how do you intend to pay for that, where is the money coming from? Find some good answers to those questions and your party is more likely to get my vote in the future.

J.G. Murray

I received the following response.

Dear J.G.,

Thank you for your follow up email. I appreciate your thoughts and concerns. 

I can say that conversations are always happening both at the Standing Committee on National Defence and within the Conservative team about what needs to happen to fix the issues facing the Canadian Armed Forces. Our defence policy and costed platform will be released in due course. Until then, I am unable to share the specifics of what a future Conservative government will do, but rest assured it is front of my mind. 

 

Thank you again for your correspondence. 

James Bezan, MP

Shadow Minister for National Defence

This reply was received from Pierre Poilievre, leader of the official opposition.

Dear J.G. Murray:

On behalf of the Hon. Pierre Poilievre, thank you for your correspondence.  We have noted your concerns regarding the Canadian military and national defence spending.   

After nine years of Trudeau, our military has been gutted and left in a state of disrepair.  Trudeau has failed our Canadian Armed Forces and the men and women who serve.  In 2017, the Liberals released their first Defence Policy document Strong, Secured, Engaged, which proved to be a book of empty promises. They have missed every marker set out by the original defence policy for defence spending.

In fact, this Liberal government has let over $10 billion lapse in the last eight years and recently cut the defence budget by another $1-billion.  Under the Liberals’ watch, we are short almost 16,000 troops this year and a further 10,000 troops are undertrained and undeployable.  After eight years of Trudeau, he has hollowed out our military and only 58% of our forces stand ready to deploy.

Further, Canada’s stature as a trusted and reliable NATO partner has been diminished under this Liberal government.  Last year, the Trudeau government spent 1.29% of our GDP on defence, putting Canada 25th out of 29 NATO members.  Two years after the war in Ukraine began, this borders on negligence.

Our allies no longer take Canada seriously. Under the Liberals watch, our warships are rusting out, our fighter jets are worn out, our army has been hollowed out and we are so short of sailors, soldiers and aircrew that our troops are burnt out.  Entire air squadrons are being shut down because they don't have enough personnel. Our submarines are barely in the water and our warships are aging faster than expected and the Liberals’ plan to replace them is still years away. 

As the world is gripped with Russian aggression, it is more important than ever for our military to have the equipment it needs to protect our vast borders and support our NATO allies.  Conservatives support the commitments Canada has made to NATO, and we must make an effort to meet them.

Common sense Conservatives are the only party that will stand with our troops and ensure they have the equipment and resources they need to do their important work.

Once again, thank you for taking the time to write.

Sincerely,

Correspondence Unit
Office of the Leader of the Official Opposition

I replied as follows;

Correspondence Unit, Office of the Leader of the Official Opposition

 Thank you for responding on behalf of the Hon. Pierre Poilievre. I share your concerns about the Canadian Armed Forces, but it is not clear from your email what you plan to do about the problems you catalogue. If you will recall, the suggestion in my initial correspondence was that I was prepared to forgo some social spending in order to increase spending on the Armed Forces.

  What increases in the budget of the DND do you foresee under a Conservative government?  I would also be interested to know if you plan to fund any increases by way of cuts to other programs or by raising taxes.  Does a Conservative government under Pierre Poilievre expect to reach the NATO target of spending a minimum of 2% of GDP on defence and, if so, do you have a spending plan to achieve that goal?

Thank you again for reaching out, I look forward to hearing from you.

J.G. Murray

In the event that more replies of note are received I will pass them on.

TANKS FOR THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

 

TANK

As stated in the new government defence policy update (DPU) "Our North Strong and Free", it is now accepted that "main battle tanks continue to have a decisive effect on the modern battlefield and remain key to conducting land operations against conventional militaries with advanced capabilities". Based on this belief the new defence policy states that the government intends to "explore options for upgrading or replacing our tank...fleets". 

One must assume that those who formulated this document felt the need to emphasize the gravity of their message by the use of bold type in the policy report.

So if it is true that the government, and one presumes the Army, really believe that "main battle tanks...have a decisive effect and remain key to conducting land operations " then certain questions are inevitably raised. For example, how best can Canada use tanks to achieve these effects and how many tanks are needed to do it? 

At this time it would not appear that the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) have a clear vision as to how they want to integrate tanks into the brigade structure or how to use them alongside armoured reconnaissance forces for combat against peer forces.

According to Canadian Army Doctrine, tank forces exhibit characteristics which include firepower, protection and mobility. Firepower is usually provided by an accurate large calibre main gun system capable of, among other things, defeating enemy armoured forces. Protection is a dominant characteristic. A tank’s armour enables it to operate in the face of enemy fire.  Mobility, as a characteristic, speaks to both the bold mindset traditionally instilled in armour commanders as much as it does to mechanical performance. Of the tank’s characteristics the most unique are firepower and protection which are generally regarded as the qualities that fully distinguish tank forces from other land elements because of their ability to maneuver and fight when in direct contact with enemy forces.

The role of armoured reconnaissance is different. It acts as a specialized reconnaissance and security element, structured to conduct its primary tasks and capable of fighting for information. Armoured reconnaissance elements are not associated with a specific platform and are defined by their mobility, light protection, communications, firepower and low personnel density. Containing integral combat support elements they can fulfill a variety of combat roles but their primary task is reconnaissance.

In theory the RCAC is currently divided into two streams; tanks and armoured reconnaissance, with approximately 30% of personnel specializing in the former and 70% in the latter.

In fact, even though these are separate roles calling for separate doctrines and in most cases different equipment, training courses at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School train all students on the Leopard 2, Textron Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV) , and LAV VI armoured fighting vehicles in a single unified 14 week course in which students are taught about commanding the crew of a single vehicle on the Leopard 2 MBT, as well as being trained as armoured reconnaissance troop leaders, using the LAV 6 and TAPV.

Currently the RCAC fields a series of armoured subunits: some of which are reconnaissance squadrons and some of which are tank squadrons, all under the overarching umbrella of “armour.” These are separate tasks. To distinguish between them and for the purposes of this argument, it would be better to refer to reconnaissance as a 'cavalry' role while tank forces are designated as 'armour'. What is important to understand is that while tanks can conduct cavalry duties, vehicles which are not tanks can not act as armoured forces. 

The RCAC has struggled with these issues for decades. When left with tanks (obsolescent Centurions) they have called them fire support vehicles, when given fire support vehicles (AVGP Cougars) they have been organized as tanks. When the Cougars were replace by Coyotes, first in service in 1996 for use in the reconnaissance scout role, they were also tasked in the role of medium tank trainer within armoured cavalry squadrons in the same way as the AVGP Cougar it replaced.

Now the Coyotes have been replaced by the Textron TAPV (Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle) which, while a reasonable replacement for the woefully inadequate Mercedes-Benz G-Wagons used in the light reconnaissance role, is a step backward from the 25mm cannon armed Coyotes. Hopefully the addition of suitable numbers of LAV 6 Recce and LAV OPV units will help to redress this issue. 

So, how best can Canada use tanks to meet the goals laid out in the new defence policy, and how many tanks are needed to do it? 

There  are several alternatives for the Canadian Army and their tank force. And while it may seem redundant, but based on previous experience it is still mandatory, to point out that, regardless of which options are chosen, all vehicles assigned to army formations should have appropriate finances allocated to provide suitable spares and maintenance. It would also be a real asset to such a relatively small force to use just one model of whichever tank is being used, rather than the three different models of Leopard 2 tanks currently in use.

They can continue with the present organization. Currently Leopard 2 tanks have been issued to one of the three regiments associated with the three mechanized brigade groups fielded by the regular (full time) forces of the Canadian Army. That unit, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) is attached to 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and based in Edmonton, Alberta. Leopard tanks can also be found at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School based at Gagetown, New Brunswick where, at least in theory, the tank squadrons of the two other RCAC regiments attached to regular force brigade groups can be found.

Minister Blair also noted that a Canadian Army Tank Squadron of 15 Leopard 2A4M tanks, along with supporting personnel and equipment announced in July 2023, recently arrived in Latvia as part of Operation REASSURANCE. The full complement of approximately 130 personnel should be in place by spring 2024.

Properly supported with spares and training, retaining this structure could be accomplished using the Leopard 2 tanks currently in inventory, approximately 70 vehicles. 

Another option, and probably the least expensive, would be to maintain a tank squadron in Latvia while concentrating all other tank units at Gagetown. As well as being cheap, this choice would have the advantage of allowing the army to field a full regiment (battalion) at least occasionally as a training option. 

It would also allow the armoured regiments attached to the regular force to concentrate on the armoured reconnaissance (cavalry) role. Exercising as cavalry regiments (battalions) for the associated brigades would make it possible to determine the best mix of organic support units, such as fire-support, anti-tank and infantry, that should be added to the reconnaissance teams to achieve desired effects. 

The downside of this strategy would be that the regular force brigades would no longer be able to train regularly with organic tank units, although admittedly this opportunity is only available to one brigade currently, so nothing would change for the majority of the army. With one tank squadron in Latvia and four in Gagetown that would be a total of 5 squadrons of 15 tanks or 75 Tanks. This would be the bare minimum number of gun tanks necessary and would not include support vehicles like armoured recovery, engineering and bridging vehicles based, one hopes, on the same chassis.

If, as another example, the Canadian Army were to field one squadron with each mechanized brigade, one squadron in Latvia and two squadrons (for training and in reserve) in New Brunswick at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School that would be a total of 6 squadrons of 15 tanks or 90 tanks. This would be the bare minimum number of gun tanks necessary and would not include support vehicles like armoured recovery, engineering and bridging vehicles based, one hopes, on the same chassis.

In this scenario armoured regiments (battalions) attached to brigades would consist of two squadrons (companies) in the armoured reconnaissance role and one tank squadron.  Suitable fire-support, anti-tank and infantry support for the reconnaissance units would be attached at either the squadron or regimental level as dictated by doctrine developed through exercises. The armoured squadron (tanks) although attached to the regiment for logistics purposes would be seen as a brigade level resource and tasked as such. They would not, except at the brigade commanders discretion, be used as reconnaissance assets.

Of course it is always possible that the Army, and government, could go 'all in' on tanks and purchase enough vehicles to provide a complete regiment (battalion) of tanks for each regular force brigade, to add to the existing armoured reconnaissance regiments (battalions), as well as another regiments (battalion) worth of tanks at armoured school in Gagetown and a squadron in Latvia. As this would involve the purchase and maintenance of over 200 tanks this option, while possibly desirable, seems wildly unlikely.   

Which ever options are chosen, the government appears to have signaled in the DPU that they want the Army to get serious about tanks and tank warfare. To do this properly the Canadian Army is going to have to separate the roles of armoured reconnaissance (cavalry) and armour (tanks) and organize their forces in such a way as to maximize the advantages of these complementary but distinct forces.

NOT A TANK

 The Role of Armoured Reconnaissance Within the  Canadian Army

https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/05/the-role-of-armoured-reconnaissance-within-the-canadian-army.html

Canadian Army Journal 19.3, published December 2022
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2022/mdn-dnd/D12-11-19-3-eng.pdf

Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring 2022
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/PDFs/CMJ222Ep17.pdf

THE RE-TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARMOURED CORPS
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/mdn-dnd/D12-11-17-3-eng.pdf

CAVALRY: AN OPTIMIZED CAPABILITY FOR ADO
https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/317/305/morin.pdf

The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1999

https://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/D12-9-2-4E.pdf

A Perspective on Cavalry: Re-examining the Mounted Arm for the Future

https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/12/a-perspective-on-cavalry.html#operations

A FEW MORE QUESTIONS ABOUT "Our North, Strong and Free" HELICOPTERS, WHAT HELICOPTERS?

In their latest Defence policy "Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence" the government announced that they would " provide the Canadian Armed Forces with the speed and airlift capacity to assert Canada’s sovereignty and respond to natural disasters and emergencies throughout the country, we will acquire a more modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability."

There are several obvious candidates to fill the tactical helicopter role for the Canadian Armed Forces.

One would be the Bell UH-1Y "Venom". The Bell UH-1Y is a twin-engine, medium-sized utility helicopter built by Bell Helicopter as one of the latest members of the numerous Huey family of helicopters, a family which includes the Bell CH-146 "Griffon", the current tactical helicopter used by the Canadian Armed Forces. 

As an evolved version of the aircraft currently in use it would be a natural and comparatively easy transition for pilots and maintainers.  As it is currently in service with the U.S. Marines it can be expected to be in service for many years with spares, upgrades, and even doctrine being easily available. Costs for both initial purchase and maintenance should also be relatively straight forward given U.S. experience.

The other obvious choice to fill the role would be some variant of the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk. In wide spread use in a number of countries as well as the U.S. Army, it is in production with upgrades and spares available for decades to come. Sharing engine commonality with the currently in service Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone it would a safe and cost effective choice.

Another reasonable choice to fill the role of a modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability would be a troop carrying variant of the CH-148 Cyclone. Currently in service with the RCAF, the CH-148 is a military variant of the Sikorsky S-92 designed for shipboard operations, it replaced, after much time and money was spent, the CH-124 Sea King.

The H-92 is the military version of the S-92 from which the CH-148 is derived. In the utility transport role it is capable of carrying 22 troops and can also be configured for specific missions, including search and rescue and executive transportation. The choice of a CH-148 variant to fill the role would bring the commonality of spares, equipment and even training that comes with a bigger fleet. This acquisition, with its concomitant savings, could even include a few aircraft, configured for search and rescue, to augment our hard worked and under resourced CH-149 Cormorant SAR fleet.

A less likely but still viable choice would be to purchase more CH-147 heavy lift helicopters. In 2009, Canada signed a contract for 15 of the F model of the aircraft which, inevitably and at great expense, were extensively modified and upgraded for the Canadian Forces, they were delivered in 2013–2014 with the Canadian designation CH-147F.

While not thought of as a 'tactical' helicopter they are often used as such. More to the point, heavy lift helicopters are almost a national asset, as useful for disaster relief as they are for logistic support, you really can't have enough of them. While such a procurement might seem more expensive, in terms of initial purchase cost, savings would be found in the commonality with an existing fleet and its attendant logistics and training infrastructure.

If a purchase of CH-147 Chinook helicopters was paired with a purchase of Bell 429 'Global Rangers' , the same aircraft in service with the Canadian Coast Guard, to be used as a more economically viable aircraft for the purely utility role, there could be further savings. It doesn't hurt that these useful aircraft are manufactured in Canada.

All of the above would be viable choices for the Government intention to "acquire a more modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability" which they suggest in the new Defence policy is a priority. If the procurement was pursued with any sense of urgency the aircraft could be in service within five years at an affordable price.

This will not happen. In five years the Department of National Defence will announce that they are five years away from an option which involves a bespoke aircraft, highly modified for Canadian use and in service no where else in the world which costs twice as much as any of the above options. They will be mistaken, it will take twice as long as predicted and cost three times more then it should.

This last is not a cynical prediction, based on all previous performance and the lack of any real change in our procurement policies, it is a fact.

A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT "Our North, Strong and Free" LONG RANGE MISSILES

 

In a recent statement the Government of Canada has announced that, among other things they intent to acquire "Long-Range Land Missiles" spending"$2.7 billion over 20 years to acquire long-range missile capabilities to enable our forces to deter threats to Canada from an appropriate distance and reach targets at greater ranges than our adversaries in combat."

As well the new policy announcement states that they intend to "explore options to acquire long-range air- and sea-launched missiles to enable our forces to deter threats to Canada from an appropriate distance and reach targets at greater ranges than our adversaries in combat."

It must be assumed that at least some of these new weapons are going to be Tomahawk cruise missiles made by Raytheon Missiles & Defense in the United States as these are the same weapons previously identified as projected for use on the new Canadian Surface Combatants frigates being built for the R.C.N.

For targeting and navigation Tomahawk missiles use a combination of TERCOM or Terrain Contour Matching in which  a digital representation of an area of terrain is mapped based on digital terrain elevation data or stereo imagery. It is not clear if any branch of the Canadian government, military or civilian can supply such data or imagery.

The missile also uses DSMAC or Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation. To do this a digitized image of an area is mapped. During the flight the missile will verify that the images that it has stored correlate with the image it sees below itself. Based on comparison results the missile's inertial navigation system is updated and the missile corrects its course. Again, it is not clear if any branch of the Canadian government, military or civilian can supply such data or imagery.

Is it possible that the Government of Canada is going to acquire long range cruise missiles, a weapon never before found in our arsenal, that can only be used with the assistance, and hence permission, of a third party?

A new day, a new defence policy, a lot of questions. More to come.

I'D RATHER HAVE AN AIRFORCE THAN A NATIONAL PHARMACARE PROGRAM

What do Canadians think about Defence?

In a speech to the House of Commons in 1875 by David Mills, an Ontario Liberal MP. said “In a country situated as we are, not likely to be involved in war, and having a large demand upon our resources for public improvements, it is highly desirable to have our military affairs conducted as cheaply as possible." 

It can be argued that for most Canadians this view still reflects the majority of opinion. Unfortunately it is not 1875 and we live in a different world. 

For academics Canadian defence policy can be summed up by a few taglines. Canada wants "A seat at the table", the "commitment-capability gap" depicts the tendency of Canada's defence ambitions to surpass the means allocated to the armed forces, while more cynically some have suggested that politicians normally inquire "how much is just enough?".

For some analysts the idea of "defence against help" is regularly employed to shed light on Ottawa's approach to North American security. Defence against help is a concept identified in the early 1970's by Nils Ørvik as a security strategy for small states. To avoid unwanted “help” from large neighbours he argued that smaller countries had to establish and maintain military credibility.

 

This concept first became clear in Canada  in August 1938 when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt promised that “the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire.” At that time Prime Minister King promised that Canada would ensure that “our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air to the United States, across Canadian territory.”

King’s promise to the United States meant that Canada was no longer free to pursue a completely autonomous defence policy. If Canadians were to prove incapable of providing for their own security, the US would do it for them. This  “involuntary American guarantee” suggests that the United States is likely to defend Canada from external aggression in any manner they choose, regardless of whether or not Canadians wish to be defended.

Most Canadians may not think about it, but the case can be made that the most important part of our "Defence against Help" can be found in NORAD. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is a United States and Canada bi-national organization charged with "the missions of aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning for North America. Aerospace warning includes the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles, through mutual support arrangements with other commands. "

If that it is true that NORAD is the major component of Canada's Defence against Help, then that part of our defence is coming to an end because the time is coming when Canada, and the United States, will discover that we don't really have an Air Force to contribute to NORAD.

We don't have enough transport aircraft to meet our stated needs. We don't have enough search and rescue aircraft for a country this size, nor do we have the numbers of long range reconnaissance/patrol aircraft our lengthy coastlines demand. Many of the helicopters we use are aging and we do not have a viable number of heavy lift helicopters.  Even more important, we don't have the personnel to properly maintain and fly the aircraft we do have. All these shortcomings are most evident, and most troubling, in our fighter fleet.

The fleet of operational Cf-18 Hornet jet fighters is currently down to about 37 aircraft.  This fleet size is sufficient only to sustain domestic NORAD operations. In fact it has been announced that the RCAF would withdraw from NATO commitments for the foreseeable future. Even more problematic is the lack of pilots and support personnel, which may even lead to the Air Force being unable to fulfill the NORAD alert mission requirements in full. This will only get worse as the F-35 transition gets underway in the coming years. It is more than likely that there will be insufficient personnel to staff both aircraft types, which will likely result in even fewer available CF-18s to meet the alert role.

What will happen when the United States loses confidence in its northern neighbour to be a stalwart, binational partner? What will happen if the U.S. believes that there is a serious security threat that needs to be met by NORAD and that Canada is not capable of fulfilling our obligations to continental defence?

What will happen is that the commander of NORAD, an American, will take off his NORAD hat and put on his NORTHCOM hat (it should be pointed out here that the commander of NORTHCOM-the U.S. command tasked with defending North America is the same person who commands NORAD) and move the assets he deems necessary from NORTHCOM to NORAD. He may or may not pretend to ask our permission to order changes to areas of responsibility or even t0  move U.S. personal and forces to Canada.

 When that happens, when Canadians realize that not having an Air Force has real world consequences that affect Canadian sovereignty and security, we will blame the politicians for getting us in this mess. 

The politicians will blame the generals and the generals in turn will complain about the politicians. 

The truth is, it will be our fault. Canadian Citizens have not made Defence a priority for their leaders. We have chosen an illusory security and short term gains over real security and long term planning. We have taken the easy way and there will be no one else to blame but ourselves.

So I have decided that the time has come to tell our political leaders something different. If asked in the future I am going to tell anyone who will listen that:

I'D RATHER HAVE AN AIRFORCE THAN A NATIONAL PHARMACARE PROGRAM

  

TIME FOR CANADA TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE

 It can be argued that, as a “junior partner” since World War 2, Canada has followed the British and American lead in security and defence, subordinating its national interest to the goals of our allies and alliances.

There are good reasons for Canada to have followed this approach in the past. Following the lead of our allies appears to improve Canada’s standing in the world, especially amongst peer allied nations, and allows Canada to exercise some leadership in international affairs.  This increased leadership role allows Canada to further its interests through diplomacy. These policies also make it possible for the Government of Canada to highlight perceived successes abroad so as to increase popular support for its foreign policy and raise awareness of the role of the Armed Forces in maintaining security.

However this is not the only policy option available. As a sovereign power Canada can set its own strategic priorities.  Moreover, by continuing the historical pattern of letting alliance leaders determine its’ strategy, the case can be made that Canada is abdicating its responsibility to protect its own national interests.

The Canadian Armed Forces spend time and resources estimating the capabilities and kinds of forces they may confront in the future. The need to assess the probable opposition is driven by the requirement to determine what resources will be necessary to meet those threats. The time has come to start making the same estimations about the capabilities and intentions of those allies who, at least in the past, we have expected to be fighting alongside. These assessments should be driven by the same need to determine the resources necessary to meet the goals of the Government of Canada.

We are approaching the point at which it becomes necessary to take a more active role in safeguarding our own security interests.  As quoted in MacLean’s Magazine while discussing his book “America: The Farewell Tour” author Chris Hedges is quoted as saying: “America is an empire. So we’re much more fragile than nation-states, non-imperial countries. You see that throughout history: the ancient Greeks invading Sicily, and their entire fleet sunk, thousands of soldiers killed and their empire becoming unsustainable; or in 1956 when Britain tries to invade Egypt after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, retreats in humiliation and thereby triggers a financial crisis and the end of the pound sterling as a reserve currency, marking the death of the British Empire, which had been on a slow descent since the end of World War One. The dollar as the world’s current reserve currency is running on fumes. The moment that’s over, American financial supremacy is instantly finished. It will be very similar to the aftermath of the Suez disaster—something like that is always characteristic of late empire. And the fragility of an empire means that when collapse comes it’s almost instantaneous. You look back at the rapid final fall of the old Soviet Union. A failing empire is like a house of cards that just comes down—it’s not a slow descent. We know from history what happens. It’s not a mystery.”

This is not just speculation. The U.K.’s Global Strategic Trends describes a 2045 People’s Republic of China (PRC) with an economy more than double that of the United States ($62.9 trillion versus $30.7 trillion) and noting that even today, the PRC military may already be “close to matching that of the U.S., perhaps exceeding it in some areas.”  Studies show that the trajectory of PRC growth means that it poses a far greater economic challenge to the United States than did Soviet Russia, Imperial Japan, or Nazi Germany.

There is a growing understanding that the ability of the United States to afford the kind of resources it spent over the Cold War years on furnishing defense for its allies will inevitably become more challenging over the balance of the twenty-first century. From 1940 to 2017, U.S. government debt averaged 61.70 percent of GDP. For 2017, that debt ratio soared to 105 percent of GDP, a level not seen since 1946. The United States today has accumulated more government debt than any other country in the world and is approaching the point at which it can no longer afford to finance its allies’ post WWII traditions of not taking on more responsibility for their own defense.

Even absent the collapse of the American ‘empire’ the time of lone American superpower status is passing. Relative U.S. economic and technological decline may translate into significant strategic and military challenges more rapidly than many expect, leaving allies like Canada with the requirement to modify their foreign and defence policies.  

Such a reappraisal is not just a prescription for increased defence expenditure.  A brave new world in which Canada takes a greater responsibility for its own security may well result in a decision that commitments should be more in line with capabilities.

In the past Canadian Forces have taken part in operations that were only vaguely related to Canadian interests, not committing to those kinds of operations in the future would free up resources to take part in more nationally-relevant operations. Maintenance and readiness have both suffered from over-stretch. Reducing the number of extraneous deployments would decrease costs and increase readiness.

More care in selecting operations, based on realistic commitments and driven by changing geopolitical realities, would let Canada set its own priorities and allow the Armed Forces and our allies to plan based on actual capabilities.

Canadians like to see themselves as citizens of middle power that ‘punches above its weight’. It is not true. There are 195 assorted nations in the world. In terms of economy Canada has roughly the tenth largest in the world. In terms of defence spending in dollar terms Canada is the fourteenth largest spender in the world. Even in population Canada is bigger than 157 of those 195 countries.

Canada is not a small country; we are not even a middle power. Canada is a large country that actually punches well below its weight. The time is rapidly approaching when we will no longer have the luxury of pretending otherwise.

America: The Farewell Tour

https://www.macleans.ca/politics/worldpolitics/why-the-american-empire-has-lost-control-and-its-failure-is-imminent/

Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/348164/20140821_DCDC_GST_5_Web_Secured.pdf

Andrew Krepinevich, Preserving the Balance: A U.S. Eurasia Defense Strategy,  https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/preserving-the-balance-a-u.s.-eurasia-defense-strategy/publication

Reality Check: NATO's Defense Budget Woes Won't Disappear

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/reality-check-natos-defense-budget-woes-wont-disappear-30582

Economy of Canada

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Canada

List of countries by military expenditures

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures

Countries in the world by population (2018)

http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/