REVIEWING THE DEFENCE REVIEW

Writing in the "The Dispatch" Stephen Saideman  has reviewed the defence review and noted that there is a split between the academic defence community which has been advocating hard choices and those who speak for the retired military community whom he believes wish to avoid those decisions.

It is his belief that many retired military speakers think that "combat capable" means the same as “full spectrum” or "flexible" and that they assume that any choice to have less of one kind of capability would mean that the Canadian Armed Forces would not be able to do combat.

No matter what the conclusions of the Defence Review, the missions will not change nor, it seems likely, will spending patterns. The Defence Minister has already indicated that there will be no major changes on the issues of personnel and bases.

So the DND and the CAF will need to make decisions about where and how funds available are going to be spent and hard choices will have to be made and, as Saideman points out, there are no advocacy groups for spending money on readiness, exercising, and maintenance.  Yet these are the areas that will get cut, if no hard decisions are made, and getting those choices wrong  will get people killed.

Examples are not hard to find. As Paul J.Doyle makes clear in a paper entitled "Canada’s Air Force Kinetic Capability for the 21st Century: What Is Needed?" published in "Canadian Aerospace and Joint Studies, the Curtis papers  Vol. 1 • Book 1: 2009 | 2010 – Select Masters in Defence Studies"the Canadian Army was not prepared for combat in Afghanistan.

The stand-up of 1 Canadian Air Division, along with the dissolution of the air groups in 1997, started  the disengagement of the fighter force from the Canadian Army which accelerated through the 1990s. The end of the brigade-level Exercise RENDEZVOUS in 1997 also limited the large event training exercises for CF-18s with Army brigades. As the fighter force concentrated on independent missions  the number of fighter pilots qualified as FACs (Forward Air Controllers) steadily decreased.

The unintended consequences of these incidents led to the tragic events in September 2006 where a USAF A-10 mistakenly fired on Canadian troops, killing one soldier and wounding over 30 in a single strafing pass. As detailed in the DND inquiry into the incident there were many individual occurrences that led to this tragic event, from obscured visibility to fatigue, but one key contribution was the lack of a tactical air control party (TACP) with the Canadians at the brigade or battle group level.

As subsequent investigations discovered, by 2006 the Canadian Forces was not following doctrine, and TACPs had not been formed or deployed into the theatre of operations In the end it took this accident to bring this deficiency to light.

This is not just a case of each service following it's own path with no attempt at 'jointness". It is not enough to mandate cross-service cooperation in all stages of the military processes, from research, through procurement and into operations and hope that it works. Hard choices have to be made about priorities, The events of September 2006 show what happens when the hard choices are not made.

There is no constituency in the DND or the CAF for "jointness" any more then there is for  readiness, exercising, and maintenance. This has to provided by civilian and military leadership. If the Defence Review concludes that 'business as usual' results in more then political embarrassment, that the consequences are combat deaths, then it will not have been a waste of effort.

Reviewing the Summer of the Defence Review by STEPHEN SAIDEMAN

https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/97/attachments/original/1475163657/Dispatch_-_Fall_2016.pdf?1475163657#page=20

Canadian Aerospace and Joint Studies, the Curtis papers  Vol. 1 • Book 1: 2009 | 2010 – Select Masters in Defence Studies Paper

Chapter 5 –  Canada’s Air Force Kinetic Capability for the 21st Century: What Is Needed? Major Paul J. Doyle

http://airforceapp.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/eLibrary/pubs/The_Curtis_Papers-Vol1-Book1_e.pdf

Inquiry: A-10A Friendly Fire Incident 4 September 2006, Panjwayi District, Afghanistan Department of National Defence, Board of Inquiry Minutes of Proceeding  http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/A10_BOI_Report_e.pdf

DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW, QUESTION TEN, AND SOME CONCLUSIONS

The Department of National Defence has launched public consultations for the development of a new defence policy for Canada. Canadian Defence Matters is attempting to come up with some answers to the ten questions contained in the Defence Policy Review Public Consultation Document 2016

The final question asked by the Consultation paper is in many ways the most important, and the one whose answers should form the basis for a new Defence policy.

Under the section labeled “Questions relating to contributing to the Defence budget” question ten asks “What resources will the CAF require to meet Canada’s defence needs?”

The section goes on to point out that “This new vision for defence must be affordable” and that the Canadian military has been, on average, resourced at around 1% of Canadian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the past decade while noting that NATO guidelines indicate that member nations should aim to move toward spending 2% of GDP on defence.

Perhaps the most important part of the guidelines offered makes it clear that: “Canada assesses its defence spending in terms of the level of resources required to support an effective and capable CAF. Ultimately, the level of ambition we defi­ne for the CAF must be properly resourced, which will require clear priorities and strategic decisions about how to invest limited resources with maximum impact.”

Paying for the defence resources we need is paramount.  In many ways military spending is a form of insurance. No one likes paying for insurance because, like the military, the chances are that we will never really need it. But if we do need it, like the military, Canada will be very glad that it made the investment.

Just like a homeowner, Canada needs to decide how much insurance we need, how much we can afford, and what are the risks we are facing. Writing almost seventy five years ago in his book “The Military Problems of Canada” about the period between the First and Second World Wars C.P. Stacey, that doyen of Canadian military historians, said “For sixteen years (it would almost seem) no responsible Canadian statesman ever paused to ask himself these simple and fundamental questions: If this peace proves fleeting, what is the nature of the menaces that will threaten Canada? What form of organization would offer the greatest security against them? How far does the existing organization satisfy these needs?” 

In some significant ways the domestic attitude towards defence spending in Canada today is not that different from the conditions that prevailed in Stacey’s time.

Like Raoul Dandurand, Canada’s delegate to the League of Nations from 1927 to 1930, it is still the opinion of many that in international affairs Canada is “a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.” Of course, it is no truer now than it was then.

The majority of Canadians, and their elected representatives, believe that war is discretionary, essentially a matter of choice. Even in the face of everything we know about human nature and everything we have learned from history it is still widely believed that we will always be able to pick and choose our military involvements. 

If it were true we could have a very different military then the one we need, one that could put an emphasis on using its resources for a wide variety of useful, if not strictly military purposes.  We could have a military that prioritized activities such as domestic search and rescue, infrastructure building, peace keeping and job creation.

But what we need is a military based on a Defence Policy which considers a combination of known threats and strives to maintain the broad range of military capabilities that are necessary to a well-balanced force within a budget that we can afford.

Military capability cannot be created overnight. Unlike insurance, you cannot buy a military at the last minute. Modern militaries are tremendously complex and equipment can take decades to acquire. Even more important are the people, it will take decades to produce the leaders and organizations that can properly use the technology on a modern battlefield.

“What resources will the CAF require to meet Canada’s defence needs?”  The resources the Canadian Armed Forces will require to meet Canada’s defence needs are politicians and a general public willing to ask the question; If this peace proves fleeting, what is the nature of the menaces that will threaten Canada? What form of organization would offer the greatest security against them? How far does the existing organization satisfy these needs? and find the resources to pay for the answers.

Defence Policy Review

http://jgmjgm516.blogspot.ca/search/label/DEFENCE%20POLICY%20REVIEW

Defence Policy Review Public Consultation Document 2016

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/docs/defence-policy-review-consultation-paper.pdf

DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW, QUESTION 9 “WHAT ADDITIONAL MEASURES COULD DND UNDERTAKE, ALONG WITH PARTNER DEPARTMENTS, TO IMPROVE DEFENCE PROCUREMENT?”

The Department of National Defence has launched public consultations for the development of a new defence policy for Canada. Canadian Defence Matters is attempting to come up with some answers to the ten questions contained in the “Defence Policy Review Public Consultation Document 2016".

Question nine asks “What additional measures could DND undertake, along with partner departments, to improve defence procurement?”

According to the Public Consultation Document “An effective defence procurement process and a strong and vibrant Canadian defence industrial base are important to Canada’s security and economy – not only for reasons of economic prosperity – but also to ensure a range of capabilities available to provide Canada with an operational and technological edge. It is imperative that the CAF have the tools they need to carry out their day-to-day duties at home and abroad.”

It would not be unreasonable to point out that the DND has faced challenges in delivering both large and complex defence procurement project as well as smaller ones. To be fair, as the department points out, the DND has let over 40,000 contracts a year for both services and goods since 2009, with an upward trend to 60,000 in the last two ­fiscal years.

What is needed, according to  Douglas Bland in his introduction to Allan Williams’ Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement: A View from the Inside, is “a predictable defence-management system that joins strategic analysis to statements of defence requirements to efficient procurement, which in concert produce appropriate military capabilities. The system in its entirety” he says “ought to sustain the Canadian Forces by flowing force development and the resultant future force into the engaged present force”.

Currently defence procurement as practiced in Canada does none of those things. The truth is that the current Canadian defence-procurement ‘system’  is, in Alan Williams’ words, “a bureaucratic muddle,” characterized by a lack of accountability at all levels.

What is not needed is adding more layers of ‘accountability’ to the system, it will not help. Departmental reviews and new studies will not make things better; in fact these are exactly the kind of things that have given us our current convoluted and drawn out process, one overburdened by non-defence considerations, overly bureaucratic, and rife with political interference

What is needed is a single point of responsibility for defence procurement.

It is long past time that a single agency, one with cabinet level representation, be responsible for the 53 percent of federal government acquisition dollars that are devoted to defence outputs. In the past three years alone 52 percent ($10.3 billion) of all government contracts in excess of $100 million were for defence materiel and 56 percent of the total asset base of the federal government is held by the Department of National Defence.

The additional measures the DND could undertake, along with partner departments, to improve defence procurement would be to create a stand-alone  defence procurement agency, under the direction of the minister of National Defence, which would be exclusively  responsible for all military procurement contracts.

Defence Policy Review

http://jgmjgm516.blogspot.ca/search/label/DEFENCE%20POLICY%20REVIEW

Defence Policy Review Public Consultation Document 2016

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/docs/defence-policy-review-consultation-paper.pdf

Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement Foreword by Dr. Douglas Bland

http://www.cdainstitute.ca/images/ontrack11n3.pdf

Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement: A View from the Inside

https://www.amazon.ca/Reinventing-Canadian-Defence-Procurement-Inside/dp/0978169301

Defence Policy Review Public Consultation Document 2016, Question 8 – What do these things have in common?

The Department of National Defence has launched public consultations for the development of a new defence policy for Canada. Canadian Defence Matters is attempting to come up with some answers to the ten questions contained in the “Defence Policy Review Public Consultation Document 2016”.

Question eight asks” What type of investments should Canada make in space, cyber, and unmanned systems? To what extent should Canada strive to keep pace and be interoperable with key allies in these domains?”

It is hard to understand what prompted the belief that these three issues had anything in common, other than the perceived need to “keep pace” with and “be interoperable with key allies in these domains”.

The paper points out that “Space technology is increasingly critical for Canada’s economy and society” as well as being essential to national security and defence. What “space technology” does, for Canada, is provide GPS capacity, communications and a reconnaissance capability through satellite systems like RADARSAT-2 and Sapphire.

In terms of Cyber systems the Public Consultation Document also makes the point that dependence on information technology has become central to the military. It is, as noted, “a highly complex threat environment that poses significant challenges for the CAF and for Canada as a whole.”

With the premise that “Unmanned Systems have become integral to modern military operations” the paper goes on to outline the difficulties inherent in addressing the cultural road blocks imposed by using robotic systems to fulfill tasks which previously gave value to the humans that accomplished them. 

One example of this dislocation is the continued preference for the term ‘drone’ by those who oppose arming remotely piloted aircraft, while those who do not oppose “weaponization” use the term ‘unmanned systems’. Both sides of the argument apparently believing that nomenclature can determine outcomes.

One thing these three areas do have in common is that there seems to be no obvious reason that Canada needs to “keep pace” with our allies in these areas. At the same time it seems equally obvious that we do need to be “interoperable with key allies” with regard to these capabilities.

The other thing these seemingly disparate “domains” do have in common is that our dependence on them could become areas of vulnerability for our Forces.  

At a minimum, the “investments should Canada make in space, cyber, and unmanned systems” should involve a thorough and ongoing threat assessment. What are our vulnerabilities in these fields? How can we deal with the loss of capabilities in areas which we depend on but do not control? What expenditures are necessary to maintain the ability to work with the systems of our allies with minimum effort.

These are the questions we need to ask, and the answers to them are the things we need to invest in.

Defence Policy Review

http://jgmjgm516.blogspot.ca/search/label/DEFENCE%20POLICY%20REVIEW

Defence Policy Review Public Consultation Document 2016

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/docs/defence-policy-review-consultation-paper.pdf

SHOULD CANADA STRIVE TO MAINTAIN MILITARY CAPABILITY ACROSS THE FULL SPECTRUM OF OPERATIONS? ARE THERE SPECIFIC NICHE AREAS OF CAPABILITY IN WHICH CANADA SHOULD SPECIALIZE?

The Department of National Defence has launched public consultations for the development of a new defence policy for Canada. Canadian Defence Matters is attempting to come up with some answers to the ten questions contained in the public consultation paper.

Question seven is "Should Canada strive to maintain military capability across the full spectrum of operations? Are there specific niche areas of capability in which Canada should specialize?"

In a report entitled “The State of Readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces” prepared by the Standing Committee on National Defence in 2012 it was noted that “ Overall, it is essential to have a multi-purpose force that is trained and equipped to fight through the full spectrum of combat — from low to high intensity warfare.”

The Canada First Defence Strategy set out six core missions for the Canadian Forces, those missions were;

·        Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD;

·        Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics;

·        Respond to a major terrorist attack;

·        Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster;

·        Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period; and

·        Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.

In order to fulfill these missions it was expected that the Canadian Forces would need to be “a fully integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat-capable military”.  

It seems unlikely that the Canadian Armed Forces, or the any government, would wish to eliminate one of these basic missions. That being the case, then a “fully integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat-capable military trained and equipped to fight through the full spectrum of combat — from low to high intensity warfare” would appear to be a given.

It further stands to reason that any “niche capabilities” that the government or the DND might wish to pursue should never come at the cost of losing the ability to maintain military capability across the full spectrum of operations that are seen as core missions.

Defence Policy Review

http://jgmjgm516.blogspot.ca/search/label/DEFENCE%20POLICY%20REVIEW

THE STATE OF READINESS OF THE CANADIAN FORCES Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence James Bezan, M.P. Chair DECEMBER 2012

http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/411/NDDN/Reports/RP5881736/nddnrp05/nddnrp05-e.pdf

QUESTION SIX, HOW CAN DND AND THE CAF IMPROVE THE WAY THEY SUPPORT THE HEALTH AND WELLNESS OF MILITARY MEMBERS? IN WHAT AREAS SHOULD MORE BE DONE?

The Department of National Defence has launched public consultations for the development of a new defence policy for Canada. Canadian Defence Matters is attempting to come up with some answers to the ten questions contained in the public consultation paper.

Question six is “How can DND and the CAF improve the way they support the health and wellness of military members? In what areas should more be done?”

The most common complaint most of the public hear about how military members are being treated relates to the management of Canadian Forces veterans benefits.

As it happens those issues are not within the mandate of the Department of National Defence. Veterans Affairs Canada is the department within the Government of Canada which has the responsibility for the pensions, benefits and services for veterans, retired and still-serving members of the Canadian Forces, as well as their families.

This has been the case since 1928 when the Departments of Pensions and National Health became responsible for caring for ill and injured soldiers returning from that war.  After World War II the volume of soldiers returning home made it clear that the Government of Canada would require a department dedicated to serving ill and injured veterans. This is now Veterans Affairs Canada and at this time it reports directly to a cabinet level minister.

In other words, there is nothing, beyond advocacy, that the DND can do for veterans.

As for serving members of the Canadian Forces it would appear that within the DND “health and wellness” are within the purview of Military Personnel Command.

According to the Defence 101 Presentation found at the Defence policy review the command structure is made up of four commands. They are;

•  Combined Joint Operations Command
• Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
• Military Personnel Command
• Canadian Forces Intelligence Command

The Chief of Military Personnel “provides functional direction/guidance to the Canadian Forces on all military personnel management matters, monitors compliance with Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel management policies, and is accountable for the effective management of the CAF Personnel System”.

According to their website the CMP's current priorities are to:

• To provide Defence Team members of Military Personnel Command with a healthy work environment built on trust and respect for each individual, where everyone is afforded the opportunity to reach their optimal potential;
• To maintain a responsive and flexible personnel generation system through research-based planning, innovative attraction, representative selection, and challenging professional development to produce tomorrow’s warriors and leaders;
• To care for our personnel and their families, in collaboration with our partners and stakeholders, by providing the programs, services and support they need to afford them a rewarding and fulfilling career and assist their transition from military service;
• To recognize the service and sacrifices of all by providing the spectrum of care that is compassionate, agile, and responsive to their needs while responding to those of the Canadian Armed Forces; and
• To enhance the resiliency and well-being of military personnel and families with mission support capabilities by training, equipping and organizing Medical, Dental, Chaplaincy and Personnel Support services.

In other words it is the duty of the Chief of Military personnel and Military Personnel Command to provide “Health and Wellness.”

Therefore it would seem that the way for the DND and the CAF improve the way they support the health and wellness of military members is to take whatever steps are necessary to improve the ability of Military Personnel Command to deliver those services.  Possible they could start with a concentrated attempt to remove as many buzzwords as possible from their ‘mission statement’.

Defence Policy Review

http://jgmjgm516.blogspot.ca/search/label/DEFENCE%20POLICY%20REVIEW

Defence 101 Presentation

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/index.asp

Chief of Military Personnel

 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/chief-military-personnel.page

DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW, QUESTION FIVE: Should the size, structure, and composition for the Canadian Armed Forces change from what they are today?

The Department of National Defence has launched public consultations for the development of a new defence policy for Canada. This includes a Defence Policy Review public consultation paper, a website and even an e-workbook to be filled in.

Canadian Defence Matters is attempting to come up with some answers to the ten questions contained in the public consultation paper. 

Under the general heading “Questions relating to Defence capabilities and the future force, question number five is “should the size, structure, and composition for the Canadian Armed Forces change from what they are today”.

It would be relatively easy to come up with a laundry list of options the government could consider on the issue of how the size, structure, and composition for the Canadian Armed Forces could be changed from what they are today.

Evenly dividing RCN fleet units between the east and west coasts, having six military regions- to reflect geographic and political reality- instead of four, purchasing enough aircraft to allow the RCAF the depth and balance it currently lack, come to mind with no difficulty.

However the consultation paper attempts to put this in context with a section entitled:

UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENTS

” The Royal Canadian Navy consists of approximately 8,600 personnel. The Canadian fleet, divided between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, is composed of 29 warships, submarines, and coastal defence vessels – plus many more auxiliary and support vessels.

The Canadian Army, at approximately 22,600 strong, is based in four regions across Canada. Canada’s land forces operate a range of land combat vehicles, including the Light Armoured Vehicle and Leopard II tanks. They also leverage a range of integrated communications tools to support networked operations.

 The Royal Canadian Air Force, with approximately 13,200 personnel, is located in 13 locations across Canada and operates fighter aircraft, transport aircraft, and search and rescue aircraft – in addition to operating a fleet of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft.

The balance of 23,600 makes up the forces allocated to Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM), Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM), Chief of Military Personnel (CMP), Canadian Forces Health Services Group (CFHSG), and various other organizations that provide operational support.

It would appear that, in general, this is the size, structure, and composition of the Canadian Armed Forces that the government is asking if we need change from what they are today. Or at least it would be if the personnel numbers were accurate.

The figures as quoted above show regular force strength of 68,000. However according to press reports a Defence Department report tabled in the House of Commons shows a shortage of nearly 1,900 regular force members.

Nor do those figures include reservists, who currently have a mandated strength of 27,000 as against an actual strength of 21,707, a shortage of 5.300

 It should be remembered that that the Canadian Armed Forces are made up of both the Regular Force – full-time members who have made military service their career – and the Reserve Force, or part-time members. While Regular Force members are enrolled for a specified term of service, members of the Reserve Force are enrolled for an indefinite period and as such volunteer to keep themselves ready for duty if and when necessary.

It cannot be stressed often enough that a robust and well-trained reserve force is critical to the success of CAF operations. Almost as important is a regular force that is kept at authorized strength.

One way  to insure that our Forces are at authorized strength is to see that monetary compensation, i.e. pay, is disbursed appropriately and with a minimum of the bureaucratic delay so beloved of government service in general and the Armed Forces in particular. Another way is to insure that modern equipment is available in the numbers necessary for realistic training.

So, the way the “size, structure, and composition for the Canadian Armed Forces should be changed from what they are today” is by insuring that those Armed Forces, both regulars and reserves, are maintained at the personnel levels necessary to achieve the goals set for them.

Defence Policy Review Public Consultation Paper

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/docs/defence-policy-review-consultation-paper.pdf

Defence Policy Review

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/index.asp

Have your say: Defence Policy Review 2016

http://www.defenceconsultations.ca/online-workbook

Defence Policy Review

http://jgmjgm516.blogspot.ca/search/label/DEFENCE%20POLICY%20REVIEW

Canadian military losing soldiers at increasing rate as headcount drops to level not seen in years

http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-military-losing-soldiers-at-increasing-rate-headcount-drops-to-level-not-seen-in-years

DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW, QUESTION FOUR: What form should the CAF contribution to peace support operations take? Is there a role for the CAF in helping to prevent conflict before it occurs?

The Department of National Defence has announced that it is launching public consultations in the development of a new defence policy for Canada. This includes a Defence Policy Review public consultation paper, a website and even an e-workbook to be filled in.

Canadian Defence Matters is attempting to come up with some answers to the ten questions contained in the public consultation paper. 

The fourth question asked in the public consultation paper is: What form should the CAF contribution to peace support operations take? Is there a role for the CAF in helping to prevent conflict before it occurs?

According to NATO the term “Peace Support Operations” is now widely used by many civilian agencies to describe their activities in complex humanitarian emergencies. PSOs, as they are called, are multi-functional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally  recognized organisation such as the UN. They involve military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. PSO are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions.

It should be noted that Peace Support Operations include Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian relief. What distinguishes PSO from other military operations is the impartial approach by the Peace Support Force (PSF).  At least in theory PSO are neither in support of, nor against a particular party, but rather are conducted in an impartial and even-handed manner.

 PSO, again at least in theory, are designed to create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can rebuild the infrastructure necessary to create a self-sustaining peace.

As can be seen from the foregoing definition, Peace Support Operations are both complex operations and, of necessity, long term operations. It also becomes clear that military operations are only one part of a multifaceted campaign that involves both government and non-government organizations.

Conflict prevention, although a separate discipline, involves a similarly involved ‘whole of government and beyond’ approach, which could include the Armed Forces, as well as requiring a long term commitment,

All of which suggests that the government should approach the prospect of Peace Support Operations with caution and with the assurance of public support.

Contrary to the much loved image of the Canadian soldier patrolling a notional ‘green line’, in reality the traditional role of the Canadian Armed Forces has been to provide technical and logistic support to peace keeping operations. There is no reason to suppose that this has changed.

 In the publication, UN Peacekeeping Challenge: The Importance of the Integrated Approach, the point was made that the United Nations already has enough infantry pledged from 'Troop-Contributing Countries'. What is needed, the authors point out, is technical assistance from those countries capable of providing it.

The kind of assistance necessary to support international peace keeping in many cases comprise the same kinds of disciplines the Canadian Armed Forces need to exercise to fulfill their mandate to maintain capable combat forces. These specialties include, but are not limited to;

•            providing both long range and shorter range logistic support, from sea-lift capability to C-17’s, and from transport helicopters to trucks,
•      delivering  advanced communications technology while retaining the ability to communicate with civil authorities, NGOs and other  non-military agencies,
•         Offering intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  'sensor platforms'  include reconnaissance satellites, UAVs (of various sizes), and manned aircraft
•          Specialist Land Forces such as military police, disaster assistance relief teams, and even Special Forces.

If Canada and Canadians are willing to embrace the complexities and the time lines that Peace Support Operations call for, then the Canadian Armed Forces can and should train and equip themselves to aid other government, and non-government, agencies in these kinds of campaigns.

Defence Policy Review Public Consultation Paper

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/docs/defence-policy-review-consultation-paper.pdf

Defence Policy Review

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/index.asp

Have your say: Defence Policy Review 2016

http://www.defenceconsultations.ca/online-workbook

Defence Policy Review

http://jgmjgm516.blogspot.ca/search/label/DEFENCE%20POLICY%20REVIEW

NATO Peace Support Operations Doctrine

https://publicintelligence.net/nato-peace-support-operations-doctrine/

United Nations Peacekeeping Challenge The Importance of the Integrated Approach

http://www.academia.edu/10219943/United_Nations_Peacekeeping_Challenge_The_Importance_of_the_Integrated_Approach

DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW, QUESTION THREE, HOW SHOULD CANADA-UNITED STATES COOPERATION ON DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA EVOLVE IN THE COMING YEARS?

The Department of National Defence has announced that it is launching public consultations in the development of a new defence policy for Canada. This includes a Defence Policy Review public consultation paper, a website and even an e-workbook to be filled in.

Canadian Defence Matters is attempting to come up with some answers to the ten questions contained in the public consultation paper. 

The third question asked in the public consultation paper is: How should Canada-United States cooperation on defence of North America evolve in the coming years?

Canadian defence policy has always encompassed the understanding that the defence of Canada inherently included the defence of North America in co-operation with the United States.  It is difficult to imagine any scenario in which we would have to defend Canada without the United States having an interest or participating.

Post 9/11 Mackenzie King’s dictum that “we cannot permit Canadian territory to be used as an avenue of attack on the United States” has taken on new relevance.  There is no question that Canada must work with the United States to protect North America from dangerous elements and the asymmetric means they may employ.

Since its inception in 1957, NORAD has been the cornerstone of Canadian-US cooperation in continental defence. In recent years, however, the United States has changed its concept of continental defence and Canada of necessity must evolve to accommodate those changes.

USNORTHCOM, a US unified command given responsibility specifically for North America as an “area of operational responsibility”, was established by the U.S. on 25 April 2002. NORAD was subsumed by USNORTHCOM which also counts missile defence as part of its mandate.

Canada chose not to participate with the United States in Ballistic Missile Defence, BMD, and thus loosened its ties to, and influence on, NORAD. If Canada were to participate directly in BMD we would reinforce the status of NORAD, strengthen the Canada-US defence relationship, and ensure an element of protection against ballistic missile threats.

There are those who worry that closer cooperation with USNORTHCOM in continental defence will negatively influence Canadian sovereignty and there is no doubt that alliances and defence pacts will always have some effect on national independence. At the same time NORAD experience shows us that national differences can be accommodated within even the closest of alliances.

As David S McDonough has pointed out in his book Canada's National Security in thePost-9/11 World “The post 9/11 arrangements for destruction of high jacked aircraft, whereby Canadian military did not receive the same authority to act in an emergency that the US military had, underlined this. The difference in delegated authority did not itself call NORAD into question. On the contrary, it showed how national sovereignty and air defence could be reconciled within NORAD. The same can be said about the difference in authority the two governments had given CINCNORAD in 1965 to order the engagement with nuclear air defence weapons of single aircraft. Then, too, Ottawa had reserved the authority to itself. In fact, the NORAD arrangements had always involved the two governments giving the CINC different levels and kinds of authority, beginning right with the distinction between operational control and command.”

In 1957 Canadian General Charles Foulkes, one of the founding fathers of NORAD maintained that “NORAD is very efficient for processing of intelligence information regarding the aerospace threat from all sources and operational control of the forces for anti-bomber defence and has also proven a most useful for technical information and planning between Canada and the United States”. There is no reason to believe that this has changed or that we would wish it to.

If we want NORAD to continue as a cornerstone for Canada’s participation in continental defence then we need to learn how to work with USNORTHCOM in a manner that satisfies both countries. That may well include participating with the US in Ballistic Missile Defence.

Defence Policy Review Public Consultation Paper

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/docs/defence-policy-review-consultation-paper.pdf

Defence Policy Review

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/index.asp

Have your say: Defence Policy Review 2016

http://www.defenceconsultations.ca/online-workbook

Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy

https://books.google.ca/books?id=oZEyBNY-RksC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Canada%27s+National+Security+in+the+Post-9/11+World:+Strategy,+Interests,+and+...+By+David+S.+McDonough&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Canada's%20National%20Security%20in%20the%20Post9%2F11%20World%3A%20Strategy%2C%20Interests%2C%20and%20...%20By%20David%20S.%20McDonough&f=false