WHAT NEW FIXED WING SEARCH AND RESCUE AIRCRAFT MEAN FOR THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

On December 8^th of this year, Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan, Public Services and Procurement Minister Judy Foote, and RCAF Commander, LGen Michael Hood announced that the Airbus C-295W is the winning Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue (FWSAR) Aircraft Replacement Project candidate.

From the outset this has always been seen as a contest between the C-295 and the Alenia C-27J Spartan.

During the course of the project and following the report of the National Research Council on the FWSAR Project Statement of Requirements it was decided that rear ramps were a necessity for the successful deployment of SAR Techs and the safe loading of stretcher cases. It can also be argued that the desire for ramps also reflected the FWSAR aircraft's secondary role as tactical transports.

It was widely believed that the C-27J was the RCAF preference, based on a degree of commonality with the in-service CC-130J Hercules and it should be noted, the perception that the Spartan had greater utility as a military transport.

There is no question that the chosen aircraft, the C-295W will be a capable aircraft for Search and Rescue purposes. Equally there is no question that the government has opted for a status-quo response to whole issue of  Search and Rescue and that there is no thought of changing our current Search and Rescue system or of tasking some other government agency with the role.

In the past it was assumed that the RCAF could use its assets, specifically fixed wing aircraft, to aid in Search and Rescue while at the same time maintain a fleet of transports with military utility. In choosing an aircraft for this role that has a lesser military utility the government and the Air Force have signalled that this is no longer the case.

To a certain extent, the tail now wags the dog. While the government should be congratulated for making a decision, any decision, on the FWSAR file, the choice they have made reflects a troubling development.

 In the “Summary Report – The Evaluation of Options for the Replacement of the CF-18 Fighter Fleet” provided by DND the department makes the unusual claim that “Canadian engagement in future state-on-state conflicts will be highly unlikely”. Far more likely, according to this report are military engagements that are not clearly defined and that can choose to take part in “on a case-by-case basis”. They believe that not only will the Government “not be obliged to undertake such a mission” but that “the Government has choices regarding the type, degree and duration of Canada's involvement in, and contribution to, an expeditionary mission.”

Rather than trying to determine what are the threats to Canadian security  and trying to decide how those threats can best be met, within an affordable economic framework, the department has decided that the above description of use of military force as being at the governments discretion means that “The capability-based planning process for the Canadian Armed Forces uses these considerations when deciding what type of capability, if any, is required.”

“What type of capability, if any, is required” appears to be the guiding sentiment behind the choice of the C-295W. While it may be a perfectly good SAR aircraft, it’s more limited utility as a military transport means that using it to replace DHC-5 Buffalo and C-130 Hercules aircraft means that Canada will have less strictly military strength after this project is completed then we did before.

The fond belief that we will always be able to pick and choose our military engagements flies in the face of everything we know of history and common sense.  In the long run, equipping our Armed Forces based on this fallacious belief is a mistake that will be paid for in both treasure and the lives of our service people.

Summary Report – The Evaluation of Options for the Replacement of the CF-18 Fighter Fleet

http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/air/snac-nfps/eorfcf18-eorcf18ff-eng.html

FWSAR AND THE EMBRAER KC-390

 

 It has been recently announced that the
Embraer KC-390 is a candidate for Canada’s Fixed Wing Search and Rescue (FWSAR) program. The reason for this is that the RCAF may change course and consider the purchase of two types of search-and-rescue aircraft instead of one.

The RCAF believe that with a large, long-range, fast aircraft they could maintain their current model of providing Search and Rescue (SAR) services to the north using southern air bases. (Which is rather like providing Search and Rescue service for Vancouver Island from Winnipeg, but let’s not dwell on that, or give anybody any ‘fresh’ ideas) According to this model, smaller, more maneuverable aircraft would provide SAR in appropriate areas.

It’s hard to know where to begin to criticize this option.

From the viewpoint of any kind of national industrial policy it makes no sense at all. The KC-390, sometimes described as “a C-130 killer”, is a product of Embraer, described in Wikipedia as;

“Embraer S.A. is a Brazilian aerospace conglomerate that produces commercial, military, and executive aircraft and provides aeronautical services. Headquartered in São José dos Campos, Embraer is the third-largest commercial aircraft manufacturer in the world.”

Of interest is the description in Wikipedia of Bombardier Aerospace;

“Bombardier Aerospace is a division of Bombardier Inc. and is the third-largest airplane manufacturer in the world after Boeing and Airbus. It is headquartered in Dorval, Quebec, Canada.”

Alert readers will note that both companies are described as being “the third largest aircraft manufacturer in the world”. The reason for this is that the companies are of similar size and are direct competitors in many markets.

It is hard to understand why the Government of Canada, having rejected Bombardier's aircraft offerings for the FWSAR program would help to develop a competing product from a competing foreign company.

Canadian Defence Matters (CDM) has corresponded with the Minister of National Defence on the FWSAR issue. At first, assuming rather cynically, that the purpose of maintaining an RCAF SAR mandate was to acquire more tactical air lift capacity, used C-27 Spartans were advocated. Having been assured by the minister that the only purpose for the aircraft to be acquired was SAR it became obvious that some variant of Bombardier’s Dash 8 Maritime Patrol/Search and Rescue variant was the answer.

CDM was informed that a Review of the Statement of Operational Requirement for the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft by the National Research Council had recommended that a rear ramp was mandatory. Although the DND was not interested in some of the other suggestions contained in the report (for example alternate service providers) the issue of a rear ramp was considered non-negotiable.

After correspondence with Fleet Aviation CDM was assured that as far as they were concerned the Air-Operable Door (AOD) modification they provided, as approved by all other users, was suitable to the task, but had never been trialed by the DND or the National Research Council.

In communications with Bombardier it was made clear that the company saw no point in making modifications to the Dash-8 which would bring it into compliance with the NRC recommendations.

 The current candidates for Canada’s FWSAR program include the C-27J, C295, DHC-5NG, C-130J, KC-390, and the V-22. CDM does not advocate national industrial strategies being followed at the expense of properly equipping the Canadian armed forces. At the same time, if Canadian forces can be appropriately equipped with nationally sourced items it makes no sense not to do so.

It is a symptom of the shambles that FWSAR has become that CDM finds itself in agreement with the Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Rideau Institute.  The FWSAR program has become a textbook study in procurement failure. No matter what aircraft are eventually acquired it may be that the best thing that can come of this fiasco will be for all concerned to learn and apply the lessons being given on how not to buy an airplane.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE C-27J SPARTAN

 

 The C-27J Spartan has been in the news of late and as a prime candidate to fill the Fixed Wing Search & Rescue program we can expect to hear more about it. 

 The C-27J Spartan started off as a perfectly respectable twin engine military cargo plane made in Italy. Originally designed in the 1960’s, The Aeritalia G.222 (formerly Fiat Aviazione now Alenia Aeronautica) evolved over the years into the C-27. Alenia was in alliance with Lockheed-Martin to sell the aircraft as an adjunct to the Hercules transport. The C-130 Hercules is essentially the worlds standard military air lifter.With the same engines and a cockpit featuring a similar layout the two aircraft  were seen as  complementary. Lock-Mart gave up on this idea when they realized that in some markets the Italian product was competing with there own offering. Alenia didn’t give up and with the U.S. firm L-3 Communications as their partner re-branded the product as the C-27J to emphasize its commonality with latest Hercules model, the C-130J.

 In the United States, the U.S. army wanted tactical airlift for its troops. The Army believed that this was not a high priority for the U.S. Air Force which it saw as preferring zoomey high performance jet fighters. The USAF, on the other hand, believed that it was fundamentally wrong for the Army to fly airplanes. The Air Force compromise was that they would purchase and operate the C-27J’s. Everybody happy, especially the folks in the town where Alenia had promised to build the aircraft if the USAF brought the 145 planes the army felt were needed. Even the National Guard was happy as it meant new aircraft and new missions for them. Unfortunately for all, the wars were ended, the budget was cut, and something had to give. It turned out that the Air Force, in its wisdom, felt that the most expendable item in its inventory was the C-27J. On January 26 2012, in a paper entitled “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices” the US Department of Defense announced plans to sell off all C-27Js on order as “their niche capabilities are no longer required”. By cancelling the purchase, and moth balling the aircraft that had already been manufactured they felt they could save a lot of money.

 When U.S. Air Force announced it would end its C-27 program there were twenty-one aircraft involved. Twelve aircraft had been delivered, four were going through their final assembly and testing, and five were in production. It was suggested in some quarters that Canada, as well as some other countries might be able to pick up a good deal on very lightly used C-27J’s from the USAF. Alenia, already stung by the loss of the order, responded to the suggestion by announcing that any of the US aircraft that were resold by the USAF could expect no support at all from the manufacturer.

 In Australia, they were also looking for tactical air lift. The previous aircraft filling the role, the de Havilland Canada built Caribou, had been out of service for some years, but its short take-off and landing (STOVL) capabilities were still missed. On May 10, 2012, even though for all its other sterling attributes the C-27J lacked STOVL abilities, it was announced that:

 “Australia has confirmed that it will obtain 10 Alenia C-27J Spartan tactical transport aircraft for A$1.4 billion ($1.4 billion) through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Mechanism. The C-27J was assessed by Defence as the aircraft which best met all the essential capability requirements and provides the best value for money," Australia's Department of Defence said in a statement. "It was assessed as being able to fly further, faster, higher while carrying more cargo and requiring a smaller runway than the other aircraft under consideration, the Airbus Military C-295."

It should be pointed out here that the Airbus C-295 is also another leading contender for the Canadian Fixed Wing Search & Rescue (FWSR) program. It is a somewhat smaller, somewhat less capable, aircraft with a somewhat smaller price tag. In general countries with money who want more air transport capability have chosen to buy the C-27J. Countries with less money or more specific Search & Rescue requirements have purchased the C-295. It is not considered to be suitable for Search & Rescue in Canada (at least by the RCAF) as it lacks the range and speed called for by a Search and Rescue system based on a few, southern, airfields in a very large country with a very large northern area to cover.

 In Canada, we are looking for an aircraft to fill the Fixed Wing Search & Rescue program.  Canada’s insistence on labelling them as a Search & Rescue aircraft can be a slight embarrassment. As well as replacing aging C-130’s they are also replacing Buffalo aircraft in Canadian service. The original replacement for the Caribou, the de Havilland Canada Buffalo is no longer in production, although the current Canadian licence holder (Viking Canada) has offered to produce an updated model, the Buffalo NG. 

 To see Vikings position check out, http://www.vikingair.com/uploadedFiles/News/News_Item/DHC-5NG%20versus%20C27J%20January%202009.pdf

 The C-27J also suffers from a widely held belief the RCAF has tilted the field in favour of purchasing C-27J’s rather then any other aircraft by tailoring the statement of operational requirements with the object of increasing the possibility that the C-27J would be acquired.

 What the C-27J does provide is air transport. It’s a smaller, slightly cheaper, Hercules. Getting more of that capability is what Air Forces want. There are other alternatives to the C-27J, buying more Hercules aircraft for instance. C-27J’s, however, can be sold to governments on the basis that they are less expensive, and can be seen as filling a variety of roles.

Specifications C-27J  
Data from Alenia Aeronautica C-27J facts

Performance

• Maximum speed: 602 km/h (374 mph; 325 kn)
• Cruising speed: 583 km/h (362 mph; 315 kn)
• Minimum control speed: 194 km/h; 121 mph (105 kn)
• Range: 1,852 km (1,151 mi; 1,000 nmi) with 10,000 kilograms (22,000 lb) payload
• Range at 6,000 kg payload: 4,260 km (2,650 mi; 2,300 nmi)
• Ferry range: 5,926 km (3,682 mi; 3,200 nmi)
• Service ceiling: 9,144 m (30,000 ft)

General characteristics

• Crew: Minimum two: pilot, co-pilot, (plus loadmaster when needed)
• Capacity: 60 troops or 46 paratroops or 36 litters with 6 medical personnel
• Payload: 11,500 kg (25,353 lb)
• Length: 22.7 m (74 ft 6 in)
• Wingspan: 28.7 m (94 ft 2 in)
• Height: 9.64 m (31 ft 8 in)
• Wing area: 82 m² (880 sq ft)
• Empty weight: 17,000 kg (37,479 lb)
• Max takeoff weight: 30,500 kg (67,241 lb)
• Powerplant: 2 × Rolls-Royce AE2100-D2A turboprop, 3,460 kW (4,640 hp) each
• Propellers: 6-bladed Dowty Propeller 391/6-132-F/10, 4.15 m (13 ft 7 in) diameter

SEARCHING FOR SEARCH & RESCUE

Canada needs search and rescue aircraft.  Between long distances, aging aircraft and public displeasure measured in Media reports of SAR failures, we are long overdue for new aircraft and an improved search and rescue organization. Its importance is even higher considering that a new multilateral SAR treaty, a legally binding agreement, commits Canada to meet its Arctic SAR responsibilities. 

Right now the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft (FWSAR) Project is wending its way through the byzantine labyrinth of government and military approval. The favoured aircraft is the Alenia C-27 Spartan, a twin engine military transport with a high degree of commonality to the Hercules C-130J. In fact it has long been believed in some quarters that the RCAF statement of operational requirements for the role was tailored with the object of increasing the possibility that the C-27 would be acquired.

 The other main contender for the role is the EADS CASA C-295, a similar twin-turboprop tactical military transport aircraft manufactured by Airbus Military in Spain. Unfortunately for Airbus the C-27J Spartan is the favoured FWSAR aircraft because it meets requirements for high transit speeds between southern air bases and the Arctic for SAR missions.

 The current model for delivery of Search and Rescue services to the Canadian public revolves around using RCAF aircraft. These aircraft have a dual use. By using military grade cargo aircraft for FWSAR the Air Force improves its military capabilities at the same time that it provides the bulk of our national Search & Rescue assets.  The same model predicates their use from southern bases, an incredibly long distance from Canada’s North. (3500 km, more than the distance from Victoria to Toronto)

  If civilian style cargo aircraft, which are less expensive, were procured by the Armed Forces for the FWSAR program they could meet the requirements for Search and Rescue and save money but they would not provide the airlift capabilities needed by the Armed Forces. If military style cargo aircraft had to be procured by the Forces in addition to Search and Rescue aircraft any savings would be lost. If no military cargo aircraft were procured for the RCAF.  then military capability would be lost.

 This impeccable logic leads directly to the C-27 as the favoured aircraft for the FWSAR program. The logic only holds, however, if one favours the model for Search & Rescue held by the Department of National Defence.  It is considered to be a high profile job for the Armed forces and they would hate to lose it. High profile it may be with the public, but Search and Rescue has seldom been accorded the same priority with the Forces as it has with that public. It is difficult to even ascertain from the Departments website who is responsible for Search & Rescue, other than the senior officer for Canada Command (a headquarters unit soon to disappear).  It might even be said that its importance to the Armed Forces only becomes noticeable when it is suggested that some other agency take the lead in providing the service.

 In many countries much of search and rescue is performed by private companies or government supported volunteers. There are many possible whole of government approaches to providing Search & Rescue services. The Canadian Armed Forces are only part of the puzzle.

  

  One answer is to upgrade Northern Search and Rescue by procuring more, new, Viking Twin Otters for use in the north. They could easily, and far more cheaply, be flown by reserve squadrons.  A small number (four?) C-130 Hercules aircraft could be refurbished with at least two of them being based in rotation in the north. In the south, Government supported volunteers based on the successful U.S. Civil Air Patrol could be complemented by  larger civilian style aircraft run by which ever department of  government  is considered appropriate and using military aircraft as necessary.

 The military should get on with their real job of providing military capability for Canada and leave Search & Rescue to organizations that can treat it as their number one priority.