TANKS FOR THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

 

TANK

As stated in the new government defence policy update (DPU) "Our North Strong and Free", it is now accepted that "main battle tanks continue to have a decisive effect on the modern battlefield and remain key to conducting land operations against conventional militaries with advanced capabilities". Based on this belief the new defence policy states that the government intends to "explore options for upgrading or replacing our tank...fleets". 

One must assume that those who formulated this document felt the need to emphasize the gravity of their message by the use of bold type in the policy report.

So if it is true that the government, and one presumes the Army, really believe that "main battle tanks...have a decisive effect and remain key to conducting land operations " then certain questions are inevitably raised. For example, how best can Canada use tanks to achieve these effects and how many tanks are needed to do it? 

At this time it would not appear that the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) have a clear vision as to how they want to integrate tanks into the brigade structure or how to use them alongside armoured reconnaissance forces for combat against peer forces.

According to Canadian Army Doctrine, tank forces exhibit characteristics which include firepower, protection and mobility. Firepower is usually provided by an accurate large calibre main gun system capable of, among other things, defeating enemy armoured forces. Protection is a dominant characteristic. A tank’s armour enables it to operate in the face of enemy fire.  Mobility, as a characteristic, speaks to both the bold mindset traditionally instilled in armour commanders as much as it does to mechanical performance. Of the tank’s characteristics the most unique are firepower and protection which are generally regarded as the qualities that fully distinguish tank forces from other land elements because of their ability to maneuver and fight when in direct contact with enemy forces.

The role of armoured reconnaissance is different. It acts as a specialized reconnaissance and security element, structured to conduct its primary tasks and capable of fighting for information. Armoured reconnaissance elements are not associated with a specific platform and are defined by their mobility, light protection, communications, firepower and low personnel density. Containing integral combat support elements they can fulfill a variety of combat roles but their primary task is reconnaissance.

In theory the RCAC is currently divided into two streams; tanks and armoured reconnaissance, with approximately 30% of personnel specializing in the former and 70% in the latter.

In fact, even though these are separate roles calling for separate doctrines and in most cases different equipment, training courses at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School train all students on the Leopard 2, Textron Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV) , and LAV VI armoured fighting vehicles in a single unified 14 week course in which students are taught about commanding the crew of a single vehicle on the Leopard 2 MBT, as well as being trained as armoured reconnaissance troop leaders, using the LAV 6 and TAPV.

Currently the RCAC fields a series of armoured subunits: some of which are reconnaissance squadrons and some of which are tank squadrons, all under the overarching umbrella of “armour.” These are separate tasks. To distinguish between them and for the purposes of this argument, it would be better to refer to reconnaissance as a 'cavalry' role while tank forces are designated as 'armour'. What is important to understand is that while tanks can conduct cavalry duties, vehicles which are not tanks can not act as armoured forces. 

The RCAC has struggled with these issues for decades. When left with tanks (obsolescent Centurions) they have called them fire support vehicles, when given fire support vehicles (AVGP Cougars) they have been organized as tanks. When the Cougars were replace by Coyotes, first in service in 1996 for use in the reconnaissance scout role, they were also tasked in the role of medium tank trainer within armoured cavalry squadrons in the same way as the AVGP Cougar it replaced.

Now the Coyotes have been replaced by the Textron TAPV (Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle) which, while a reasonable replacement for the woefully inadequate Mercedes-Benz G-Wagons used in the light reconnaissance role, is a step backward from the 25mm cannon armed Coyotes. Hopefully the addition of suitable numbers of LAV 6 Recce and LAV OPV units will help to redress this issue. 

So, how best can Canada use tanks to meet the goals laid out in the new defence policy, and how many tanks are needed to do it? 

There  are several alternatives for the Canadian Army and their tank force. And while it may seem redundant, but based on previous experience it is still mandatory, to point out that, regardless of which options are chosen, all vehicles assigned to army formations should have appropriate finances allocated to provide suitable spares and maintenance. It would also be a real asset to such a relatively small force to use just one model of whichever tank is being used, rather than the three different models of Leopard 2 tanks currently in use.

They can continue with the present organization. Currently Leopard 2 tanks have been issued to one of the three regiments associated with the three mechanized brigade groups fielded by the regular (full time) forces of the Canadian Army. That unit, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) is attached to 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and based in Edmonton, Alberta. Leopard tanks can also be found at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School based at Gagetown, New Brunswick where, at least in theory, the tank squadrons of the two other RCAC regiments attached to regular force brigade groups can be found.

Minister Blair also noted that a Canadian Army Tank Squadron of 15 Leopard 2A4M tanks, along with supporting personnel and equipment announced in July 2023, recently arrived in Latvia as part of Operation REASSURANCE. The full complement of approximately 130 personnel should be in place by spring 2024.

Properly supported with spares and training, retaining this structure could be accomplished using the Leopard 2 tanks currently in inventory, approximately 70 vehicles. 

Another option, and probably the least expensive, would be to maintain a tank squadron in Latvia while concentrating all other tank units at Gagetown. As well as being cheap, this choice would have the advantage of allowing the army to field a full regiment (battalion) at least occasionally as a training option. 

It would also allow the armoured regiments attached to the regular force to concentrate on the armoured reconnaissance (cavalry) role. Exercising as cavalry regiments (battalions) for the associated brigades would make it possible to determine the best mix of organic support units, such as fire-support, anti-tank and infantry, that should be added to the reconnaissance teams to achieve desired effects. 

The downside of this strategy would be that the regular force brigades would no longer be able to train regularly with organic tank units, although admittedly this opportunity is only available to one brigade currently, so nothing would change for the majority of the army. With one tank squadron in Latvia and four in Gagetown that would be a total of 5 squadrons of 15 tanks or 75 Tanks. This would be the bare minimum number of gun tanks necessary and would not include support vehicles like armoured recovery, engineering and bridging vehicles based, one hopes, on the same chassis.

If, as another example, the Canadian Army were to field one squadron with each mechanized brigade, one squadron in Latvia and two squadrons (for training and in reserve) in New Brunswick at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School that would be a total of 6 squadrons of 15 tanks or 90 tanks. This would be the bare minimum number of gun tanks necessary and would not include support vehicles like armoured recovery, engineering and bridging vehicles based, one hopes, on the same chassis.

In this scenario armoured regiments (battalions) attached to brigades would consist of two squadrons (companies) in the armoured reconnaissance role and one tank squadron.  Suitable fire-support, anti-tank and infantry support for the reconnaissance units would be attached at either the squadron or regimental level as dictated by doctrine developed through exercises. The armoured squadron (tanks) although attached to the regiment for logistics purposes would be seen as a brigade level resource and tasked as such. They would not, except at the brigade commanders discretion, be used as reconnaissance assets.

Of course it is always possible that the Army, and government, could go 'all in' on tanks and purchase enough vehicles to provide a complete regiment (battalion) of tanks for each regular force brigade, to add to the existing armoured reconnaissance regiments (battalions), as well as another regiments (battalion) worth of tanks at armoured school in Gagetown and a squadron in Latvia. As this would involve the purchase and maintenance of over 200 tanks this option, while possibly desirable, seems wildly unlikely.   

Which ever options are chosen, the government appears to have signaled in the DPU that they want the Army to get serious about tanks and tank warfare. To do this properly the Canadian Army is going to have to separate the roles of armoured reconnaissance (cavalry) and armour (tanks) and organize their forces in such a way as to maximize the advantages of these complementary but distinct forces.

NOT A TANK

 The Role of Armoured Reconnaissance Within the  Canadian Army

https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/05/the-role-of-armoured-reconnaissance-within-the-canadian-army.html

Canadian Army Journal 19.3, published December 2022
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2022/mdn-dnd/D12-11-19-3-eng.pdf

Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring 2022
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/PDFs/CMJ222Ep17.pdf

THE RE-TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARMOURED CORPS
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/mdn-dnd/D12-11-17-3-eng.pdf

CAVALRY: AN OPTIMIZED CAPABILITY FOR ADO
https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/317/305/morin.pdf

The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1999

https://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/D12-9-2-4E.pdf

A Perspective on Cavalry: Re-examining the Mounted Arm for the Future

https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/12/a-perspective-on-cavalry.html#operations

A FEW MORE QUESTIONS ABOUT "Our North, Strong and Free" HELICOPTERS, WHAT HELICOPTERS?

In their latest Defence policy "Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence" the government announced that they would " provide the Canadian Armed Forces with the speed and airlift capacity to assert Canada’s sovereignty and respond to natural disasters and emergencies throughout the country, we will acquire a more modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability."

There are several obvious candidates to fill the tactical helicopter role for the Canadian Armed Forces.

One would be the Bell UH-1Y "Venom". The Bell UH-1Y is a twin-engine, medium-sized utility helicopter built by Bell Helicopter as one of the latest members of the numerous Huey family of helicopters, a family which includes the Bell CH-146 "Griffon", the current tactical helicopter used by the Canadian Armed Forces. 

As an evolved version of the aircraft currently in use it would be a natural and comparatively easy transition for pilots and maintainers.  As it is currently in service with the U.S. Marines it can be expected to be in service for many years with spares, upgrades, and even doctrine being easily available. Costs for both initial purchase and maintenance should also be relatively straight forward given U.S. experience.

The other obvious choice to fill the role would be some variant of the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk. In wide spread use in a number of countries as well as the U.S. Army, it is in production with upgrades and spares available for decades to come. Sharing engine commonality with the currently in service Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone it would a safe and cost effective choice.

Another reasonable choice to fill the role of a modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability would be a troop carrying variant of the CH-148 Cyclone. Currently in service with the RCAF, the CH-148 is a military variant of the Sikorsky S-92 designed for shipboard operations, it replaced, after much time and money was spent, the CH-124 Sea King.

The H-92 is the military version of the S-92 from which the CH-148 is derived. In the utility transport role it is capable of carrying 22 troops and can also be configured for specific missions, including search and rescue and executive transportation. The choice of a CH-148 variant to fill the role would bring the commonality of spares, equipment and even training that comes with a bigger fleet. This acquisition, with its concomitant savings, could even include a few aircraft, configured for search and rescue, to augment our hard worked and under resourced CH-149 Cormorant SAR fleet.

A less likely but still viable choice would be to purchase more CH-147 heavy lift helicopters. In 2009, Canada signed a contract for 15 of the F model of the aircraft which, inevitably and at great expense, were extensively modified and upgraded for the Canadian Forces, they were delivered in 2013–2014 with the Canadian designation CH-147F.

While not thought of as a 'tactical' helicopter they are often used as such. More to the point, heavy lift helicopters are almost a national asset, as useful for disaster relief as they are for logistic support, you really can't have enough of them. While such a procurement might seem more expensive, in terms of initial purchase cost, savings would be found in the commonality with an existing fleet and its attendant logistics and training infrastructure.

If a purchase of CH-147 Chinook helicopters was paired with a purchase of Bell 429 'Global Rangers' , the same aircraft in service with the Canadian Coast Guard, to be used as a more economically viable aircraft for the purely utility role, there could be further savings. It doesn't hurt that these useful aircraft are manufactured in Canada.

All of the above would be viable choices for the Government intention to "acquire a more modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability" which they suggest in the new Defence policy is a priority. If the procurement was pursued with any sense of urgency the aircraft could be in service within five years at an affordable price.

This will not happen. In five years the Department of National Defence will announce that they are five years away from an option which involves a bespoke aircraft, highly modified for Canadian use and in service no where else in the world which costs twice as much as any of the above options. They will be mistaken, it will take twice as long as predicted and cost three times more then it should.

This last is not a cynical prediction, based on all previous performance and the lack of any real change in our procurement policies, it is a fact.

A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT "Our North, Strong and Free" LONG RANGE MISSILES

 

In a recent statement the Government of Canada has announced that, among other things they intent to acquire "Long-Range Land Missiles" spending"$2.7 billion over 20 years to acquire long-range missile capabilities to enable our forces to deter threats to Canada from an appropriate distance and reach targets at greater ranges than our adversaries in combat."

As well the new policy announcement states that they intend to "explore options to acquire long-range air- and sea-launched missiles to enable our forces to deter threats to Canada from an appropriate distance and reach targets at greater ranges than our adversaries in combat."

It must be assumed that at least some of these new weapons are going to be Tomahawk cruise missiles made by Raytheon Missiles & Defense in the United States as these are the same weapons previously identified as projected for use on the new Canadian Surface Combatants frigates being built for the R.C.N.

For targeting and navigation Tomahawk missiles use a combination of TERCOM or Terrain Contour Matching in which  a digital representation of an area of terrain is mapped based on digital terrain elevation data or stereo imagery. It is not clear if any branch of the Canadian government, military or civilian can supply such data or imagery.

The missile also uses DSMAC or Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation. To do this a digitized image of an area is mapped. During the flight the missile will verify that the images that it has stored correlate with the image it sees below itself. Based on comparison results the missile's inertial navigation system is updated and the missile corrects its course. Again, it is not clear if any branch of the Canadian government, military or civilian can supply such data or imagery.

Is it possible that the Government of Canada is going to acquire long range cruise missiles, a weapon never before found in our arsenal, that can only be used with the assistance, and hence permission, of a third party?

A new day, a new defence policy, a lot of questions. More to come.