While
it is easy, when discussing the “best frigate for Canada”, to get caught up in
the technical merits of the competing designs or the political considerations
that are inevitable when considering a procurement of this magnitude, a more
important consideration is just what
kind of navy does Canada want to have these frigates for?
According
to the Royal Canadian Navy, “Leadmark 2050 is a discussion
piece encapsulating the Royal Canadian Navy’s long-range vision for the future.
The concepts within it are designed to encourage dialogue and debate about
maritime issues, and to support the important public discussion that is
underway about the kind of naval force Canada needs now, and as we look to
2050.”
The
navy believes that “in an era of
unprecedented and complex interdependency and hence great uncertainty. Leadmark
2050 offers a coherent design for the strategic application of 21st century
Canadian seapower.”
As
articulated in Leadmark 2050 the Navy believes that what it needs to do to is:
•
Protect Canada by exercising Canadian sovereignty in our home waters, securing
the maritime approaches to North America and contributing to maritime peace and
good order abroad.
•
Prevent conflict by strengthening partnerships and deploying forward to promote
global stability and deter conflict.
•
Project Canadian power to shape and, when necessary, restore order to the
global system.
They
intend to achieve these goals by having:
•
A strategically agile and adaptive RCN that anticipates how future conflict is likely
to evolve to drive forward the changes in how we prepare, train, equip and
organize naval forces for future operations.
•
Sailors and officers prepared as warriors and mariners for the complexities and
challenges of future operations, equipped as leaders and managers to guide the
future RCN/Canadian Armed Forces at the tactical, operational and strategic
levels.
•
A broadly balanced, combat-effective fleet, capable of independent action at
sea and able to contribute substantially to operations ashore.
It
is this last goal that can be most easily quantified. What would a “broadly balanced, combat-effective fleet,
capable of independent action at sea and able to contribute substantially to
operations ashore” look like?
It
would be, at least based on the classification system designed by professors
Daniel Todd and Michael Lindberg, be rated as a blue water navy. In recent years The RCN has not been rated
as such.
World Naval Hierarchy, according to the Todd & Lindberg
classification system (c.2015)
|
It
is interesting to note that Canada is the only member of the G7 group of counties that does
not possess a ‘blue water’ navy.
To
achieve even the lowest rank of “Blue water Navies” the R.C.N would have to be
capable of ‘force protection from sub-surface, surface and airborne threats and
a sustainable logistic reach, allowing a persistent presence at range.’ Add to
that the R.C.N.'s desire for the ability to “contribute
substantially to operations ashore”
To
fulfill these functions the navy would need ships with characteristics and in
quantities not currently available. They would have to have afloat logistics
support in the form of ships with greater number and capability then the
current MV Asterix. They would need to have Air Warfare Destroyers
capable of defending naval forces (plus assets ashore) from aircraft and
missile attack. These destroyers would also have to incorporate command and
control functions.
Even
with these assets, which the R.C.N. hopes to acquire, it is not clear how they would
be able to contribute to operations ashore, unless it is intended that the new
platforms include the capability to deploy some form of cruise missiles.
On
paper at least it appears that what the R.C.N wishes to achieve is the ability
to patrol our coast, secure those maritime approaches to North America within
their area of responsibility and, at the same time, maintain a balanced
force of at least squadron strength (i.e. an air defence destroyer, two
frigates, an AOR and possibly a submarine) at sea for an extended period.
It
should be noted here that all these missions would call for significant air
power contributions in the form of patrol aircraft of various sizes and ranges
and ship board helicopters.
It is the fond hope of the government that the
Canadian Surface Combatants will
be “Canada’s major surface component of
maritime combat power. With its effective warfare capability and versatility,
it can be deployed rapidly anywhere in the world, either independently or as
part of a Canadian or international coalition. The CSC will be able to deploy
for many months with a limited logistic footprint.
The CSC will be
able to conduct a broad range of tasks, in various scenarios, including:
·
decisive combat
power at sea and support during land operations
·
counter-piracy,
counter terrorism, interdiction and embargo operations for medium intensity
operations
·
the delivery of
humanitarian aid, search and rescue, law and sovereignty enforcement for
regional engagements”
Operating ships that can perform these
functions will no doubt be very helpful, but Canadians have never been
presented with the analysis that drove the belief that procuring 15 surface
combatants and 2 AOR’s would allow the RCN to achieve their stated goals.
In the final analysis, according to Leadmark 2050, Navies exist so that states may pursue their
national interests in peace and war. Navies are also important symbols, says that same paper, of the state projected onto a global stage.
In the absence of war it is quite possible that a fleet made up of ships that
cannot achieve the objectives assigned to them in a wartime scenario could be
seen, by some, as “important symbols of
the state”. What they might not be is the Blue Water Navy which can achieve all the tasks our maritime
professionals tell us we need and which Canadian taxpayers might think they are
paying for.
Canada in a New Maritime
World LEADMARK 2050
Blue-water navy
What are the G7 and G8?
Asterix joins Canadian Navy fleet after completing trials
Canadian Surface Combatant
