Even among the most amateur of analysts (a group
within which Canadian Defence Matters optimistically includes itself ) any
attempt to assess the current state of the Canadian Armed Forces quickly comes
to the conclusion that the force is under resourced for the roles and
commitments they are expected to fulfil.
The obvious conclusion is that more resources are
necessary and should be provided by the government. Perhaps less obvious is the idea that to
increase the quality of our Defence forces it might be necessary to decrease
their numbers.
If they were given the same amount of financing, the
argument can be made, then having smaller Armed Forces would result in a properly
resourced military capable of fulfilling the roles that could reasonably be
expected of it.
Examples of
how this might work can be found in all branches of National Defence.
The Canadian
Army currently maintains 9 somewhat understrength infantry battalions. Writing
in the “Canadian Army Journal”, issue 16.2 2016, in an article entitled “Organizing Canada’s Infantry”
Major Cole Petersen points out that army has a stipulated establishment of six
mechanized infantry battalions and three light infantry battalions with each,
in theory, comprising three rifle companies, a combat support company and an
administration company. The mechanized infantry battalions are established at
833 personnel but are normally maintained at strength closer to 593 soldiers,
which are considered to be sufficient for training and force generation. The
light battalions have an establishment of 834 personnel all ranks for
employment, but are reduced to 560 personnel in garrison for training purposes.
It is assumed that for operational purposes the empty positions would be filled
through out-of-unit and reserve augmentation.
It is not hard to make the argument that an army
with six full strength infantry battalions is in many circumstances more
capable then a force with nine understrength units inaccurately referred to as
‘infantry battalions’.
Similarly, if the decision was made to use the
finances available to purchase fewer fighter jets than the governments preferred option of 88 aircraft
then it is possible that the result would be the acquisition of better aircraft
with more sustainment resources.
It would not be impossible for the Air Force to be
effective with fewer fighters. One of the key findings in a now deleted Canadian defence report on
Fighter Jets entitled “A Comparative Analysis of Minimum Resource Requirement
for Single and Mixed Fleets for the National Fighter Procurement Evaluation of
Options” was that “Based on reasonable
assumptions, the RCAF can maintain anticipated domestic and international
commitments using a single fleet of 65 fighter aircraft and 90 pilots.”
It should also be noted that from 1961 to 1984
Canada met all its NORAD commitments with a force that never exceeded 66 CF-101 Voodoo aircraft.
The Royal Canadian Navy is currently on track to
receive fifteen new “Canadian Surface Combatants”. These ships are to include ships capable of replacing the Royal
Canadian Navy's Iroquois-class destroyers. These anti-air warfare ships had improved
command, control and communications capabilities in order to make them capable
of acting as task group leaders.
If the navy were to choose instead to only to
replace the 12 Halifax class frigates with new ships of similar general purpose
abilities then the resultant money saved could be used to fund replacements for
the Kingston class coastal defence vessels which do so much valuable work and for which no
replacements are in sight.
While it is true that the Canadian Government has” expressed an interest” in
ordering 12 vessels, which are capable of “conducting coastal surveillance and
patrol operations, as well as search and rescue, law enforcement, resource protection
and fisheries patrols” it is also true that there is currently no cash actually
allocated for this project.
Likewise true is the fact that a navy without anti-air
warfare or command and control capabilities would not be considered a “blue water navy” but, as this
has not been seen to be a problem for the last decade or so, it is possible to
contemplate this state of affairs continuing, especially if it meant that the
navy we get is capable of efficiently doing the tasks we require of it.
While it may seem counter-intuitive to suggest that
we reduce the size of the Canadian Armed Forces there are good reasons to
believe that it is inevitable.
David Perry, writing for the Canadian Global Affairs
Institute, in a paper entitled “Strong,Secure, Engaged So Far” points out that while overall funding
allocations on defence are tracking close to the projected levels outlined in
the government’s defence policy, called Strong, Secure, Engaged, capital
allocations are lagging significantly behind the projection published in June
2017.
Perry suggests that if the new defence
policy is to be implemented as planned it will be necessary to change Canada’s
defence procurement system to enable it to spend procurement money at the rate
projected in Strong, Secure, Engaged.
While there is no doubt that Canada’s defence
procurement system needs radical changes it is also true that the two factors which
should inform major capital expenditures are almost completely absent from
traditional policy debate in Canada. One is the extent to which government
should pay a price premium to have defence capital equipment built domestically
rather than overseas. The other is the degree to which market competition
should be used as a method for equipment procurement.
As long as the prevailing attitudes and structures
remain in place there is no reason to believe that capital expenditures for
major equipment purchases will match either the government’s desires or the
needs of the Canadian Armed Forces, at least as they are presently constituted.
Another key
problem is that the government’s existing defence spending plans are based on
the historically unlikely assumption that the current positive financial
circumstances will continue indefinitely. In reality there will be, as there
always is, a downturn in the national economy. In this case it will be accompanied
by the large debt the current government is accumulating. When this happens
defence spending will be scrutinised, as it always is, for perceived ‘savings’.
In order to
avoid these all too predictable cuts in Defence spending it will be useful to
be able to demonstrate that the Armed Forces, as constituted, represent the
minimum adequate force that can be maintained efficiently.
One obstacle to the idea that we can increase the
effectiveness of the Armed Forces by decreasing its size might, in theory, be
political. To be successful, a policy of lowering of the effective strength of
the Armed Forces would have to be accompanied with a concurrent lessening of
DND commitments. This would mean the government accepting that the country does
not have the level of capabilities they aspire to.
For several reasons this is not as great a problem
as it would appear. It is important to remember, as politicians are all too
aware, that Canadians do not care about defence. No election in living memory
has had its outcome influenced by the defence policies of the parties
contesting them. Perhaps even more important, rather than provide leadership on
this issue, governments don’t care either.
It has become obvious to even the most casual of
observers that the current government does not measure progress in terms of
actual outcomes. In fact it could be argued that they genuinely value rhetoric
over results. It would appear that they
believe that the manner in which they express their intentions actually creates
value. Given that belief system, it
follows that they will have no concerns about the about a loss of capabilities
by the Armed Forces, as long as the general public shows no concern and as long
as the terms “diversity”, “peacekeeping” and “good middle-class jobs” can still
be frequently used in all press releases coming from the Department of National
Defence.
National Defence should accept these realities and
take the initiative to secure the equipment and capabilities that it cannot
afford to lose by preemptively down-sizing now. This would leave them better positioned
for the inescapable budget discussions to come.
ORGANIZING CANADA’S
INFANTRY
Major Cole Petersen, CD
Replacing and
supplementing Canada's fighters
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
MINIMUM RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FOR SINGLE
AND MIXED FLEETS FOR THE
NATIONAL FIGHTER PROCUREMENT EVALUATION
OF OPTIONS
FOCUS ON… THE CF-101
VOODOO
Shipbuilding projects to
equip the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard
Operation CARIBBE 2018
Top Royal Canadian Navy
Procurement Projects: What You Need to Know
A BLUE WATER NAVY FOR
CANADA
Strong, Secure, Engaged So
Far
