On Oct. 29, 2003, Liberal Defence Minister John McCallum and
Lt.-Gen. Rick Hillier announced the end of the country's tank force
According to Lt.-Gen. Hillier, the army's Leopards had served
their purpose and were now of limited use. The vehicle of the future was
instead a LAV III variant, which the
general, an armoured officer, called state-of-the art and a
"war-winner."
"A mobile gun system is
the right vehicle for Canada 's
army and will provide an excellent capability on Canadian Forces
operations," Lt.-Gen. Hillier said. "We
are losing a millstone that has hamstrung our thinking for years,"(emphasis
added), referring to the Leopard tanks.
Flash forward nine years and
we find that the Canadian Forces have acquired 100 Leopard 2A4 tanks from the Netherlands in 2007. Twenty Leopard
2A6Ms were borrowed from Germany
from mid-2007 to support the Canadian deployment in Afghanistan ,
with the first tank handed over after upgrading by KMW on August 2, 2007, and
arriving in Afghanistan
on August 16, 2007. Two Bergepanzer 3
Büffel recovery vehicles were purchased from the German Bundeswehr for use with
the Canadian deployment in Afghanistan . An additional fifteen Leopard 2A4 tanks are
being purchased from Germany
for spare parts. An additional 12
surplus Pz 87 were purchased from Switzerland in 2011 for conversion
to protected special vehicles. (For more on the tortured history of Canada ’s
Leopard 2 acquisitions check out the excellent collection of pages at CASR)
Currently the Canadian Army plans to be able
to deploy 40 combat tanks. The Canadian
Forces want 2 combat-ready squadrons of approximately 20 tanks each: 1 for
deployment and a 2nd for rotation into theater to allow for depot repair and
overhaul of the 1st.
They also need 40 for training. Another 2 squadrons of 20 tanks each
are required for collective and individual training in Canada : individual training at the Combat
Training Centre at CFB Gagetown, New Brunswick ;
and squadron training at CFB Wainwright at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training
Centre in Alberta .
Finally, there are at least
20 key support vehicles such as armored recovery vehicles, which can winch out
stuck tanks, or lift a turret or engine out for repairs.
The Department of National
Defence believes this is the minimum fleet size necessary to support a deployed
tank squadron.
What happened?
Why do we have tanks?
Is there such a thing as a Peace keeping tank?
Just how wrong was Gen. Hillier?
What happened is Afghanistan .
That war highlighted a need for armoured fire support.
Leopard 1 tanks (known in Canadian service confusingly enough as
“Leopard C2’s) still in service, were brought in to fill that need. They were
always seen as a stopgap measure and eventually the Leopard 2’s were purchased
to replace them.
When the Army contemplated
getting rid of tanks they planned to replace them with a variety of direct fire vehicles. The system of
direct fire vehicles contemplated by the army (the mobile gun system, tow
missiles and ADATs, all on LAV platforms) were advertised as being a system to
defeat enemy armour.
The key here is the need to
defeat enemy armour. Although they are a formidable anti-tank system that is
not what Canada ’s
‘new’ tanks are for. The anti-armour mission has decreased in importance as the possibility of Canadian Forces
engaging in front line combat against traditional armies has declined.
Fire support for infantry has
always been the goal, the increasingly complicated nature of modern warfare
dictated that troops have always have powerful organic fire support. The
Leopard 2 tanks provide mobile, protected, accurate fire support. That is why
we have them.
Tanks can be used for peace keeping. They are very intimidating, and
intimidating people is better then killing them, especially in a peacekeeping
situation. Tanks give troops the luxury of time; time to evaluate a situation
while rocks, bottles, bullets and worse bounce off all that heavy armour. Tanks
are accurate; the 120mm high velocity gun on a Leopard 2 is astonishingly
accurate at long ranges under a wide variety of conditions. Hitting what you
want, and just what you want, without danger of ‘collateral’ damage is a
peacekeeping “must have”. The troops inside a tank are surrounded by modern
sensors and hooked into a comprehensive communications network, all the things
necessary to manage and control complex situations. Not the be all and end all
for peacekeeping, but a valuable tool.
In the final analysis Gen.
Hillier was not that wrong. I suspect that what he was concerned about was an
army that was still preparing to fight massed Russian tank forces in Europe . He wanted a more mobile, more flexible force that
could be used in a wide variety of situations.
It’s not whether or not you
have tanks, its how you organize them and how you plan to use them that
matters. Canada ’s
tanks are a powerful addition to our forces, a useful addition to our military ‘insurance’
policy and if used properly a flexible instrument of national policy.