The report, “The Ghost of General Otter: Putting the Canadian Forces Report on Transformation 2011 in
Context” by Andrew Godefroy, published by the Canadian Defence & Foreign
Affairs Institute, November, 2012, is recommended reading, and not just because
it references Sir William Otter, one of Canadian Defence Matters
favourite generals.
The report is a companion
piece to the CDFAI’s report “Defence after the Recession” and adds to
our understanding of the future of the Canadian Armed Forces.
Godefroy makes two excellent
points. First he makes clear the use of the word “transformation” in this
context.
Reorganizations are not
popular. Because of the belief, best summed up by the quote, “We trained hard . . . but it seemed that
every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. I
was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by
reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of
progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization”
(Erroneously attributed to Petronius Arbiter, 210 B.C.) the word itself has
fallen into disrepute. As the report points out” Whereas in the past such plans were more simply known as
‘reorganizations’, in the 21st century DND has given them the much more
Disney-like title of ‘transformation’”.
Needless to say, the Canadian
Armed Forces are not going to transform themselves into a car, or even an
intergalactic robot. What they are doing
is reorganizing in an attempt to save money and retain as many capabilities as
possible with a smaller budget.
This is where the report makes another pertinent observation. The author notes that: “Canadian history
has repeatedly observed that in the absence of War, all military efficiency
studies eventually come to pass.”
This report argues that while
trying instinctively to the same with less (also known in government circles as
“doing more with less”) it is not possible. The author argues that any reorganization
should acknowledge this and not attempt to maintain capabilities at the expense
of corporate abilities and the ability to re-generate those capabilities in the
future when need and budget allow for them.
"At one time in 2010, for example, the CF was simultaneously carrying out five of the six core missions laid out by the government in the Canada First Defence Strategy. In addition to ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan, the CF responded to a sudden humanitarian crisis in Haiti, supported government security initiatives for the 2010 Winter Olympics, maintained its preparations for a response to a terrorist attack, and carried on its daily provision of maritime aerial surveillance and search and rescue capabilities.”
In order to adequately cope
with the coming budgetary shortfall the Armed Forces are going to have to speak
truth to power. They have to tell government and the public that they can no longer
fulfill the full range of services they have attempted to perform in the past with
the budget they have today.
In the past they have essentially
said of their capabilities, “you can have one from column A and 2 from column
B at any time”. In the future the nation must explain that the choice is “one from
column A or two from column B. Unless
you want to mortgage the future capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces you will
have to understand that doing with less means less.”
