James Hasik (1)
has commented on the situation brought to light by KPMG's audit of the Joint Strike
Fighter program (2) as
reported by David Pugliese's article, in Defense News.(3)
In brief, it would appear
that the F-35 to be acquired by the Canadian Forces will not be capable of
“hose & drogue” air-to-air refueling and that as such will not be
compatible with Canada’s
current fleet of aerial tankers. (4)
"...According to Lockheed Martin,
Canada has
conducted a study to examine options for F-35 aerial refueling techniques.
Lockheed Martin officials were not able to say what conclusions the Canadian
study yielded.
Currently, the RCAF employs hose and drogue aerial
refueling provided by CC-130H (T) and CC-150 aircraft. If the F-35A is adopted
without any change, the Canadian way of aerial refueling would not be
compatible. If one assumes Canada
will retain its current aerial tanking technique, the options are to keep the
current F-35A aerial refueling system and add the hose and drogue refueling
piping.
The F-35A apparently has the space to accommodate this
addition; however it would add weight to the aircraft, and would change the
aircraft's center of gravity to some degree. We are unsure what implication the
added weight and change in center of gravity would cause. Additionally, if the
standard F-35A aerial refueling piping is retained, there would be maintenance
required to keep that system functioning, even if it's not used.
If the standard F-35A aerial refueling piping is
removed and only the hose and drogue piping installed, a change in the center
of gravity would again need to be addressed and certified.
Regardless of any of these options, it is unknown what
costs would be associated to such modifications of Canadian jets...." (5)
Hasik goes on to calculate all
the permutations possible in this situation; buying new tankers, reconfiguring
our current tankers, relying on our allies and various schemes for renting
tanker time. He also points out that many countries do without dedicated air to
air tankers.
None of these seem like
practical options. Canada
needs an organic air-to-air refueling ability. It is not just a question of
being able to support operations in our own, large, country. The truth is that
support aircraft are of even more use in coalition actions then aircraft
capable of “kinetic” effects. Anybody can show up at the party with a handful
of fighter-bombers but it will be air refueling and ISR aircraft that make any
actions possible.
To quote from the Department
of National Defences’ web site (6) regarding Operation Mobile, our involvement in Libya;
“Operation Mobile
has been a significant RCAF effort because we’ve been able to do it pretty much
all ourselves,” said Maj. Kettles. “We used the CC-150 tankers to get our jets
here.
“Our CC-150s and the CC-130 Hercules tankers, as well
as other nations’, have fueled our CF-18s throughout the operation. The CP-140
Auroras have
provided intelligence products favoured by NATO, while the CC-177 Globemaster
III has been huge in delivering everything from aircraft parts to equipment,
which has allowed us to sustain our operation.
“These capabilities have allowed us to have a huge
impact within the coalition.”
It would be a serious mistake
for Canada
to overlook these lessons. When the F-35 was first contemplated it was seen in
many ways as an F-16 replacement. (7) In
that light it was assumed that a modification for hose and drogue refueling,
as currently practiced by every Air Force in the world accept the U.S. Air
Force, would be a simple matter. If it is not, if to have the F-35 Canada has
to forgo an air-to-air refueling capability, then it is one more reason not to
purchase the F-35 and one more reason to look for other ways for Canada to
project power.
[1] The Canadian Aerial Refueling Question - 5 January
2013
[3] Canadian Military Would Need To Outsource F-35
Refueling
[5] Canadian F-35 Aerial Refueling Considerations (excerpt
from 'Flying the F-35')
[6] CF-18 pilot flies 50th combat mission during Op
Mobile
