According to Defence Administrative
Orders and Directive # 5002-0, “Military Personnel Requirements and Production”
CAF members are seen as “Canada’s most valuable and most difficult to renew resource in fulfilling the defence mission.” If this is true then
the question must be asked, why do we spend all our time talking about things
and not people?
It may be considered
heretical to suggest, but the emphasis on the capabilities and characteristics
of the various weapons systems and platforms being contemplated for acquisition
by the Canadian Forces is not that important. In other words, with all due
respect to Doug Allen, it
doesn’t matter which is the “best fighter for Canada’, or the best ship, or rifle
or tank or whatever.
Concern about the technical
quality of weapons is not a new phenomenon; however it has reached the level of
obsession in the current age. The belief that warfare can be reduced to a
digitally calculable exercise is common. But the case can be made that it is
not weapons that win wars or battles, but rather the way they are used and the
quality of the troops using them.
A good example of the fallacy
of believing that it is weapons alone that win wars would be the Battle of France.
Also known as the Fall of France, the German invasion of France and the Low
Countries during the Second World War began on May 10th,
1940. The battle, which ended on June
22nd with the signing of an armistice between France
and Germany, resulted in the
German occupation of large parts of France and was unprecedented
success for German forces.
It was commonly believed at
the time that German victories at the beginning of the war sprung from their
development and use of superior armoured fighting vehicles, specifically tanks.
This belief, although widely disputed by historians, is still common.
In fact German tanks were, by
and large, not as advanced or as numerous as those of their opponents. Much of their armour consisted of early model
vehicles which had been designed for training. At that stage of the war the
German Army lacked a heavy combat tank like the French Char B1 or the British
Matilda. In armament and armour allied tanks featured stronger designs and were
more plentiful.
It was how the German army
used the tanks they had which determined the outcome of the battle. German
forces emphasized combined arms tactics which relied on highly mobile offensive
units, with balanced numbers of well-trained artillery, infantry, engineer and
tank formations, all integrated into Panzer divisions. The Panzer divisions
were supported by motorized infantry divisions and used self-contained
logistics, allowing for three or four days of combat.
It was this concentration of
force along with superior command and control which was responsible for the
German victory.
Only a few months later,
during the Battle of Britain which lasted from July until the end of October in
1940 and has been described as the first major campaign to be fought entirely
by air force, the German Luftwaffe failed to realize its objective of achieving
air superiority over the British mainland.
History, some history,
reports that it was “a near run thing”, with the British barely able to hold
out against larger numbers of technologically similar combat aircraft. In point
of fact the British were never in any danger of loosing air superiority over
their own country. While it is true that the German force could have done more
damage, it is also true that they were quite incapable of achieving their goal
of so completely suppressing British air defences that an invasion could have
been undertaken or that the UK
would sue for peace with conditions favourable to the Third Reich.
If one sees it as a contest
between a force that had spent over a decade creating an organization capable
of defending national air space against one designed for the tactical support
of ground forces, as the Luftwaffe was, the results seem more inevitable then
if one simply adds up the aircraft numbers, combat ranges and weapons capacity
of the opposing forces.
It is interesting to note
that in the more the ten years the RAF had been planning for such a situation
they paid little attention to specific aircraft types. They concentrated on
building an air defence organization knowing that, with the speed at which
aviation technology was advancing in those decades, any aircraft they could
conceive of would be obsolete within years. They successfully counted on
industry to provide the right fighters at the right time and concentrated their
efforts on building airfields, command centers and research into detection
systems (radar).
In this case it was not
technology but organization that triumphed. It is also true that in many cases
western, professional, forces have enjoyed a substantial lead in the quality of
their personal over those of their enemies.
The Soviet MiG-15 jet fighter
was first encountered by western pilots in the Korean War. After the first
engagements USAF pilots reported that the performance of the MiG-15 was
superior to all United Nations aircraft, including the USAF's newest plane, the
F-86 Sabre.
In the fall of 1953 Major
Chuck Yeager and Captain Harold "Tom" Collins performed a complete
evaluation of the first Russian MiG-15 to fall into American hands. Testing
revealed that the aircraft was a reasonably good fighter, but lacked the
technological sophistication of American aircraft, such as the F-86. Even after
allowing for such differences Yeager and Collins determined that the MiG-15 and
F-86 were equally capable. Pilot experience and training proved to be the most
important factor during dogfights. In support of this belief is the fact that
while flying the MiG-15 Maj. Yeager consistently defeated Capt. Collins in mock
dogfights. He could also defeat Capt. Collins with equal ease when he was
flying the Sabre against Capt. Collins in the MiG-15.
In the end American pilots
claimed a kill ratio of between 10 and 12 to 1 against enemy fighters during
the Korean War. In fact, although American pilots in their F-86 Sabres fought
well against Chinese and North Korean MiG-15 pilots, a ratio of something
closer to 2:1 appears more likely against Soviet pilots, many of them
experienced veterans of WWII air combat, who flew covertly in the Korean War
also. It’s all about experience, or so it would seem.
As unlikely as it seems many
of the lessons of the War in Vietnam
have already been lost or forgotten. This was a conflict in which technological
dominance played no role in the outcome. The American forces arrayed against
the forces of North Vietnam
and their South Vietnamese allies could not have enjoyed a greater superiority,
and yet the United States
lost that war in every sense of the word lost that matters. They lost to an
enemy which had focused on their strategic objectives and who never confused
tactics with those strategic objectives.
In some ways it was the
military campaigns in Iraq
during the 1990’s and early 2000’s which cemented the belief in the ascendance
of technology as the final arbiter of success in war. In fact western forces
seemed so dominant that it is now popularly believed that the militaries of
other countries can not hope to win against such a force and the only hope of
success comes with the use of so called asymmetric warfare.
Once again the truth lies
somewhere between myth and accepted wisdom. Iraq, and Saddam Hussein, did not
loose their wars because of inferior weapons, they lost them because as General
Schwarzkopf observed “As far as Saddam Hussein being a great military strategist,
he is neither a strategist, nor is he schooled in the operational arts, nor is
he a tactician, nor is he a general, nor is he a soldier.” Iraq lost its
wars with the west because the same thing could accurately be said about his
armies and his generals.
Let me be clear that this is
not an argument in favour of keeping antique weapons in service or for not
purchasing the best material we can afford for our armed forces.
The case that is being made
here is that in a time (and isn’t it always?) of economic stringency for the
Department of National Defence it is important to think about how much of the
budget should be spent on human resources.
What I am saying is that we
must avoid the mistake of saying something like “the individual Canadian soldier
is our most important asset”, and then promptly turn to discussions of which
new wonder ‘app’ we should acquire, even if it becomes necessary to cut troop
levels to afford it.
The point that is being made
is that if something has to be discarded on the altar of fiscal responsibility
let us resolve that what we will not discard is clear policies and
doctrine. Given a choice between
helicopters and training we will choose training. If it comes down to the
latest and greatest ships at the cost of having enough sailors, let us pick
sailors every time. If we can’t, or don’t wish, to afford enough of the most
advanced fighters then lets build organizations that make the most use out the
fighters we do get.
In other words let’s treat CAF
members as “Canada’s most valuable and most difficult to renew
resource in fulfilling the defence mission.”
