It has recently been announced that, at least provisionally, the Type 26 frigate
from BAE Systems has been chosen as the winner of a competition to provide a
design for Canada’s next generation of warships. In keeping with the finest
traditions of Canadian procurement programs this announcement was followed
shortly afterward by a court order
to postpone the award of the $60B contract because the warship design selected may
not meet the stated requirements.
The Department of Defence (DND) and the
government had originally decided that budget constraints necessitated the
selection of a "Military Off-The-Shelf" (MOTS) product to limit the
risk of escalating costs and delays. In such a competition, a government
chooses amongst existing designs. This strategy suggested that a fixed-price
contract for an adaptable MOTS product would be pursued.
As James Hasik has pointed out the Type 26 frigate from BAE Systems is not a
MOTS product. No Type 26s are yet in service anywhere, so the risks and costs
that typically attend the selection of an unproven and untested ship should
have been considered as critical determinants in the competitive process.
At this point it would appear that those doing the
selection have undermined the integrity of the process by choosing a design
which will inescapably multiply the risk, cost and delays to the largest
defence procurement in Canada's history.
Warships are expensive investments in national security.
Today, a multi-purpose frigate can cost more than $2 billion; a price that most
navies find puts constraints on the number of warships which can be procured.
This is particularly true of the Royal Canadian Navy which is restricted by
government edict to ships built in Canadian ship yards at what are, in
international terms, uncompetitive rates.
It has become obvious that Canada will never have
the navy which our military professionals believe we need as long as Canadians
continue to elect governments which will not budget the amounts necessary to
achieve the goals of either self-sufficiency or national security. This is
particularly true of governments who prise political expediency over fiscal
responsibility.
Given that our navy must be built within the narrow
budget allocated for maritime defence the question becomes not “can we build
the navy we need” but rather, “what is the best navy we can get for the money
available”? This means looking at the mix of ships that budget and personal and
politics allow for and deciding which will come closest to achieving the goal
of having sufficient naval forces.
Currently
the government plans to build
15 surface combatants designed to be capable of meeting multiple
threats in both open oceans and complex coastal environments, ensure that
Canada continues to monitor and defend its waters and contribute significantly
to international naval operations. It has been stated that these ships are to
replace the Royal Canadian Navy's Iroquois-class destroyers and Halifax-class
frigates. No coherent rational has ever been given to explain how the number of
frigates deemed necessary was arrived at. The suspicion is that it is simply
the largest number the Navy thought they could get.
The RCN needs more than surface ships however. In order to
meet Canada’s defensive needs, the RCN must have an effective submarine
capacity. Canadian submarine interests can be divided into three categories:
the defence of Canada and North America; supporting Canadian expeditionary
deployments; and supporting Canada’s interest in global maritime stability. In the final
analysis without submarines Canada cannot have the vital maritime situational
awareness as to who is operating in our waters.
According to a 2017 Senate Report
“Submarines are likely to remain the
dominant naval platform for the foreseeable future, and hence are an essential
component of a balanced combat effective navy.” According to that same report “An enhanced submarine capability is vital
for the Royal Canadian Navy. The current fleet of four Victoria-class
submarines is inadequate to provide an effective presence in three oceans and a
much larger fleet is required. Since about one-quarter of any submarine fleet
is often in a scheduled refit or maintenance period, only three out of four
vessels are operational. This modest capability is divided between two coasts.
Moreover, the Victoria-class submarines do not possess an under-ice capability
making them an ineffective instrument in Canada’s Arctic. A modern submarine
fleet will allow Canada to defend its own coasts, sea lanes, ports and harbours
from sea mines and under water threats, while simultaneously contributing to
NORAD and NATO operations in a high readiness state.”
Undeterred by these facts it is reported
that the government has rejected a Commons defence committee recommendation
that the Victoria-class subs be replaced with new submarines capable of
under-ice capabilities. They are quoted as saying that: “The government has also committed to modernizing the four
Victoria-class submarines to include weapons and sensor upgrades that will
enhance the ability of the submarines to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) and deliver necessary improvements of platform and combat
systems to extend operational capability to the mid-2030’s”.
Writing in the Canadian Naval Review Michael Byers has noted that “Instead
of hiding behind another round of refits, the government should face up to the
fact that Canada’s submarine capability is running out of time. As Chief of
Maritime Staff Paul Maddison told the Senate National Security and Defence
Committee in 2012“I would envision
initiating a next-generation submarine discussion within the next three or four
years to ensure there is no gap in submarine capability, which is what we faced
in the 1990s.” In other words, a decision is urgently needed.”
The enforced halt to the Canadian Surface Combatant program may give us
a last chance to reconsider the mix of ships appropriate to Canada’s needs and
budget. In the same article Byers points out that the cost of a modern
submarine is approximately one quarter that of the kinds of frigates Canada is
procuring. This would suggest that by cutting just one or two surface ships
from our current program of record would give Canada a force of up to 8 modern
submarines along with more than a dozen multi-purpose surface warships. Such a
force would appear to be at least as useful as, and much more militarily
effective than, the force we are currently on track to acquire.
Unfortunately submarines are not built in Canada. Nor, after watching Australia’s example, is it
likely that we should wish to do so. It would of course be perfectly possible
to purchase submarines from Western allies and ensure that servicing and
maintenance could be done in Canada by Canadian based companies.
The reason that this is unfortunate is because it has become obvious
that the government regards military procurement programs as job creation programs.
As long as the government and the public are content with this state of affairs
than there is little hope that a rational and balanced naval fleet can be
achieved.
If national security and military
efficiency were ever found to be of use in determining military budgets then maintaining
an increased submarine fleet, even if at the expense of the surface fleet,
would become a valid option.
Lockheed Martin selected as preferred designer for
Canada's next generation of warships
Feds ordered to postpone award of $60B contract because
warship may not meet requirements such as speed
Commentary:
Getting It Right For The RCN And Canadian Taxpayer - By James Hasik
Shipbuilding projects to equip the Royal Canadian Navy
and the Canadian Coast Guard
REINVESTING IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES: A PLAN FOR THE
FUTURE
Canadian Forces says submarines can operate until
mid-2020s - but still no details on how fleet will be upgraded
Canada’s Submarines are Sunk Costs
Michael Byers
$100 billion babies: Defence reveals true cost of new
submarines for taxpayers
Babcock
receives extension to Victoria In-Service Support Contract
