TANK
As stated in the new government defence policy update (DPU) "Our North Strong and Free", it is now accepted that "main battle tanks continue to have a decisive effect on the modern battlefield and remain key to conducting land operations against conventional militaries with advanced capabilities". Based on this belief the new defence policy states that the government intends to "explore options for upgrading or replacing our tank...fleets".
One must assume that those who formulated this document felt the need to emphasize the gravity of their message by the use of bold type in the policy report.
So if it is true that the government, and one presumes the Army, really believe that "main battle tanks...have a decisive effect and remain key to conducting land operations " then certain questions are inevitably raised. For example, how best can Canada use tanks to achieve these effects and how many tanks are needed to do it?
At this time it would not appear that the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) have a clear vision as to how they want to integrate tanks into the brigade structure or how to use them alongside armoured reconnaissance forces for combat against peer forces.
According to Canadian Army Doctrine, tank forces exhibit characteristics which include firepower, protection and mobility. Firepower is usually provided by an accurate large calibre main gun system capable of, among other things, defeating enemy armoured forces. Protection is a dominant characteristic. A tank’s armour enables it to operate in the face of enemy fire. Mobility, as a characteristic, speaks to both the bold mindset traditionally instilled in armour commanders as much as it does to mechanical performance. Of the tank’s characteristics the most unique are firepower and protection which are generally regarded as the qualities that fully distinguish tank forces from other land elements because of their ability to maneuver and fight when in direct contact with enemy forces.
The role of armoured reconnaissance is different. It acts as a specialized reconnaissance and security element, structured to conduct its primary tasks and capable of fighting for information. Armoured reconnaissance elements are not associated with a specific platform and are defined by their mobility, light protection, communications, firepower and low personnel density. Containing integral combat support elements they can fulfill a variety of combat roles but their primary task is reconnaissance.
In theory the RCAC is currently divided into two streams; tanks and armoured reconnaissance, with approximately 30% of personnel specializing in the former and 70% in the latter.
In fact, even though these are separate roles calling for separate doctrines and in most cases different equipment, training courses at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School train all students on the Leopard 2, Textron Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV) , and LAV VI armoured fighting vehicles in a single unified 14 week course in which students are taught about commanding the crew of a single vehicle on the Leopard 2 MBT, as well as being trained as armoured reconnaissance troop leaders, using the LAV 6 and TAPV.
Currently the RCAC fields a series of armoured subunits: some of which are reconnaissance squadrons and some of which are tank squadrons, all under the overarching umbrella of “armour.” These are separate tasks. To distinguish between them and for the purposes of this argument, it would be better to refer to reconnaissance as a 'cavalry' role while tank forces are designated as 'armour'. What is important to understand is that while tanks can conduct cavalry duties, vehicles which are not tanks can not act as armoured forces.
The RCAC has struggled with these issues for decades. When left with tanks (obsolescent Centurions) they have called them fire support vehicles, when given fire support vehicles (AVGP Cougars) they have been organized as tanks. When the Cougars were replace by Coyotes, first in service in 1996 for use in the reconnaissance scout role, they were also tasked in the role of medium tank trainer within armoured cavalry squadrons in the same way as the AVGP Cougar it replaced.
Now the Coyotes have been replaced by the Textron TAPV (Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle) which, while a reasonable replacement for the woefully inadequate Mercedes-Benz G-Wagons used in the light reconnaissance role, is a step backward from the 25mm cannon armed Coyotes. Hopefully the addition of suitable numbers of LAV 6 Recce and LAV OPV units will help to redress this issue.
So, how best can Canada use tanks to meet the goals laid out in the new defence policy, and how many tanks are needed to do it?
There are several alternatives for the Canadian Army and their tank force. And while it may seem redundant, but based on previous experience it is still mandatory, to point out that, regardless of which options are chosen, all vehicles assigned to army formations should have appropriate finances allocated to provide suitable spares and maintenance. It would also be a real asset to such a relatively small force to use just one model of whichever tank is being used, rather than the three different models of Leopard 2 tanks currently in use.
They can continue with the present organization. Currently Leopard 2 tanks have been issued to one of the three regiments associated with the three mechanized brigade groups fielded by the regular (full time) forces of the Canadian Army. That unit, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) is attached to 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and based in Edmonton, Alberta. Leopard tanks can also be found at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School based at Gagetown, New Brunswick where, at least in theory, the tank squadrons of the two other RCAC regiments attached to regular force brigade groups can be found.
Minister Blair also noted that a Canadian Army Tank Squadron of 15 Leopard 2A4M tanks, along with supporting personnel and equipment announced in July 2023, recently arrived in Latvia as part of Operation REASSURANCE. The full complement of approximately 130 personnel should be in place by spring 2024.
Properly supported with spares and training, retaining this structure could be accomplished using the Leopard 2 tanks currently in inventory, approximately 70 vehicles.
Another option, and probably the least expensive, would be to maintain a tank squadron in Latvia while concentrating all other tank units at Gagetown. As well as being cheap, this choice would have the advantage of allowing the army to field a full regiment (battalion) at least occasionally as a training option.
It would also allow the armoured regiments attached to the regular force to concentrate on the armoured reconnaissance (cavalry) role. Exercising as cavalry regiments (battalions) for the associated brigades would make it possible to determine the best mix of organic support units, such as fire-support, anti-tank and infantry, that should be added to the reconnaissance teams to achieve desired effects.
The downside of this strategy would be that the regular force brigades would no longer be able to train regularly with organic tank units, although admittedly this opportunity is only available to one brigade currently, so nothing would change for the majority of the army. With one tank squadron in Latvia and four in Gagetown that would be a total of 5 squadrons of 15 tanks or 75 Tanks. This would be the bare minimum number of gun tanks necessary and would not include support vehicles like armoured recovery, engineering and bridging vehicles based, one hopes, on the same chassis.
If, as another example, the Canadian Army were to field one squadron with each mechanized brigade, one squadron in Latvia and two squadrons (for training and in reserve) in New Brunswick at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School that would be a total of 6 squadrons of 15 tanks or 90 tanks. This would be the bare minimum number of gun tanks necessary and would not include support vehicles like armoured recovery, engineering and bridging vehicles based, one hopes, on the same chassis.
In this scenario armoured regiments (battalions) attached to brigades would consist of two squadrons (companies) in the armoured reconnaissance role and one tank squadron. Suitable fire-support, anti-tank and infantry support for the reconnaissance units would be attached at either the squadron or regimental level as dictated by doctrine developed through exercises. The armoured squadron (tanks) although attached to the regiment for logistics purposes would be seen as a brigade level resource and tasked as such. They would not, except at the brigade commanders discretion, be used as reconnaissance assets.
Of course it is always possible that the Army, and government, could go 'all in' on tanks and purchase enough vehicles to provide a complete regiment (battalion) of tanks for each regular force brigade, to add to the existing armoured reconnaissance regiments (battalions), as well as another regiments (battalion) worth of tanks at armoured school in Gagetown and a squadron in Latvia. As this would involve the purchase and maintenance of over 200 tanks this option, while possibly desirable, seems wildly unlikely.
Which ever options are chosen, the government appears to have signaled in the DPU that they want the Army to get serious about tanks and tank warfare. To do this properly the Canadian Army is going to have to separate the roles of armoured reconnaissance (cavalry) and armour (tanks) and organize their forces in such a way as to maximize the advantages of these complementary but distinct forces.
https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/05/the-role-of-armoured-reconnaissance-within-the-canadian-army.html
Canadian Army Journal 19.3, published December 2022
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2022/mdn-dnd/D12-11-19-3-eng.pdf
Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring 2022
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/PDFs/CMJ222Ep17.pdf
THE RE-TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARMOURED CORPS
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/mdn-dnd/D12-11-17-3-eng.pdf
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1999
Canadian Army Journal 19.3, published December 2022
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2022/mdn-dnd/D12-11-19-3-eng.pdf
Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring 2022
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/PDFs/CMJ222Ep17.pdf
THE RE-TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARMOURED CORPS
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/mdn-dnd/D12-11-17-3-eng.pdf
CAVALRY: AN OPTIMIZED CAPABILITY FOR ADO
https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/317/305/morin.pdf
https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/317/305/morin.pdf
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1999
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/D12-9-2-4E.pdf
https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/12/a-perspective-on-cavalry.html#operations
