Black Swan events are, by definition, low probability events with outsized effects. There is a small but measurable chance that such an event could occur as a result of the wars ongoing in Ukraine and Russia
On August 6 Ukraine launched a surprise incursion with armour and infantry into the Kursk and Belgorod regions involving thousands of troops amounting to 14 brigades.
This invasion surprised western observers, most of whom seem to have missed the historic significance of an invasion of the Kursk region of Russia.
In July 1943 German forces launched Operation Citadel against Soviet forces in the Kursk salient during the Second World War on the Eastern Front that initiated the Battle of Kursk. For the Germans, this campaign, which included the largest tank battle in history, was the final strategic offensive that Germany was to launch on the Eastern Front.
The deliberate defensive operation that the Soviets implemented to repel the German offensive is referred to as the Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation. The extensive loss of men and tanks suffered by the German forces during the operations ensured that the victorious Soviet Red Army enjoyed the strategic initiative for the remainder of the war.
While the significance of this Russian victory of WWII may be lost on some who do not live in the region, it is hard to believe that the implications of an invasion of Russia in this area is not a factor for those directly involved in the current conflict.
One possible, if extremely unlikely, outcome would be the use of nuclear weapons, by Russian forces, to expel the Ukrainian invaders. The question must be asked; has the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons been lowered by the advance of Ukrainian army units into the Kursk region?
If such an admittedly low probability event should occur the effects would be enormous.
Even though all the consequences of the use of such weapons by Russia are hard to assess, it is fair to say that they might not all be negative for the current regime ruling that nation.
It would be difficult for some nations, based on their own current nuclear use policies, to condemn the use of nuclear weapons by Russia on their own soil against an invading army.
As Russia is currently the recipient of a host of economic and political sanctions, there is not much left in this sphere which can be used to punish Russia for flouting international norms.
The effect on other countries adjacent to Russia, those which currently condemn Russian actions in Ukraine, might be seen to be to Russian advantage, i.e. they might moderate their views out of renewed fear of hostilities.
The use of nuclear weapons would have incalculable effects on U.S. politics, but throwing U.S. politics into disarray is never a bad thing from Russia's point of view.
Negative consequences for Russia would involve, among other factors, a general weakening of the universal prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. Offsetting this might be the belief, by Russian leadership, that such risks can be handled, at least in the short term, by a nuclear power.
Of course even more important is not what would happen in response to such an action, but rather what Russian leadership, that is to say Vladimir Putin, believes would happen.
In this regard it should be noted that according to the Institute for the Study of War the Kremlin's response to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has emphasized how the Kremlin's internal priorities have increasingly oriented towards regime stability, especially over the past year.
In the most basic terms, what matters is that if Putin believes the consequence of detonating one or more low yield nuclear weapons, hopefully in such a manner as to limit radioactive fallout, on Russian territory against invading Ukrainian forces is to advance his war aims, protect the borders of greater Russia against all possible enemies for a generation and to solidify his hold on power then the chances of this happening are more then zero.
Western responses in general and Canadian responses in particular to the chances of such an event are limited. Nor is it clear what could be done in the aftermath of the use of nuclear weapons by Russia in Russia.
In advance of such an event Global Affairs Canada could liaise with allies to try and determine what their responses would be. An attempt could be made to reassure partner nations that Canada would not change its policies in the aftermath of the use of nuclear weapons in a European conflict. It is not clear if this is indeed the fact.
After such an event both Global Affairs Canada and the Department of National Defence would have to re-examine many of their assumptions and plans.
Let us hope that this never becomes necessary and that the forgoing commentary is the result of faulty analysis and an overly active imagination.
