KURSK, PAST AND FUTURE-TENSE

Black Swan events are, by definition, low probability events with outsized effects. There is a small but measurable chance that such an event could occur as a result of the wars ongoing in Ukraine and Russia

On August 6 Ukraine launched a surprise incursion with armour and infantry into the Kursk and Belgorod regions involving thousands of troops amounting to 14 brigades.

This invasion surprised western observers, most of whom seem to have missed the historic significance of an invasion of the Kursk region of Russia.

In July 1943 German forces launched Operation Citadel against Soviet forces in the Kursk salient during the Second World War on the Eastern Front that initiated the Battle of Kursk. For the Germans, this campaign, which included the largest tank battle in history, was the final strategic offensive that Germany was to launch on the Eastern Front.

The deliberate defensive operation that the Soviets implemented to repel the German offensive is referred to as the Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation. The extensive loss of men and tanks suffered by the German forces during the operations ensured that the victorious Soviet Red Army enjoyed the strategic initiative for the remainder of the war.

While the significance of this Russian victory of WWII may be lost on some who do not live in the region, it is hard to believe that the implications of an invasion of Russia in this area is not a factor for those directly involved in the current conflict.

One possible, if extremely unlikely, outcome would be the use of nuclear weapons, by Russian forces, to expel the Ukrainian invaders. The question must be asked; has the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons been lowered by the advance of Ukrainian army units into the Kursk region?

If such an admittedly low probability event should occur the effects would be enormous.

Even though all the consequences of the use of such weapons by Russia are hard to assess, it is fair to say that they might not all be negative for the current regime ruling that nation.

It would be difficult for some nations, based on their own current nuclear use policies, to condemn the use of nuclear weapons by Russia on their own soil against an invading army.

As Russia is currently the recipient of a host of economic and political sanctions, there is not much left in this sphere which can be used to punish Russia for flouting international norms.

The effect on other countries adjacent to Russia, those which currently condemn Russian actions in Ukraine, might be seen to be to Russian advantage, i.e. they might moderate their views out of renewed fear of hostilities.

The use of nuclear weapons would have incalculable effects on U.S. politics, but throwing U.S. politics into disarray is never a bad thing from Russia's point of view.

Negative consequences for Russia would involve, among other factors, a general weakening of the universal prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. Offsetting this might be the belief, by Russian leadership, that such risks can be handled, at least in the short term, by a nuclear power.

Of course even more important is not what would happen in response to such an action, but rather what Russian leadership, that is to say Vladimir Putin, believes would happen.

In this regard it should be noted that according to the Institute for the Study of War the Kremlin's response to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has emphasized how the Kremlin's internal priorities have increasingly oriented towards regime stability, especially over the past year.

In the most basic terms, what matters is that if  Putin believes the consequence of detonating one or more low yield nuclear weapons, hopefully in such a manner as to limit radioactive fallout, on Russian territory against invading Ukrainian forces is to advance his war aims, protect the borders of greater Russia against all possible enemies for a generation and to solidify his hold on power then the chances of this happening are more then zero.

Western responses in general and Canadian responses in particular to the chances of such an event are limited. Nor is it clear what could be done in the aftermath of the use of nuclear weapons by Russia in Russia.

In advance of such an event Global Affairs Canada could liaise with allies to try and determine what their responses would be. An attempt could be made to reassure partner nations that Canada would not change its policies in the aftermath of the use of nuclear weapons in a European conflict. It is not clear if this is indeed the fact.

After such an event both Global Affairs Canada and the Department of National Defence would have to re-examine many of their assumptions and plans.

Let us hope that this never becomes necessary and that the forgoing commentary is the result of faulty analysis and an overly active imagination.

A FEW THOUGHTS ON THE RIVER CLASS DESTROYERS

On June 28^th of this year it was announced that construction had officially begun on Canada’s fleet of Canadian Surface Combatants.

 Given that the design and design team contract was originally awarded in February of 2019, the announcement focused largely on federal government messaging about the naming of the class, in the future the CSC will be known as the River-class.

While the Miriam-Webster dictionary defines a destroyer as “a small fast warship used especially to support larger vessels and usually armed with guns, depth charges, torpedoes, and often guided missiles” the Canadian government, in their press release, have defined destroyers as “a powerful and multi-functional ship, that is a fast, maneuverable, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine long-endurance warship, which can escort larger vessels in a fleet, convoy, or carrier battle group and defend them against a wide range of general threats.”

This is a definition which more accurately describes the 8,800 ton displacement, missile armed ship previously know as the Canadian Surface Combatant.

As the Royal Canadian Navy’s next generation combat ship the CSC, or River class destroyers, will replace both the Iroquois class destroyers and the Halifax-class frigates.

While the Iroquois class ships have long been retired, the Halifax class ships, the first of which was launched in 1988, are still in service.  HMCS Ottawa, the most recently built unit of the 12 ship class, was launched in May of 1996. In the year 2050, the currently projected in service date for the last of the River class destroyers, she will be 54 years old.

When in service there were 4 Iroquois class destroyers, with a displacement of 5,100 long tons each, along with the currently serving 12 Halifax class frigates which displace 4,690 long tons each. The total tonnage of all 16 vessels being replace is 76,680 long tons.

 Compare this to the River class destroyers which, at a displacement of over 8,000 long tons each, come to a total of 121,200 long tons for the fifteen ships currently envisioned. 

As a note of interest, the 14 original River class destroyers of WW II fame displaced approximately 1,340 long tons each for a total of 18,760 long tons.

The graphic provided with the announcement indicates that the government in continuing with the choice of the Leonardo 127mm gun rather then the BAE MK 45 as used by our allies. Explanations of this choice have been less then coherent.

It has been noted that there appears to have been a reduction in weapons on the CSC. Originally the RCN appeared to suggest that there would be 32 Missile Vertical Launch Systems on each combatant. Now, that has been reduced to 24. No explanation was provided.

With only 24 VLS systems the River Class will be seriously under-armed by modern AAW destroyer standards, and will likely be one of the expensive in terms of missile cells/launchers by platform cost and size.

 One of the reasons for the loss of VLS tubes is explained by fact sheet published with the June 28 announcement showing  the Rolling Airframe Missile replacing the previously selected CAMM Sea Ceptor for the close in defence role. 

While it is true that there was an overlap between the capabilities of the CAMM and the RIM-162 ESSM Sea Sparrow air defence missiles that are to be carried in some of the VLS launchers, with the loss of CAMM it means that more of the relatively few VLS tubes may have to be devoted to the Sea Sparrow missiles leaving fewer tubes available for other weapons.

Aft of the RAM launcher are two Leonardo Lionfish 30/X 30mm stabilized rapid-fire guns. While having some point defence capabilities it is assumed that the choice of these weapons was also driven by the emerging threats of attack drones, both airborne and naval. 

What is not clear is why it was decided that these weapons were so superior to the BAE Mark 38 25 mm machine gun system currently used on the Canadian Navy's  Harry DeWolf-class offshore patrol vessels that the advantages outweighed the costs of introducing a new and untried weapons system with all its entailed logistic, training and operational costs. 

Of course all of this is speculation. As unlikely as it seems, nobody, including the Navy and the Government, really know exactly what their new warship will look like or how it will be equipped.

It has been reported that government officials acknowledged they don’t have a final cost for the project. It is an indictment of the entire procurement process that is producing these ships that even though ship design started in February 2019 and the preliminary design review was completed in December 2022 they also still don’t have a final design.

 

 

 

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2024/06/construction-begins-for-canadas-new-warship-fleet--the-river-class-destroyers.html

https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/navcom-surfcom-eng.html#a2

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMCS_Ottawa_(FFH_341)

https://www.naval-technology.com/news/canadas-new-river-class-destroyers-begin-construction/

https://vanguardcanada.com/canadas-next-generation-warship-fleet-the-river-class-destroyers-set-sail/

https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/fleet-units/surface/river-class-destroyer/fact-sheet.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_River-class_destroyer

https://jgmjgm516.blogspot.com/2023/10/why-is-canada-procuring-5-inch-naval.html

https://jgmjgm516.blogspot.com/2023/12/does-anyone-really-know-what-is-going.html

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/11/royal-canadian-navy-unveils-new-details-on-csc-frigates/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAMM_(missile_family)#Operators

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-116_Rolling_Airframe_Missile#Service

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aegis_Combat_System#Operators

https://www.espritdecorps.ca/feature/introducing-the-river-class-destroyer-the-rcns-new-warship

SOME "ANSWERS" FROM THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA ABOUT DEFENCE

After posting I'D RATHER HAVE AN AIRFORCE THAN A NATIONAL PHARMACARE PROGRAM Canadian Defence Matters sent an abbreviated version of the post to a variety of politicians, it said;

I believe that as a citizen it is my duty to make my priorities clear to my representatives in government. I am contacting you to with these priorities in mind.

 I am not sure how many people realize that Canada doesn't really have an Air Force.

 We don't have enough transport aircraft to meet our stated needs. We don't have enough search and rescue aircraft for a country this size, nor do we have the numbers of long range reconnaissance/patrol aircraft our lengthy coastlines demand. Many of the helicopters we use are aging and we do not have a viable number of lift helicopters.  Even more important, we don't have the personnel to properly maintain and fly the aircraft we do have. All these shortcomings are most evident, and most troubling, in our fighter fleet.

 The fleet of operational Cf-18 Hornet jet fighters is currently down to about 37 aircraft.  This fleet size is sufficient only to sustain domestic NORAD operations. In fact it has been announced that the RCAF would withdraw from NATO commitments for the foreseeable future. Even more problematic is the lack of pilots and support personnel, which may even lead to the Air Force being unable to fulfill the NORAD alert mission requirements in full. This will only get worse as the F-35 transition gets underway in the coming years. It is more than likely that there will be insufficient personnel to staff both aircraft types, which will likely result in even fewer available CF-18s to meet the alert role.

Aside from the very real threats posed to Canadian security by this situation, what will happen when the United States loses confidence in its northern neighbour to be a stalwart, binational partner? What will happen if the U.S. believes that there is a serious security threat that needs to be met by NORAD and that Canada is not capable of fulfilling our obligations to continental defence?

I believe that there will be real world consequences that will impact Canada negatively. When that happens, when Canadians realize that not having an Air Force have consequences that affect Canadian sovereignty and security, we will blame the politicians for getting us in this mess. 

The politicians will blame the generals and the generals in turn will complain about the politicians. 

The truth is, it will be our fault. Canadian Citizens have not made Defence a priority for their leaders. We have chosen an illusory security and short term gains over real security and long term planning. We have taken the easy way and there will be no one else to blame but ourselves.

So I have decided that the time has come to tell our political leaders something different. If asked in the future I am going to tell anyone who will listen that: 

I'D RATHER HAVE AN AIRFORCE THAN A NATIONAL PHARMACARE PROGRAM

I received replies from James Bezan, the Conservative party shadow minister for National Defence and, eventually, from Pierre Poilievre, leader of the official opposition.

Dear J.G.,

Thank you for taking the time to share your concerns with me regarding our Royal Canadian Air Force.

 

I agree that Canada's Air Force is essentially unable to meet our NORAD and NATO partnership commitments, which degrades our standing amongst our allies who depend on us for binational and multilateral security.

 

Under the Trudeau Liberals, our fighter pilots and technicians have left in droves in response to Liberal politicking with fighter jet procurement. After a naive election promise never to purchase the F-35, Justin Trudeau ran a years long competition only to select the F-35 in the end. In the interim he spent a billion dollars purchasing used jets from Australia as old as our current obsolete fleet. 

 

When Canada finally takes delivery of the F-35 in the mid 2030's, barring further delays, we will not have the staffing necessary to fly or maintain them.  The fault lies at the feet of Justin Trudeau and his contempt for our men and women in uniform. 

 

Conservatives understand that rebuilding our Air Force and the CAF in general will not happen overnight, but we understand the national security implications of allowing our military to further erode. At a time of increased geopolitical instability at levels not seen since the Cold War, and increased great power competition, Conservatives will bring home security for Canadians.

 

Thank you again for sharing your thoughts with me, and for your concern for our Royal Canadian Air Force.

 Sincerely,

James Bezan, MP

Shadow Minister for National Defence

I replied as follows;

James Bezan,

 Thank you for your reply to my email. I appreciate your concern for our armed forces and agree with you that 'politicking' is a key reason for many of the problems we have. Unfortunately, blaming Justin Trudeau personally for all the problems our defence establishment suffers from is just another example of the kind of behavior that has handicapped the Canadian Armed Forces for so long.

 I understand that if you wish to bring in new policies you need to form a government, and I understand that the Liberal Party of Canada has worked long and hard to sell Justin Trudeau as their 'brand leader' so it becomes incumbent upon you, if you wish to attack the brand, to attack the spokesman. But phrases like "Justin Trudeau and his contempt for our men and women in uniform." are not just pointless,(and probably untrue) they suggest that you are more interested in politicking then in dealing with the real problems we face. 

We have real issues with recruiting and retention, getting rid of Justin Trudeau will not create more jobs for spouses of service personnel in places like Cold Lake or Bagotville. It won't help with unaffordable housing or the frequent moves that make military service so unappealing for so many. We have real problems that are going to need hard choices to fix. 

My main point was that I was willing to forgo spending on social problems so as to be able to put more resources into Defence. I know you want to "bring home security for Canadians." but how do you intend to pay for that, where is the money coming from? Find some good answers to those questions and your party is more likely to get my vote in the future.

J.G. Murray

I received the following response.

Dear J.G.,

Thank you for your follow up email. I appreciate your thoughts and concerns. 

I can say that conversations are always happening both at the Standing Committee on National Defence and within the Conservative team about what needs to happen to fix the issues facing the Canadian Armed Forces. Our defence policy and costed platform will be released in due course. Until then, I am unable to share the specifics of what a future Conservative government will do, but rest assured it is front of my mind. 

 

Thank you again for your correspondence. 

James Bezan, MP

Shadow Minister for National Defence

This reply was received from Pierre Poilievre, leader of the official opposition.

Dear J.G. Murray:

On behalf of the Hon. Pierre Poilievre, thank you for your correspondence.  We have noted your concerns regarding the Canadian military and national defence spending.   

After nine years of Trudeau, our military has been gutted and left in a state of disrepair.  Trudeau has failed our Canadian Armed Forces and the men and women who serve.  In 2017, the Liberals released their first Defence Policy document Strong, Secured, Engaged, which proved to be a book of empty promises. They have missed every marker set out by the original defence policy for defence spending.

In fact, this Liberal government has let over $10 billion lapse in the last eight years and recently cut the defence budget by another $1-billion.  Under the Liberals’ watch, we are short almost 16,000 troops this year and a further 10,000 troops are undertrained and undeployable.  After eight years of Trudeau, he has hollowed out our military and only 58% of our forces stand ready to deploy.

Further, Canada’s stature as a trusted and reliable NATO partner has been diminished under this Liberal government.  Last year, the Trudeau government spent 1.29% of our GDP on defence, putting Canada 25th out of 29 NATO members.  Two years after the war in Ukraine began, this borders on negligence.

Our allies no longer take Canada seriously. Under the Liberals watch, our warships are rusting out, our fighter jets are worn out, our army has been hollowed out and we are so short of sailors, soldiers and aircrew that our troops are burnt out.  Entire air squadrons are being shut down because they don't have enough personnel. Our submarines are barely in the water and our warships are aging faster than expected and the Liberals’ plan to replace them is still years away. 

As the world is gripped with Russian aggression, it is more important than ever for our military to have the equipment it needs to protect our vast borders and support our NATO allies.  Conservatives support the commitments Canada has made to NATO, and we must make an effort to meet them.

Common sense Conservatives are the only party that will stand with our troops and ensure they have the equipment and resources they need to do their important work.

Once again, thank you for taking the time to write.

Sincerely,

Correspondence Unit
Office of the Leader of the Official Opposition

I replied as follows;

Correspondence Unit, Office of the Leader of the Official Opposition

 Thank you for responding on behalf of the Hon. Pierre Poilievre. I share your concerns about the Canadian Armed Forces, but it is not clear from your email what you plan to do about the problems you catalogue. If you will recall, the suggestion in my initial correspondence was that I was prepared to forgo some social spending in order to increase spending on the Armed Forces.

  What increases in the budget of the DND do you foresee under a Conservative government?  I would also be interested to know if you plan to fund any increases by way of cuts to other programs or by raising taxes.  Does a Conservative government under Pierre Poilievre expect to reach the NATO target of spending a minimum of 2% of GDP on defence and, if so, do you have a spending plan to achieve that goal?

Thank you again for reaching out, I look forward to hearing from you.

J.G. Murray

In the event that more replies of note are received I will pass them on.

TANKS FOR THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

 

TANK

As stated in the new government defence policy update (DPU) "Our North Strong and Free", it is now accepted that "main battle tanks continue to have a decisive effect on the modern battlefield and remain key to conducting land operations against conventional militaries with advanced capabilities". Based on this belief the new defence policy states that the government intends to "explore options for upgrading or replacing our tank...fleets". 

One must assume that those who formulated this document felt the need to emphasize the gravity of their message by the use of bold type in the policy report.

So if it is true that the government, and one presumes the Army, really believe that "main battle tanks...have a decisive effect and remain key to conducting land operations " then certain questions are inevitably raised. For example, how best can Canada use tanks to achieve these effects and how many tanks are needed to do it? 

At this time it would not appear that the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) have a clear vision as to how they want to integrate tanks into the brigade structure or how to use them alongside armoured reconnaissance forces for combat against peer forces.

According to Canadian Army Doctrine, tank forces exhibit characteristics which include firepower, protection and mobility. Firepower is usually provided by an accurate large calibre main gun system capable of, among other things, defeating enemy armoured forces. Protection is a dominant characteristic. A tank’s armour enables it to operate in the face of enemy fire.  Mobility, as a characteristic, speaks to both the bold mindset traditionally instilled in armour commanders as much as it does to mechanical performance. Of the tank’s characteristics the most unique are firepower and protection which are generally regarded as the qualities that fully distinguish tank forces from other land elements because of their ability to maneuver and fight when in direct contact with enemy forces.

The role of armoured reconnaissance is different. It acts as a specialized reconnaissance and security element, structured to conduct its primary tasks and capable of fighting for information. Armoured reconnaissance elements are not associated with a specific platform and are defined by their mobility, light protection, communications, firepower and low personnel density. Containing integral combat support elements they can fulfill a variety of combat roles but their primary task is reconnaissance.

In theory the RCAC is currently divided into two streams; tanks and armoured reconnaissance, with approximately 30% of personnel specializing in the former and 70% in the latter.

In fact, even though these are separate roles calling for separate doctrines and in most cases different equipment, training courses at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School train all students on the Leopard 2, Textron Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV) , and LAV VI armoured fighting vehicles in a single unified 14 week course in which students are taught about commanding the crew of a single vehicle on the Leopard 2 MBT, as well as being trained as armoured reconnaissance troop leaders, using the LAV 6 and TAPV.

Currently the RCAC fields a series of armoured subunits: some of which are reconnaissance squadrons and some of which are tank squadrons, all under the overarching umbrella of “armour.” These are separate tasks. To distinguish between them and for the purposes of this argument, it would be better to refer to reconnaissance as a 'cavalry' role while tank forces are designated as 'armour'. What is important to understand is that while tanks can conduct cavalry duties, vehicles which are not tanks can not act as armoured forces. 

The RCAC has struggled with these issues for decades. When left with tanks (obsolescent Centurions) they have called them fire support vehicles, when given fire support vehicles (AVGP Cougars) they have been organized as tanks. When the Cougars were replace by Coyotes, first in service in 1996 for use in the reconnaissance scout role, they were also tasked in the role of medium tank trainer within armoured cavalry squadrons in the same way as the AVGP Cougar it replaced.

Now the Coyotes have been replaced by the Textron TAPV (Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle) which, while a reasonable replacement for the woefully inadequate Mercedes-Benz G-Wagons used in the light reconnaissance role, is a step backward from the 25mm cannon armed Coyotes. Hopefully the addition of suitable numbers of LAV 6 Recce and LAV OPV units will help to redress this issue. 

So, how best can Canada use tanks to meet the goals laid out in the new defence policy, and how many tanks are needed to do it? 

There  are several alternatives for the Canadian Army and their tank force. And while it may seem redundant, but based on previous experience it is still mandatory, to point out that, regardless of which options are chosen, all vehicles assigned to army formations should have appropriate finances allocated to provide suitable spares and maintenance. It would also be a real asset to such a relatively small force to use just one model of whichever tank is being used, rather than the three different models of Leopard 2 tanks currently in use.

They can continue with the present organization. Currently Leopard 2 tanks have been issued to one of the three regiments associated with the three mechanized brigade groups fielded by the regular (full time) forces of the Canadian Army. That unit, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) is attached to 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and based in Edmonton, Alberta. Leopard tanks can also be found at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School based at Gagetown, New Brunswick where, at least in theory, the tank squadrons of the two other RCAC regiments attached to regular force brigade groups can be found.

Minister Blair also noted that a Canadian Army Tank Squadron of 15 Leopard 2A4M tanks, along with supporting personnel and equipment announced in July 2023, recently arrived in Latvia as part of Operation REASSURANCE. The full complement of approximately 130 personnel should be in place by spring 2024.

Properly supported with spares and training, retaining this structure could be accomplished using the Leopard 2 tanks currently in inventory, approximately 70 vehicles. 

Another option, and probably the least expensive, would be to maintain a tank squadron in Latvia while concentrating all other tank units at Gagetown. As well as being cheap, this choice would have the advantage of allowing the army to field a full regiment (battalion) at least occasionally as a training option. 

It would also allow the armoured regiments attached to the regular force to concentrate on the armoured reconnaissance (cavalry) role. Exercising as cavalry regiments (battalions) for the associated brigades would make it possible to determine the best mix of organic support units, such as fire-support, anti-tank and infantry, that should be added to the reconnaissance teams to achieve desired effects. 

The downside of this strategy would be that the regular force brigades would no longer be able to train regularly with organic tank units, although admittedly this opportunity is only available to one brigade currently, so nothing would change for the majority of the army. With one tank squadron in Latvia and four in Gagetown that would be a total of 5 squadrons of 15 tanks or 75 Tanks. This would be the bare minimum number of gun tanks necessary and would not include support vehicles like armoured recovery, engineering and bridging vehicles based, one hopes, on the same chassis.

If, as another example, the Canadian Army were to field one squadron with each mechanized brigade, one squadron in Latvia and two squadrons (for training and in reserve) in New Brunswick at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School that would be a total of 6 squadrons of 15 tanks or 90 tanks. This would be the bare minimum number of gun tanks necessary and would not include support vehicles like armoured recovery, engineering and bridging vehicles based, one hopes, on the same chassis.

In this scenario armoured regiments (battalions) attached to brigades would consist of two squadrons (companies) in the armoured reconnaissance role and one tank squadron.  Suitable fire-support, anti-tank and infantry support for the reconnaissance units would be attached at either the squadron or regimental level as dictated by doctrine developed through exercises. The armoured squadron (tanks) although attached to the regiment for logistics purposes would be seen as a brigade level resource and tasked as such. They would not, except at the brigade commanders discretion, be used as reconnaissance assets.

Of course it is always possible that the Army, and government, could go 'all in' on tanks and purchase enough vehicles to provide a complete regiment (battalion) of tanks for each regular force brigade, to add to the existing armoured reconnaissance regiments (battalions), as well as another regiments (battalion) worth of tanks at armoured school in Gagetown and a squadron in Latvia. As this would involve the purchase and maintenance of over 200 tanks this option, while possibly desirable, seems wildly unlikely.   

Which ever options are chosen, the government appears to have signaled in the DPU that they want the Army to get serious about tanks and tank warfare. To do this properly the Canadian Army is going to have to separate the roles of armoured reconnaissance (cavalry) and armour (tanks) and organize their forces in such a way as to maximize the advantages of these complementary but distinct forces.

NOT A TANK

 The Role of Armoured Reconnaissance Within the  Canadian Army

https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/05/the-role-of-armoured-reconnaissance-within-the-canadian-army.html

Canadian Army Journal 19.3, published December 2022
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2022/mdn-dnd/D12-11-19-3-eng.pdf

Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring 2022
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/PDFs/CMJ222Ep17.pdf

THE RE-TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARMOURED CORPS
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/mdn-dnd/D12-11-17-3-eng.pdf

CAVALRY: AN OPTIMIZED CAPABILITY FOR ADO
https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/317/305/morin.pdf

The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1999

https://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/D12-9-2-4E.pdf

A Perspective on Cavalry: Re-examining the Mounted Arm for the Future

https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2022/12/a-perspective-on-cavalry.html#operations

A FEW MORE QUESTIONS ABOUT "Our North, Strong and Free" HELICOPTERS, WHAT HELICOPTERS?

In their latest Defence policy "Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence" the government announced that they would " provide the Canadian Armed Forces with the speed and airlift capacity to assert Canada’s sovereignty and respond to natural disasters and emergencies throughout the country, we will acquire a more modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability."

There are several obvious candidates to fill the tactical helicopter role for the Canadian Armed Forces.

One would be the Bell UH-1Y "Venom". The Bell UH-1Y is a twin-engine, medium-sized utility helicopter built by Bell Helicopter as one of the latest members of the numerous Huey family of helicopters, a family which includes the Bell CH-146 "Griffon", the current tactical helicopter used by the Canadian Armed Forces. 

As an evolved version of the aircraft currently in use it would be a natural and comparatively easy transition for pilots and maintainers.  As it is currently in service with the U.S. Marines it can be expected to be in service for many years with spares, upgrades, and even doctrine being easily available. Costs for both initial purchase and maintenance should also be relatively straight forward given U.S. experience.

The other obvious choice to fill the role would be some variant of the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk. In wide spread use in a number of countries as well as the U.S. Army, it is in production with upgrades and spares available for decades to come. Sharing engine commonality with the currently in service Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone it would a safe and cost effective choice.

Another reasonable choice to fill the role of a modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability would be a troop carrying variant of the CH-148 Cyclone. Currently in service with the RCAF, the CH-148 is a military variant of the Sikorsky S-92 designed for shipboard operations, it replaced, after much time and money was spent, the CH-124 Sea King.

The H-92 is the military version of the S-92 from which the CH-148 is derived. In the utility transport role it is capable of carrying 22 troops and can also be configured for specific missions, including search and rescue and executive transportation. The choice of a CH-148 variant to fill the role would bring the commonality of spares, equipment and even training that comes with a bigger fleet. This acquisition, with its concomitant savings, could even include a few aircraft, configured for search and rescue, to augment our hard worked and under resourced CH-149 Cormorant SAR fleet.

A less likely but still viable choice would be to purchase more CH-147 heavy lift helicopters. In 2009, Canada signed a contract for 15 of the F model of the aircraft which, inevitably and at great expense, were extensively modified and upgraded for the Canadian Forces, they were delivered in 2013–2014 with the Canadian designation CH-147F.

While not thought of as a 'tactical' helicopter they are often used as such. More to the point, heavy lift helicopters are almost a national asset, as useful for disaster relief as they are for logistic support, you really can't have enough of them. While such a procurement might seem more expensive, in terms of initial purchase cost, savings would be found in the commonality with an existing fleet and its attendant logistics and training infrastructure.

If a purchase of CH-147 Chinook helicopters was paired with a purchase of Bell 429 'Global Rangers' , the same aircraft in service with the Canadian Coast Guard, to be used as a more economically viable aircraft for the purely utility role, there could be further savings. It doesn't hurt that these useful aircraft are manufactured in Canada.

All of the above would be viable choices for the Government intention to "acquire a more modern, mobile and effective tactical helicopter capability" which they suggest in the new Defence policy is a priority. If the procurement was pursued with any sense of urgency the aircraft could be in service within five years at an affordable price.

This will not happen. In five years the Department of National Defence will announce that they are five years away from an option which involves a bespoke aircraft, highly modified for Canadian use and in service no where else in the world which costs twice as much as any of the above options. They will be mistaken, it will take twice as long as predicted and cost three times more then it should.

This last is not a cynical prediction, based on all previous performance and the lack of any real change in our procurement policies, it is a fact.